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 ABSTRACT 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Permission To Die: An Examination of the Law and Morality of Battlefield Mercy 
Killing 
By Harry East 
 
‘Requests for battlefield euthanasia have, no doubt, occurred on battlefields 
as  long  as  there  have  been  battlefields.  When  men  have  taken  up  arms 
against  one  another,  for  whatever  reason,  there  have  always  been  those 
wounded  who  do  not  die  immediately,  but  clearly  cannot  live  for  long, 
either because of their wounds or their circumstances. This can generate the 
desire to hasten their inevitable death, by both the wounded soldier as well 
as  their  comrades.  These  situations  have  probably  occurred  throughout 
history.’
1 
 
Mercy killings, those lethal actions carried out to relieve suffering, enacted by soldiers upon 
wounded enemy combatants during and after combat have been evidenced since the earliest 
recordings of armed conflict. An action which was taken from necessity due to inadequate 
medical knowledge and resources and also because of the existence of a less humane, but 
perhaps more practical society, are now considered as a criminal act. However, the act is 
often carried out from compassion and a feeling of sympathy towards the victim. 
 
                                                           
1 J Keegan, R Holmes & J Gau Soldiers: History of Men in Battle (Hamish Hamilton London 1985) 146 Meanwhile, public values, the common law and legislation dealing with euthanasia have all 
developed in the domestic civilian setting.  Mercy killings have traditionally been dealt with 
in  a  confusing  manner  by  the  courts,  using  ill-fitting  doctrines  such  as  diminished 
responsibility to alleviate the criminal stigma placed upon the defendant. In other situations 
the  application  of  the  law  has  created  uncertainty  concerning  the  demarcation  between 
whether an act constitutes murder or manslaughter.  
 
This uncertainty is compounded when the law developed to deal with civilian situations is 
juxtaposed on a mercy killing carried out by a soldier on another combatant in a battlefield 
setting. These situations present circumstances beyond the comprehension of civil domestic 
law. To implement it correctly requires a strained alignment between the pressures facing the 
soldier in combat and the pressures facing the defendant in peacetime, and there is a high 
likelihood that by doing so an injustice shall be served to the soldier and the victim. 
 
The potential trial processes faced by the soldier who has carried out a battlefield coup de 
grace are also questionable. To try the soldier in a civilian court is to place the deliberation of 
his actions into the hands of those who are not his military or cultural peers and who will 
judge  his  actions  in  accordance  with  a  belief  system  contrary  to  those  the  defendant  is 
indoctrinated with through his military training. However, implementing civil criminal law in 
a  court  martial  alongside  military  discipline  offences  for  crimes  which  represent  serious 
operational  misconduct,  creates  conflict  between  which  values  should  be  prioritised.  The 
values of military discipline are in competition with the values of the criminal law. The court 
martial  also  carries  with  it  the  aura  of  unfairness  due  to  its  inherent  bias,  and  there  are 
concerns over its partiality. However, it also offers potentially the best place for the soldier to face trial because the case is deliberated upon by a Board of military personnel, his peers, 
who understand the unique culture of the soldier.  
 
By comparing the professional soldier with medical professionals, who are also involved with 
end of life decision making a better sense of the ‘wrongness’ of the action can be found. In 
the medical context consent can be used to legitimise many actions which may lead to death, 
and even without it the doctor may act in the patient’s best interests in a manner which avoids 
liability but results in death. The practice of double effect allows a physician to deliver pain 
relief even though there is a foreseeable consequence of death. The soldier’s actions exhibit 
many of the same motives but are never legally justified. The comparison serves to change 
the perception of the action, from merely legally wrong to morally legitimate. 
 
Although difficulties exist in arguing that mercy killing actions should be made legal, the 
wider  consideration  of  the  influences  and  behaviours  can  show  that  such  actions  can  be 
morally legitimate and that it is not just to punish the soldier too harshly, nor is it just to hold 
him  to  account  to  laws  which  ill-fit  the  circumstances,  be  they  domestic  criminal  laws, 
international criminal laws or military offence. 
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When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains, 
And the women come out to cut up what remains, 
Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains 
An' go to your Gawd like a soldier. 
 
Rudyard Kipling ‘The Young British Soldier’ (1895) 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
It is one hundred degrees in the shade; you are burdened with fifty pounds of equipment, and 
have just endured a sustained fire fight. Surrounding you are members of a fledgling foreign 
militia. Your charge is to organise and train these troops in order to secure their homeland 
from the insurgent threat that has dogged them for many years. On the ground before you, 
lays a wounded soldier. A soldier like yourself, who has fought bravely, showing the same 
loyalty to his comrades as you have shown to yours. The same devotion, the same battle, but 
a different cause; this man is your adversary, and he has suffered the fate that recently you 
fought hard not to suffer yourself. He is seriously wounded displaying all the hallmarks of 
being caught in a brutal exchange of modern military technology, severe blood loss, exposed 
soft tissue and misshapen appendages. It is almost certain that his affliction is mortal; if by 
some miracle he survives he will never live the life he has previously known or hoped for. 
The atmosphere emanating from the foreign militia is palpably hostile.  You are faced with 
conflicting duties, first, your duty to fulfil the mission prerogatives of your patrol and to 
maintain  the  order  of  the  foreign  troops  whose  hatred  of  the  enemy  is  deep  rooted  and 
seething. You are obliged to uphold the laws of war and set an example to your men, but 
there is another duty, a nagging sentiment lurking in the mire. It is a moral duty to end the 
soldiers suffering, a soldier who like you, shared the same fears of this moment coming to 
pass. Amidst the physical exertions, the mental anguish and the moral dilemma, you have to 
quickly make a choice. Out of compassion, you raise your rifle and fire two bullets into the 
wounded man.  Several weeks later, after the incident has come to light, you are arrested and 
charged with murder. 
 6 
 
Contemplate another scene. A mother enters a nursing home to visit her twenty year old 
severely brain damaged son, he had fallen from an ambulance several months earlier and can 
no longer care for himself or communicate and has no unaided mobility. She checks in under 
a false name because she is banned from visiting him, she has previously attempted to kill her 
son, who she perceives as suffering greatly. She locks herself in his room and produces a 
quantity of heroin and a syringe. She injects her son with a measure of heroin which she has 
been assured will be enough to produce a painless but fatal result. All the while the victim 
remains silent. A short while later she is arrested and charged with the murder of her son. 
 
Finally, consider the life of a young woman in constant pain, her illness is not fatal but it is 
chronically  debilitating,  she  has  been  stranded  in  her  bedroom  since  her  teenage  years, 
suffering  from  severe  Myalgic  Encephalopathy  (ME).  As  a  result,  she  has  to  live  in  a 
darkened  room,  her  bones  are  brittle,  breaking  easily,  she  is  susceptible  to  debilitating 
infections and can never have children. Having been withdrawn from school prematurely, she 
has no friends, peers or social life, except those she meets through the internet, and with 
whom she discusses the possibility of committing suicide. Hers is a story of lost hope of ever 
living  a  normal  life  and  of  recovery.  She  decides  to  kill  herself  via  an  intravenous 
administration  of  painkillers.  However,  halfway  through  the  process  she  is  too  weak  to 
continue. Her mother, a nurse, steps in and administers the last, fatal doses. She too is arrested 
and charged with the attempted murder of her daughter. 
 
All  three  are  true  accounts  of  events  recounting  the  actions  leading  to  a  mercy  killing.
2 
Although representing very different circumstances, relationships among the actors, different 
causes of suffering and the  part which each actor and victim played in their demise, the y 
                                                           
2 These cases respectively run, R v Semrau, which is an unreported Canadian military case, R v Inglis [2010] 
EWCA Crim 2637 and R v Gilderdale [2010] Unreported, which was widely reported in the British media. 7 
 
share two characteristics. All of the protagonists acted from a sentiment of mercy towards the 
victim, and their actions are all considered as murder.  
 
The width of activities the phrase ‘mercy killing’ covers results in uncertainty over how to 
manage the killing. In the first scenario the jury could not return a verdict on the charge of 
murder. In the second the mother was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for murder,
3 and 
in  the  third  the  mother  received  a  conviction  for  assisted  suicide  with  no  term  of 
imprisonment.
4 It is these differing outcomes, circumstances, and practical applications which 
give rise to the investigation carried out in this thesis. 
 
1.1Mercy Killing: Outlining the Conflict Between Mercy and Justice 
 
To understand what is meant by ‘mercy’ here, and to see why enacting a ‘mercy’ killing 
conflicts  with  the  law  and  the  institutional  justice  delivered  under  the  legal  system,  the 
argument should start with the premise that ‘justice is giving people what they deserve’.
5 
From this basis it is argued that a person can deserve mercy; and so justice and mercy, which 
whilst often conflicting, also often occupy the same philosophical space.  This conflict occurs 
because the function of the law is to administer protection or punishment to people in line 
with  social  standards  of  morality  and  which  is  appropriate  to  their  behaviour,  but,  the 
behaviours which can be considered as deserving legal sanctions or not are so numerous that 
there exists no means to design rules which would appropriately cover them all. Hence, the 
law manifests itself in general and cumbersome offences, and focuses on the narrow mental 
                                                           
3 E Grice ‘Is Frances Inglis a cold – blooded killer or a loving mum? The Telegraph (London 22
nd Jan 2010) 
4 Sandra Laville ‘Mercy killing mother cleared of murder after helping seriously ill daughter die’ The Guardian  
(London 25
th January 2010) 
5 Plato The Republic (Translated by Sir Desmond Lee Penguin Classics 2003) 8 
 
element of intent coupled with whether the act was carried out or not. This system is adequate 
to effectively and efficiently deliver the justice people deserve in most, but not all cases. 
6 
 
Sometimes, the application of these generalised offences delivers a justice which is out of 
sync with society’s concept of moral justice, or right and wrong, namely because in applying 
the broad offence to an action, and focusing only on whether the action occurred and whether 
the accused wanted it to occur, it fails to take into account the unique qualities of the act. One 
such act is a battlefield mercy killing, which is committed from compassion and seemingly in 
line with moral justice; that the victim should be spared an agonising or protracted death if at 
all possible, but one in which the actor suffers under the application of the offence of murder 
in accordance with institutional justice. Mercy in this context is a characteristic of those who 
have power to make choices otherwise, for instance the soldier in the battlefield mercy killing 
situation, such as Capt. Semrau, whose actions ran contrary to what was procedurally right 
but still appear morally correct.
7 
 
This thesis argues that the correct method of treating the battlefield mercy killer is to consider 
those wider circumstances that the criminal law does not take into account because of the 
generalised nature of its application. The justice applied in this unique and morally complex 
situation should consider the moral justice as well as the institutional justice that is applicable 
to the soldier. When a person delivers mercy to a person in the form of a mercy killing, very 
often it is because it is considered that no person deserves to die in either mental of physical 
suffering. Moral justice requires that the person’s passing is eased, whilst the institutional 
justice  argues  that  the  act  of  easing  the  person’s  passing  is  prohibited  and  deserves 
punishment on behalf of the perpetrator. This is the central theme of this thesis, that the 
                                                           
6 James Sterba ‘Can a person deserve mercy?’ [1979] Journal of Philosophy 10 11 
7 Claudia Card ‘On Mercy’ [1972] 182 The Philosophical Review 81 83 9 
 
current institutional justice delivered to the mercy killer inadequately represents the moral 
justice that their action deserves. 
 
When a mercy killing is enacted; a killing designed to avoid what would be considered a far 
more brutal or painful  death, it raises a series  of moral conundrums.  Some condemn the 
action on a moral basis, founded in the belief that any killing is wrong. Others refuse to 
morally condemn the action because when the moral context is considered in which the actor 
behaved  the  condemnation  of  his  actions  become  irrelevant.  Others  still  praise  the  good 
intention of the mercy killer in acting to save the victim from a worse fate.
 8   
 
In this thesis, the battlefield mercy killer’s actions are not condemned on the basis that their 
actions can only be understood in context to and with reference to numerous considerations 
and circumstances which brought them to the point of enacting the killing. It is not the stance 
of this thesis to argue that the current law is bad, only that the law is badly applied to the 
soldier under several justice systems which could apply to the soldier and does not take into 
account several key principles which underline the basis of the criminal law. First, that it 
produces an incorrect stigma, second, that it is not proportionate and finally that it does not 
reflect the moral responsibility attributable to the soldier when they ease another combatant’s 
suffering. Without considering these factors the battlefield mercy killer cannot receive justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
8 For the full range of ethical questions which are exposed in such a situation see: Didier Pollefeyt ‘The 
Judgement of the Nazi’s’ in Micheal Beren Baum ed. Murder Most Merciful: Essays on the ethical conundrum 
occasioned by Sigi Zeiring’s ‘The Judgement of Herbert Bierhoff (University Press of America New York) 10 
 
1.2 Fair Treatment for the Battlefield Mercy Killer 
 
‘I believe there are two elements that need to be considered, the moral and 
the legal. Much of the moral issue has already been discussed by previous 
speakers. I do not wish to canvass those views except to say that, whilst we 
speak about freedom of choice in both life and death, it seems to me that 
there is a considerable difference between taking one’s own life and asking 
somebody  else  to  help  one  take  it.  Mercy  killing  is  a  fact  of  war.  For 
example, a soldier may be too badly wounded to be carried and you do not 
wish him to fall in to the hands of the enemy, for obvious reasons. There is a 
difference, however, between that type of behaviour in war and a similar 
type of behaviour, be it mercy killing or euthanasia in peace.’
9 
 
It  is  the  premise  of  this  thesis  that  cases  of  mercy  killing  on  the  battlefield  should  be 
considered differently, morally and legally from domestic cases. It is argued that treating 
these cases similarly to activities explained as ‘domestic’ mercy killings, causes the soldier to 
suffer  an  injustice.  Whilst  fundamentally  the  actors’  motivations  to  alleviate  pain  and 
suffering are similar, the influences affecting the soldier are incomparable to the domestic 
mercy killer. These influences are too far removed from mercy killings taking place in the 
domestic setting, during a time of peace, which the law has developed in accordance with.  
 
Furthermore, unlike the domestic mercy killer, the battlefield mercy killer may be subject to 
Service law and tried in a Service Court Martial. Whilst this form of trial may be more 
contextually  adept,  as  those  deliberating  upon  the  decision  are  all  military  men  like  the 
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defendant, it may also have adverse effects on the type of justice the soldier receives. The 
soldier may be treated more harshly and less fairly than his civilian counterpart because of the 
innate disciplinary aspect of Service law. Following the procedure in service law may also 
trivialise  the  killing  by  marginalising  the  criminal  and  moral  aspect  of  the  act  through 
viewing it as a predominately as a disciplinary concern. 
 
Ultimately, the discussion seeks insight into what the correct ‘justice’ is, not only for the 
mercy killer but also for the act. Only through analysis of the context in which the act takes 
place, the nature of the criminal doctrines, the various legal jurisdictions the mercy killer is 
subject to and identifying the strengths and weaknesses in each, can this be achieved. 
 
1.3 Mercy Killing and the Legal Dilemma  
 
Key to the legal dilemma concerning mercy killings is the difficulty in matching the law to 
the nature of the act. Public opinion tends to differ from the legal view of compassionate 
mercy killings. They  are considered  as acts  of murder, despite the negative connotations 
attached to this criminal label, and this supports the view that successive legislatures have 
‘taken no steps to translate the new morality into the concepts of law.’
10 Seemingly, support 
for mercy killings is stronger when the killing is associated with relieving the indignities of 
protracted and painful dying,
11 and when the law is applied in full force to these situations the 
dilemma is compounded as the rules and the circumstances of the act fail to satisfactorily 
match  each  other.   Murder  and  the  mandatory  life  sentence   which  accompanies  it  are 
unjustifiable in combat related mercy killings for two clear reasons. Neither the punishment 
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nor the conviction corresponds with the moral wrongfulness of the crime, and as such they do 
not deliver the appropriate justice to the battlefield mercy killer or the act itself.
12 
 
In each of the above examples ‘justice’ was administered differently.  Perhaps it is best to say 
that certain types of mercy killings represent ‘gaps’ which the law does not necessarily cover 
appropriately  or  with  certainty.  In  the  three  previous  cases,  the  court  came  to  differing 
conclusions as to the liability of the defendant’s actions; failing to  convict for homicide, 
murder and assisted suicide respectively. There remains uncertainty as to the type of justice 
the mercy killer should receive. 
 
Where the accused is a soldier this uncertainty is compounded by the possible impact Service 
law will have on the proceedings. Unlike the civilian, the soldier is also subject to military 
justice and discipline. His actions are likely to constitute a breach of these standards and 
instigate unique military discipline charges. Furthermore, he will likely be subject to a court 
martial, in which military personnel will deliberate on the case concerning both his civil and 
military offences. The justice distributed by this court could possibly be overly harsh, in order 
to instil discipline, or biased against the criminal charges in order to protect the reputation of 
the armed forces and their personnel. 
 
The justice applied to the mercy killing soldier is dependent on many factors, legal, political, 
and sometimes moral. But whether taking account of these factors delivers the right justice 
for  the  right  reasons  is  questionable.  No  consideration  on  this  topic  is  complete  without 
acknowledging the moral debate surrounding mercy killings, and the moral debate will be 
                                                           
12 W H Hexlion ‘Mercy Killings in Combat: Ending the Suffering of Gravely Wounded Combatants- A Brief 
History,  Applicable  Law,  Recent  Prosecutions  and  Proposals  For  Much  Needed  Change’  available  at 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GefTRDoc?ADA519236 accessed 24/06/2012 13 
 
used to inform the investigation as to what true justice is in a situation which has no specific 
legal rules developed for or pertaining to it. 
 
To  correctly  gauge  the  extent  of  the  soldier’s  ‘criminality’  when  they  enact  a  battlefield 
mercy  killing  their  moral  culpability  is  integral.  This  is  not  to  confuse  moral  and  legal 
concepts of right and wrong,
13 but in acknowledgement that the perception of any act of 
mercy killing, indeed any act, will be tempered in some manner by society’s view of it. Thus 
to come to a conclusion as to the justice attributable to the act, the act must be put in context.  
This is particularly important in a situation, such as a battlefield mercy killing, which has 
evaded any direct interaction with the development of the law and a ‘penumbra of doubt’ 
exists as to its treatment.
14  
 
1.4 The Professional Soldier and Medical Practitioner 
 
Modern, western soldiers might be said to have a professional duty to protect as well as take 
life, as enshrined in the Geneva Convention and specific national standards.
15 They are held 
to professional duties and standards  by which they are expected to adhere when faced with  
life  and  death  situations.  As  such   sometimes  administering  violence  causes   death  and 
sometimes administering violence protects life. 
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‘It  is  axiomatic  that  all  soldiers  must  exercise  the  highest  standards  of 
professionalism….at  all  times to  both  safeguard operational effectiveness 
and also the Army’s reputation.’
16 
 
Physicians  represent  of  another  professional  body  closely  linked  to  end  of  life  decision 
making and actions which operate in accordance to specific standards. Therefore, considering 
the moral and legal frameworks within which doctors operate in end of life situations will 
help widen the view of the soldier’s action, from one emanating simply from sympathy to one 
which has a clear and humane purpose. Physicians must treat those under their care, 
 
‘…with  respect  whatever  their  life  choices  and  beliefs…not  unfairly 
discriminating  against  patients  by  allowing  personal  views  to  affect 
adversely professional relationships with them or the treatment provided or 
arranged.’
17  
 
In a similar vein the soldier is expected to behave in the following manner to all those who 
come under their protection. 
 
‘Respect  for  others  also  extends  to  the  treatment  of  all  human  beings, 
especially  the  victims  of  conflict,  the  dead,  the  wounded,  prisoners  and 
civilians, particularly those we have deployed to help.’
18 
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In the UK, medical practitioners are often the subject of focus in the wider euthanasia debate. 
Accordingly, much of the comparison will focus on the doctrine of double effect, the nature 
of consent and its ability inculpate or exculpate the defendant, and the difference between 
positive acts and omissions in end of life decision making. 
 
1.5 The contextual nature of mercy killings 
 
Mercy killings can only be properly considered within the context in which they occur. In the 
case of the bedridden woman previously described, her mother’s act can be seen as providing 
aid; she completed a task her daughter had initiated and requested help in completing. In the 
case of the handicapped son, the mother acted from a misguided sentiment of care, believing 
that her son’s death was the best outcome for him. Both of these actors can be said to have 
been influenced to behave as they did from ties of love and affection originating from their 
close  familial  relationship,  causing  both  actions  to  take  place  in  an  emotionally  charged 
atmosphere. In the soldier’s case, whilst emotions were undoubtedly high, no relationship 
existed. He did not know the wounded man, but a duty called him to act from mercy, and 
there  existed  a  plethora  of  comparable  circumstances  which  can  be  seen  to  be  just  as 
mitigating as those commonly forwarded in domestic cases, regarding the wrongfulness of his 
action. 
 
To understand these circumstances, military tradition, its brutalising, isolated culture and the 
effect that conflict can have on a soldier’s subjective judgement of wrong and right must be 
contemplated. By contextualising the soldier’s actions, it can be seen that the application of 
domestic  criminal  law  is  inept,  and  that  a  charge  of  or  conviction  for  murder  does  not 
correspond  with  the  wrongfulness  of  the  crime.  Such  a  conviction  is  damaging  for  two 16 
 
reasons, first because of the imposition of a mandatory life sentence and second because of 
the deprecating criminal label it attaches to the convicted. This label, or stigma, is indelibly 
linked to the concept of administering appropriate justice.  To consider what justice both the 
battlefield mercy killer and the act itself deserve requires the attachment of the correct ‘label’ 
to the act and actor. Understanding what stigma is and does will give understanding as to why 
it is wrong to convict the battlefield mercy killer for the crime of murder both generally and 
under the civil criminal law. 
 
1.6 Criminal stigma and the importance of correct labelling in cases of mercy killing 
 
In ancient Greece, ‘stigma’, referred to physical deformities which signified the moral status 
of the possessor, usually inferring that they were morally bad in some way; often the signs, or 
stigma, were cut or burnt into the body as punishments to advertise the bearer as a criminal or 
traitor.  These  persons  were  to  be  avoided,  especially  in  public.
19 Contemporarily,  the 
stigmatised  often  suffer  from  poor  mental  health,  reduced  access  to  education  and 
employment and are affected by a gradual lowering of their social status,
20 and the term is 
applied more to the disgrace that the p erson has committed than any bodily evidence of it. 
Today stigmatisation occurs when ‘some attribute or characteristic conveys a social identity 
that is devalued in a particular social context’.
21 Participating in criminal behaviour can result 
in this devaluing, yet within criminal activity, there are different levels of stigmatisation. It is 
conjectured  that  generally,  rapists  are  regarded  as  morally  worse  than  shop  lifters  and 
instances of thuggery are worse than trespass. Stigmatisation functions to bring about a group 
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desire  for  order  and  conformity.
22  Broad  or  loca l  cultural  values  influence  the  exact 
characteristics an individual must possess and which are irrelevant when being targeted for 
stigma. To be stigmatised is detrimental  to the individual, signifying that the stigmatised 
person has done something beyond the values of the group’s collective morality, and should 
thus be treated accordingly. Most importantly, stigmatisation occurs, apart from to heighten 
individual self-esteem and social identity as an important tool which helps to justify particular 
social, economic and political institutions.
23 For example, the criminal justice system requires 
the phenomenon of stigmatisation in order to act as a deterrent. If people were ambivalent as 
to  how  they  were  labelled,  then  a  significant  part  of  a   criminal  conviction  would  be 
nullified.
24 The negative trait of criminality is founded upon the base structure of the criminal 
justice system, because to be labelled negatively is a deterrent in itself and as such the label is 
a punishment in the same way as the sentence. 
 
The criminal law labels the offender according to the crime committed, some crimes are more 
heinously  detested  than  others;  categorisation   communicates  the  differing  degree  of 
unacceptability of different types of conduct. ‘The label applied to an offence ought fairly to 
represent the offender’s wrongdoing.’
25 Labels should not be misleading as to the convict’s 
degree  of  guilt,  they  should  encapsulate  the  gravity  of  the  behaviour  the  offender  has 
undertaken and thus their moral guilt.
26 Offenders may feel subject to unjust treatment if the 
label attached to their conviction does not represent their ‘real’ guilt, especially considering 
the affect stigmatisation can have on them financially, mentally and socially. Labelling sends 
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a symbolic message, but is sometimes too broad and uninformative as to the offenders true 
behaviour. For this reason, English law does not have a single offence for homicide, but sub 
divides unlawful killings between the offences of murder and manslaughter.
27 However, even 
with  this  sub  division,  convictions  can   sometimes  produce  undesirable  outcomes  by 
suggesting a higher degree of guilt than their actions perhaps warrant. 
 
Consider the imposition of a conviction for murder upon the mercy killer. Murder is generally 
perceived as  a crime  emanating from outright violence and criminal aggres sion that may 
involve elements of spite and hatred.
28 In contrast, the mercy killer acts from sentiments of 
compassion, sympathy and solitude. Murder,  could be said to hold the greatest criminal 
stigma of any crime as it is the only offence in the laws   of  England and Wales which 
demands the imposition of a mandatory life sentence upon conviction. If mercy killings were 
considered as morally wrongful as murder, the majority would agree with stigmatising the 
mercy killer in the same way as the murderer. However, generally this has not been found to 
be the correct manifestation of the public opinion .
29 This claim is further  supported by the 
continual suggestions that mandatory life imprisonment should be abolished and sentencing 
should be left to the discretion of the judge, so that mercy killers receive a more proportionate 
justice.
30 Repeated Bills have been proposed to dema rcate the offences of murder or to 
legalise euthanasia in some instances.
31 Many mercy killers are currently subject to unfair 
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labeling, because the components of their crime do not match the stigmatisation which stems 
from a murder conviction.
32 
 
Often, in  a case of mercy killing, a sentence of manslaughter   by means of diminished 
responsibility has been imposed. But the manslaughter conviction is another broad criminal 
label. It involves those who are responsible for work place accidents, those who have kill ed 
after being provoked, those that are affected by an abnormality of the mind and many others 
who do exhibit the required intention for murder. Of course, arguments exist which support 
murder convictions for any intentional killer as more than just. To  those who uphold the 
sanctity  of  life   as  the  utmost  moral  cons ideration  any  intentional  killing  is  justifiably  
murder.
33 Many other concepts exist justifying the rightness or wrongness of the conviction, 
for instance, a platonic view also supports attaching a murder label to the mercy killer, as it 
states that it is non-adherence to the laws of government that make a man unjust, not the 
nature of his actions.
34 These are issues which shall receive sufficient analysis when dealing 
specifically with the appropriate justice that should be served to the mercy killing soldier  in 
chapter eight. 
 
1.7 The significance of the ‘battlefield mercy killer’ hypothesis 
 
No prosecution has ever taken place in the United Kingdom for actions defined as ‘battlefield 
mercy killings.’ However, prosecutions have taken place against NATO soldiers, in countries 
with  a  common law tradition  and  similar systems  of military justice.  These prosecutions 
involved killings which have taken place in the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan in 
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which British armed forces have been heavily involved. It is conjectured that many acts of 
battlefield mercy killing go unreported, evidenced by the numerous recollections collated in 
this work. However, the potential for prosecutions is rising in tangent to the increased use of 
recording equipment used by the armed forces and individual soldiers. Besides the continual 
presence of increasing numbers of journalists embedded with troops and the use of unmanned 
aerial  drones,
 35 individual  soldiers  now  record  much  of  the  combat  ‘action’  on  portable 
handheld recording devices.
36 
 
In recent years a number of high profile incidents have taken place involving military 
misconduct brought to light through personal recordings and photographs, for instance , the 
mistreatment of Iraq suspects in Abu Ghraib prison,
37 or the desecration of Taliban dead by 
US marines.
38 The use of personal technology makes it easier to evidence such misconduct. 
Likewise, the potential to capture evidence of a battlefield mercy killing or  the act itself is 
increasing which could prompt a case which may suffer from an unjust administration of law 
due to the current legal conflict. However, it is also imaginable that the presence of recording 
equipment or journalists might act as a deterrent to misconduct. 
 
The previously mentioned, Canadian case of battlefield mercy killing is a perfect example 
upon which to base the considerations of this investigation. It shall be used as the primary 
reference to exhibit both  the similar and differing  aspects of a battlefield mercy killing in 
comparison to its do mestic counterpart.  Two US cases wil l also be used as secondary 
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evidence of the behaviour and the legal treatment that different soldiers may receive. Both the 
Canadian and US military justice systems have developed from the system used by the British 
army during its imperial occupation of these territories. For that reason they bear many of the 
characteristics, positive attributes and criticisms of the British system which is the primary 
focus of this work, which makes them ideal examples. 
 
1.8 The case of Captain Robert Semrau 
 
Following the events depicted above, Capt. Robert Semrau was charged on December 31
st 
2009 with two criminal charges and two military charges relating to an incident that took 
place on the 19
th of October 2009. He was charged with one count of second degree murder 
and one count of attempted murder under the Canadian Criminal Code.
39 The military charges 
consisted of one charge each of negligently performing a duty
40 and one of behaving in a 
disgraceful or cruel manner.
41  What exactly happened on that day is still something of a 
mystery and the case report is subject to various confidentiality sanctions. Coupled with this 
Capt. Semrau did not testify at his trial so his motives for acting that day cannot be known for 
certain.
42 However, a clear enough picture can be garnered to allow a detailed analysis. 
 
The Captain was a member of the Royal Canadian Regiment, and was commanding an 
Operational Mentor and Liaison Team. The role  of these groups was to provide practical 
training,  advice  and  oversight  to  the  newly  formed  Afghan  National  Army.  He  was 
accompanied by three other Canadian service personnel and up to thirty Afghan National 
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Army personnel.
43 This team was operating in the Lashkar Gah region of Helmand Province 
when they were ambushed by a force of Taliban insurgents. Air support was calle d and the 
Taliban forces withdrew. It was claimed that as a result of the fire fight over a hundred 
Taliban insurgents were killed.
44 In the aftermath, a dead Talib was found by the members of 
the  Afghan  National  Army  (ANA)  under  Semrau’s  supervision,  and  another,  initially 
presumed dead, was located nearby. This second, wounded person had severe injuries, one 
leg was missing, the foot from the other had also been severed and there was a large gaping 
wound through his torso.
45 Capt. Semrau seemingly determined that nothing could be done 
for the wounded Talib, and  neither his nor  his  dead  comrade’s  body  were  recovered  by 
NATO forces.
46  
 
It is at this point that the influences that affected Captain Semrau’s next action come into play. 
Apparently,  the  body  was  initially  found  by  the  ANA  soldiers,  whom  the  Captain  was 
mentoring. Allegedly, they were kicking, spitting on and insulting the wounded fighter, whilst 
contact had been made with the Afghan Frontier Police who were planning to strangle the 
man.  In  the  words  of  the  superior  officer  of  the  Afghan  soldiers  at  the  scene,  Capt. 
Shafigullah, ‘There was no possibility for him to stay alive that day.’
47 Capt. Semrau came 
across this dilemma, allegedly being told by his Afghan comrades that the soldier should be 
left rather than cared for, his fate being in ‘Allah’s hands.’
48 Semrau asked for all attending to 
disperse, two shots were then fired and then he reappeared. This particular detail is much 
contested. Of the three Canadian soldiers accompanying Semrau on patrol, two claimed that 
they then agreed to cover up the shooting, whilst one claims to remember nothing of the 
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episode.
49 An Afghan interpreter attached to  the patrol claimed he saw the Captain  fire the 
two bullets,
50 Capt. Shafigullah, Capt. Semrau’s ‘best friend’, claimed he was angry because 
Semrau did not consult with him first.
51 Corporal Fournier, a member of the mentoring team, 
claimed that the Captain had told him and the others, ‘you don’t have to see this,’ and after 
the shooting had claimed Semrau told him how he ‘hadn’t expected the shots to go through 
him like that.’
52 Finally, it was alleged that Captain Semrau felt ‘bound by a soldiers pact to 
quickly end the battlefield suffering of the grievously wounded’, be they friend or foe.
53 
 
However,  while  the  court  found  that  Capt.  Semrau  did  indeed  fire  two  bullets  into  the 
insurgent, they could not convict him on the charge of murder or attempted murder because 
the body was never recovered.
54 A military investigation team, returned some months later to 
the sight but found no trace of the body, although they did find two 5.56mm bullet casings, 
identical to those which Semrau’s own weapon would have fired.
55  
 
The only charge that resulted in a conviction was the military offence of disgraceful conduct. 
His punishment was a demotion in rank, from Captain to 2
nd Lieutenant, and to be stripped of 
his  medals  and  decorations  and  dismissed  from  the  Army.  This  was  the  lowest  possible 
punishment  that  the  court  martial  could  administer;  he  was  not  dismissed  with  disgrace, 
which would have negated him ever working for the federal government of Canada again.
56 
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This case presents a veritable smorgasbord of legal and moral discussion. The sentencing 
especially indicates the vagueness of the acceptability of Capt. Semrau’s actions. As stated, 
whilst Semrau’s case was tried in Canada, the similarities between UK common law and the 
Canadian Criminal Code permit comparisons to be drawn. This similarity is especially acute 
concerning the composition of the rules governing military law between the two states. There 
are two other cases, United States v Alban Cardenas
57 and United States v Maynulet,
58 in 
which  the  courts  have  treated  the  defendant’s  differently  and  which  help  highlight  the 
circumstances  in  which  these  types  of  actions  take  place  and  multiple  approaches  taken 
towards them. 
 
The Cardenas case concerned a situation where, in the early hours of 18
th August 2004, Staff 
Sergeant  (SSG)  Cardenas’  platoon  was  conducting  a  security  patrol  in  Baghdad,  Iraq. 
Intelligence indicated that the insurgents were transporting insurgents into Sadr City in dump 
trucks in preparation for an attack. Cardenas’ platoon engaged a dump truck that appeared to 
be throwing out explosive devices. The truck caught fire and rolled to a halt. SSG Cardenas 
section moved to secure the area around the dump truck, and arrived to discover a number of 
dead and wounded Iraqis in and around the vehicle. Cardenas and his companion Sgt. Horne 
began to provide medical assistance to the wounded Iraqis. 
 
Sergeant (Sgt.) Home found an injured Iraqi teenager, Qassim Hassan, in the flames of the 
burning refuse. After moving him to safety he discovered that Qassim’s limbs were burnt 
black, and his abdomen had been eviscerated leaving his organs exposed. Others reported on 
the victim’s condition, 
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58 United States v Maynulet No.04-9847,242-243 (Headquarters, 1
st Armoured Division April 1
st 2004) 25 
 
‘...his torso...pretty much all tore up,[and] his guts laying (sic) on the street, 
covered in blood.’
59 
 
Sgt. Horne informed his officer that he thought Qassim was untreatable, the officer asked 
‘What do you want to do?’ to which Sgt. Home replied, ‘I want to put the guy of out of his 
misery.’ The officer replied ‘If you are going to do it, go ahead, but hurry up.’
60 
 
Horne  then  consulted  with  SSG  Cardenas.  Several  minutes  passed  whilst  first  aid  was 
administered to the other injured Iraqis and the situation in the surrounding environment was 
becoming increasingly hostile. SSG Alban was becoming increasingly concerned about an 
imminent attack and wanted to get his soldiers to a safe area. He approached Sgt. Horne who 
was standing close to Qassim. On seeing the victim’s apparently irreparable condition and the 
terrible pain he was experiencing, he told Sgt. Horne, 
 
‘…were staying too long…shoot the guy and put him out of his misery.’
61 
 
Horne then fired his weapon at Qassim’s chest in order to end his suffering. After two shots 
the  victim  was  still  alive  and  Sgt.  Horne  delivered  another,  to  the  head,  resulting  in  the 
victim’s demise. 
 
At his trial Sgt Horne reiterated that neither he nor Cardenas shot the injured Iraqi from 
malice but,  
 
                                                           
59 n.53 above testimony of Sgt. Devault at 102 
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‘…because  of  the  compassion  we  felt  for  (him)…[and]  because  of  the 
condition that he was in. It’s just not right to let any human just lay there 
and suffer like that… that’s why I did it and I know that's why Sergeant 
Cardenas did it’
62 
 
The  panel  of  military  officers  at  their  court  martial  found  both  guilty  of  unpremeditated 
murder,
63 and both were sentenced to a reduction i n rank to that of private, a bad conduct 
discharge and for Sgt. Cardenas, one year confinement, whilst Sgt. Horne who fired the fatal 
shot received three years confinement. 
 
In United States v Maynulet,
64 Capt. Maynulet was in command of an armoured convey on a 
‘kill or capture’ mission seeking a high value target in the Iraq insurgency near Iraq. They 
established roadblocks, yet the target evaded their capture and a pursuit began in which shots 
were fired at the vehicle. The vehicle crashed and the occupants fled but the driver was 
unresponsive, he had suffered a bullet wound to the back of the head which had removed part 
of his skull leaving exposed brain matter. 
 
Capt. Maynulet ordered his men to pursue the fleeing insurgents and the company medic to 
treat the driver. The medic estimated the victim had lost over one litre of blood, had an inch 
by six inch ‘gaping head wound’ and informed the Captain, ‘There’s nothing I can do for him, 
he isn’t going to make it.’
65 He said it was the worst head wound he had ever seen,
66 and he 
believed the victim would be dead within twenty minutes.
67 
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Presently, word came over the radio that his men had captured the target, who was in need of 
medical assistance. He sent his company medic to treat the target, and subsequently shot the 
injured river twice in the head. At his trial he also stated he did not act out of malice, but from 
respect to the victim’s dignity. 
 
‘He was in a state that I didn’t think was dignified. I had to put him out of 
his misery…It was the right thing to do. I think it was the honourable thing 
to do. I don’t think allowing him to continue in that state would have been 
proper.’
68 
 
The panel of officers at his court martial cleared Capt. Maynulet of assault with intent to 
commit murder, but found him guilty of the lesser offence of assault with intent to commit 
voluntary manslaughter. He was spared a custodial sentence and was merely dismissed from 
service. 
 
These cases evidence modern occurrences of battlefield mercy killings, committed by soldiers 
serving in forces with comparable military justice systems, and help build a picture of the 
mind-set of the defendant, the context within which the killing took place and the differing 
ways  the  law  will  interpret  the  situation.  They,  particularly  Semrau,  will  be  referred  to 
throughout this thesis as a point of focus. 
 
Chapter  one focuses  on the context  in  which battle field  mercy killings  take place. This 
includes historical recollections, and considerations of the nature of war, its violence and also 
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the psyche of the soldier, the military ethos and the bonds forged by brothers in arms. In order 
to portray the markedly different nature of battlefield mercy killings  from their domestic 
counterparts, the unique influences that the soldier faces, from the military indoctrination 
process  and  their  subsequent  exposure  to  the  stresses  of  armed  conflict,  are  discussed 
concerning the potential effect this can have on the soldier. 
 
Chapter two provides an overview of the three branches of law which may affect the soldier’s 
treatment.  Domestic  criminal  law,  service  law  and  international  criminal  law  are  all 
significant and plausible routes to justice and overlap exist between them. The justice that the 
battlefield mercy killer receives in light of each may differ because the stigma attached to the 
differing offences proffered by each is different. For instance, under international criminal 
law the mercy killer could be deemed a war criminal, under domestic law a murderer, and 
under service law they could be subject to various military discipline offences. The chapter is 
aimed at establishing the interplay between each system. 
 
Chapter three involves an analysis of the criminal law and the debate over how mercy killings 
are dealt with in the civilian context. All types of ‘mercy killing’ are illegal in England and 
Wales and can be seen to constitute the crimes of murder, manslaughter or assisted suicide. 
The prohibition stands regardless of who the actors are, whether the victim be a spouse, 
sibling or offspring, or if the offender be a close relative, medical practitioner or a stranger.  
However, as will be demonstrated, the relationship between the defendant and the victim, and 
the defendant’s motive is often crucial to the treatment of the defendant in court.  
 
 The  rightfulness  of  classifying  mercy  killings  as  murder  is  questioned  as  is  the  legal 
sophistry which is used to soften the affect criminal sanctions have on the defendant. The 29 
 
‘inconsistencies and ambiguities associated with the present legal approach’
69 are particularly 
apparent in the court’s use of the doctrine of diminished responsibility and assisted suicide 
which, unlike murder convictions allow for mitigation in sentencing.  It is contended that 
none of these approaches is able to produce justice for the battlefield mercy killer themselves 
or for the action that has taken place. The criminal law has developed to deal with civilian 
issues in peacetime and these already ill-fitting doctrines befit not the soldier acting in times 
of conflict. 
 
Chapter four asks whether the actions of the mercy killing soldier have anything in common 
with the actions of physicians involved in end of life decision making and practices. First, the 
theory of double effect is discussed. Whilst the soldier cannot benefit from the doctrine he 
clearly has much in common with the intention of the physician who seeks to alleviate the 
patient’s  suffering.  Second,  the  absence  of  consent  from  the  victim’s  in  the  cases 
detrimentally alters the morality of the action. This is accentuated when the consent and it’s 
justifications  are considered solely in  relation  to  assaults and other overtly  criminal  acts. 
Understanding when consent is and is not relevant in the medical setting often softens the 
impact the lack of consent has upon the mercy killings righteousness. 
 
Service law is the focus of chapter five. Historically, the traditional accusations levelled at the 
military  justice  system  decree  it  as  unjust  and  lacking  impartiality.  However,  recent  and 
widespread reforms seemingly make the process more stringent. Any case of a battlefield 
mercy killer would likely come before a court martial consisting of military officers who 
deliberate upon the facts and have a role in passing the sentence. It is argued that whilst the 
danger still exists, the soldier may benefit from being judged by a Board of military men who 
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have some insight of the military training, ethos, lifestyle and perhaps combat, under which 
pressures the soldier has enacted the killing. However, there is also a risk that a distinct class 
bias is present within the military justice system potentially causing officers and enlisted men 
to be treated differently in similar circumstances of battlefield mercy killing. 
 
Finally, to understand what constitutes justice for the battlefield mercy killer the reasons why 
he is being punished must be understood. Moral arguments surrounding mercy killing are 
often at odds with each other, some arguing that a murder conviction is just whilst others 
argue it is unjust. The reasons for punishment, retributivist in nature, do not always match up 
to the moral perceptions of the soldier’s action, and thus this negates the moral culpability 
which is required for such punishment. The current ability to interpret the law only narrowly 
potentially leads to the conviction of a soldier who does not pose a threat of infringement of 
the normative expectations of an individual. The main focus should be upon the soldier’s 
compassionate and sympathetic motive which is negated by the legal preoccupation on intent 
in the justice system. By judging the actions of the battlefield mercy killing soldier in light of 
all  the  aforementioned  considerations,  it  is  concluded  that  his  actions  are  morally  and 
normatively legitimate contrary to the archaic legal position. This is very much in line with 
the debates on civilian mercy killings and whether it is appropriate to criminalise them. 
 
1.9 Terminology and Definitions and Conceptual Boundaries 
 
In order to embark upon an analysis of the topic, an attempt will be made to give refined 
definitions to some of the key components, including the terms ‘battlefield’ ‘soldier’ and 
‘mercy killing’, each of which has a myriad of possible practical and legal interpretations.  
 31 
 
The term ‘battlefield’ will be understood as the scene of the killing. It shall be compared with 
the hospital or home, the scene of many domestic mercy killings. Individuals are bound by 
different behavioural requirements and legal constraints dependent upon their professional 
position and the circumstances they are operating in. This is no different in the armed forces; 
different roles have different duties which change dependent upon the theatre within which 
they are operating. The battlefield is circumstantially different to the wider area affected by 
armed conflict. For instance, the conflict may be in England but the specific area where the 
fighting takes place is the ‘battlefield’, the place of battle which can change daily. Thus, the 
violence which precedes the need to enact a mercy killing cannot be justified if the battlefield 
is,  fir  example,  in  London  but  the  mercy  killing  takes  place  in  Birmingham  after  an 
altercation between two drunken soldiers working in an administrative capacity. Perhaps a 
better term is ‘combat zone’; those isolated areas in which the fighting occurs, rather than the 
area or region of the wider conflict within which there can be a number of demilitarized 
zones,
70 and safe zones.
71 
 
‘The  combat  zone  where  subject  to  the  undefended  places  rule  liberty  to 
bombard  the  whole  area  is  quite  plain,  not  restricted  to  enemy  forces  or 
installations, nor restrained by the presence of civilians in villages or towns 
usable for military purposes.’
72 
 
Of course, civilians can never be legitimately intentionally targeted, but within this ‘zone’ the 
legitimate violence between the belligerents is authorised. Thus, the ‘battlefield’, can occur 
wherever hostilities are engaged between two forces, whether it is an attack on a defended 
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position or an ambush of an enemy patrol, from that moment until the end of the violence the 
area has become the field of battle. For final clarity and due to the lack of a precise legal 
definition of where and what the battlefield is, a literal interpretation shall be employed, ‘the 
piece of ground on which a battle is or was fought’
73 
 
Second, who exactly is a soldier must be defined, as in this study the battlefield mercy killing 
takes  place  between  two  soldiers.  Establishing  who  constitutes  a  bona  fide  combatant  is 
important  because  the  rules  apply  differently  to  soldiers  and  civilians  respectively.
74In 
conventional interstate conflicts it is easy to ascertain who the soldier or fighter is , but in 
asymmetric warfare it is harder to determine because guerrilla tactics or irregular militias may 
be employed.  International law states that, the 
 
‘…armed forces of a Party to the conflict consist of all organised armed 
forces, groups and units which are under the command responsible to that 
Party for the conduct of its subordinate.’
75 
 
However, this is not a helpful definition in conflicts defined by insurgency and guerrilla 
warfare, in which it is not easy to distinguish the farmer from the fighter,
76 the soldier may 
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toil in the fields by day and fight by night. Uniforms are worn by conventional fighting forces 
as required by law, if only by use of a distinctive emblem or insignia.
77  
 
‘Combatants  are  obliged  to  distinguish  themselves  from  the  civilian 
population while they are engaged in an attack or on a military operation 
preparatory to an attack.’
78 
 
Yet in conflicts such as Afghanistan, it may be difficult for traditional soldiers to identify 
fighters and local inhabitants by their dress. In Afghanistan today, the International Security 
Armed  Forces  (ISAF)  are  fighting  several  ‘sects’  of  insurgency,  none  of  which  may  be 
recognisable  from  the  other,
79 even though  international law  requires   soldiers  to make 
themselves distinguishable from civilians. 
 
If no uniform is worn, the very minimum requirement placed upon a soldier belonging to 
such a force is to demand they display their arms openly, 
 
(a) during each military engagement 
 
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a 
military deployment preceding the launching of an attack.
80 
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If they do so, they are entitled to the same protections and status as a combatant, which also 
affords them all the rights of attributable to prisoners of war. Because of the vagueness of 
clearly identifying who constitutes a soldier, a common sense theory will be applied here. 
Those armed persons, who occupy the area of the battlefield and are engaged in fighting with 
weapons will be considered ‘soldiers’ or fighters for the purposes of this study. That it is 
impossible to decide which sect or militia they fight for is irrelevant, for they are entitled to 
the same protection under international law even if they have not followed its requirements 
concerning openly declaring their combatant status.
81  
 
For clarity, the term ‘mercy killing’ must also be defined in regard to its use in this thesis. 
Acts of ‘mercy killing’ are regularly featured in the contemporary media,
82 and the rightness 
or wrongness of such activities have been the key issues in some of the U.K.’s highest profile 
cases in the early part of the twenty-first century.
83 But the general public’s perception of 
‘mercy killing’, as simply aiding a suffering victim to an inevitable death through a less 
painful route, hides the complexity of the debate.  
 
In  this  capacity  mercy  killing  is  known  by  various  names,  assisted  dying,  voluntary 
euthanasia, non – voluntary euthanasia, assisted suicide and physician assisted suicide. Not all 
of these actions are  undertaken from motives of empathy. Each is a variation on the practice, 
entailing different actions by very different players, and each asking different questions of the 
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law when such an act is carried out.  Whilst the intricacies of each of them shall be considered, 
they are not all similar to actions carried out on the battlefield, particularly those conducted 
by the likes of Capt. Semrau. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, a mercy killing shall be 
considered as an intentional act which is aimed at ending the pain and suffering of another 
person. Under this definition, on the battlefield it might be understood as a ‘coup de grace,’ 
defined simply as ‘…a final blow or shot given to kill a wounded person’,
84 and is ‘an action 
or event that serves as the culmination of a bad or deteriorating situation.’
85 In the battlefield 
mercy killing the victim is expected to be in a condition close to death. How much pain the 
victim is in, whether their injury is mortal or merely more than trivial and whether mental 
suffering falls within the ambit of acts constituting mercy killings are qualifications which 
will be refined through both case analysis and engagement with ethical theory.   
 
This  thesis  is  not  overtly  concerned  with  mercy  killings  which  may  take  place  in  field 
hospitals  by  medical  practitioners.  They  do  not  come  within  the  definition  of  battlefield 
outlined above, nor do they concern the same actors implicated here. The battlefield mercy 
killing takes place between two fighting soldiers using the weapons of their trade to enact the 
killing, whilst any such act in a hospital would likely involve a military medic using medical 
equipment.  In  referencing  the  soldier  the  male  gender  is  generally  used,  not  from  any 
chauvinistic overtures, but purely arising from the normative understanding, which generally 
assigns the role of the warrior to the male.
86 Also, the victim’s gender in Semrau, Cardenas 
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and Maynulet, was male as were all the other actors involved, and as particular reference shall 
be made to these episodes, the male pronoun will dominate the discussion. 
 
Finally, the studies into the conduct of war, the concept of battlefield mercy killing and the 
development  of  a  normative  process  of  ‘warriorisation’  within  the  armed  forces  are 
predominately based on western concepts. It is accepted that the victims of Capt. Semrau, 
Capt. Maynulet and SSG Cardenas were surely not westerners, and that other societies hold 
different values as core to their military ethos. But, here the concern is with U.K. forces, the 
U.K. justice system and the morality which informs them. Again, it is important to reiterate, 
that although Semrau was heard under Canadian jurisdiction, this was sufficiently similar in 
form  for  postulation  of  the  possible  outcomes  and  reasoning  for  the  outcome  if  such  an 
instance  were  to  occur  in  the  U.K.  courts.
87
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deaths resulting from the 2004 Iraq war and Afghan conflict beginning in 2001, less than 1% are female.  
87 This will be evidenced in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7  
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Chapter Two 
Mercy Killing, War and the Warrior: A socio-historical investigation of the cultural 
influences upon the soldier and the impact of combat upon their perceptions 
 
This chapter examines the circumstances which may drive a solider to enact a battlefield 
mercy killing. To do so it will first look at the influences which the courts accept may affect 
the civilian when they commit a mercy killing. From there, it can be seen that the influences 
which affect the soldier are markedly different. They are formed from unique military cultural 
experiences,  and  the  unparalleled  mental  impact  that  conflict  brings  as  well  as  from  an 
inherent expectation of what it means to be a member of society’s ‘warrior’ caste.  In any 
situation, a multitude of factors influence a person’s behaviour. Previous social experiences, 
moral  beliefs,  group  pressures,  practical  implications  and  legal  constraints  are  all  factors 
which inform a persons actions. 
 
When  cases  of  mercy  killing  arise  in  the  courts  ‘exceptional  circumstances’
1 especially previous traumas, are often considered. In Marshall
2 for example, the defendant 
had previously watched her husband die a ‘protracted and painful death’ from cancer and 
could no longer bear to watch her mother suffer the same condition.
3 The court recognised the 
killing was committed from mercy rather than m alice, yet this recognition could only be 
reflected in the twelve month sentence suspended for two years, rather than the conviction for 
attempted murder which the court had no choice but to impose.
4 
 
                                                           
1 Adam Jankiewicz ‘Woman walks free after mercy killing case’ The Independent 29
th September 2001 
2 R v Marshall [2001] Unreported 
3 n.1 above 
4 In this case the defendant, Doreen Marshall had admitted crushing sleeping pills to try and kill  her ninety year 
old mother, Cecilia Maxwell, unsuccessfully. Thus she was charged with attempted murder rather than murder.   
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‘It is, I think, common ground between prosecution and defence that your 
mother’s  existence  was  absolutely  wretched  beyond  belief…I  am  quite 
satisfied  on  the  evidence  before  me  that  what  you  were  attempting  is 
sometimes described as a mercy killing … What your motive was, was one 
of mercy and consideration for your mother…The law does not permit 
mercy killing. That is the law, there are very good reasons for that law, but 
I  have  to  pass  a  sentence  of  imprisonment  to  mark  the  gravity  of  this 
offence.’
5 
 
In such instances the courts are often ready to accept that the psychological impact of the 
defendant’s circumstances are relevant to their treatment at sentencing. For instance, many 
mercy killers have close familial relationships with the deceased and have been their full-time 
carer, this intimacy is acknowledged as having an impact on some defendants.  
 
‘…there is a significant body of research that demonstrates the negative 
psychological impact of being a full time carer for another person who is 
suffering  from  a  physical  or  psychological  disorder.  In  my  view  the 
psychological effect [on the defendant] will have been compounded uniquely 
by the complex relationship that existed.’
6 
 
In Webb, the defendant smothered his wife, whom he had cared for full time for a number of 
years. She had repeatedly voiced her wish to die, and made him promise he would not let her 
awake from the deathly slumber she had instigated by drinking a cocktail  of tablets  and 
brandy. The court accepted these circumstances as evidence that the principle of the sanctity 
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6 R v Webb [2011] EWCA Crim 152 at para 26  
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of human life would not  be undermined, unlike in  Marshall,  allowing them to impose a 
sentence of manslaughter by means of diminished responsibility. This defence is often used in 
order  to  mitigate  the  mandatory  life  sentence  accompanying  a  murder  conviction.  It  is 
justified  by  referring  to  the  defendant’s  state  of  mind,  affected  by  the  circumstances,  as 
constituting an abnormality substantially impairing the defendant’s judgement.
7 In doing so 
the courts are often seen to display sympathy towards the defendant.  
 
‘It is clear from the evidence…that the mental turmoil engendered by the 
impossible situation in which the defendant found himself must have been 
dreadful…[and] that this lonely old man may receive the help that he will 
need to come to terms with the disaster that has overtaken his life.’
8 
 
Each case is judged on its facts, and often, although the court might sympathise, it cannot be 
reflected in the ruling, in spite of the gravity of the influencing factors upon the defendant’s 
actions. In R v Inglis
9   the court accepted that, 
 
‘The  genuineness  that  the  actions  represented  an  act  of  mercy  and  a 
combination of factors including that above i.e. a long obsession with the 
belief that she owed a duty to Thomas to end his suffering are…powerful 
considerations, far removed from the ordinary case of murder.’
10 
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40 
 
However, this did not prevent a conviction for murder, upheld on appeal, and the imposition 
of a mandatory life sentence.
11 The court did not accept that the mother’s actions represented 
no threat to the principle of the sanctity of life as in Webb because, ‘the fact is that he was 
alive, a person in being. However brief the time left for him, that life could not be lawfully 
extinguished.’
12 Thomas, her son, sustained severe brain damage after falling from a moving 
ambulance; he could not communicate, move or feed himself. At the time of the mercy killing 
Inglis was on bail for attempted murder, having previously injected her son with a near fatal 
dose  of  heroin  for  the  same  purpose.  She  was,  ‘…motivated  throughout  by  her  personal 
conviction that should would release him from [his] living hell.’
13  
 
These are descriptions of ‘domestic’ mercy killings, which will be used to form comparisons 
between civilian and battlefield mercy killings especially in relation to the circumstantial and 
motivational factors which the courts take into consideration. There are an almost infinite 
number of possibilities in which a ‘domestic mercy killing’ may occur; hypothetically, an 
individual may be accidentally run over and in order to put the victim out of their suffering 
another driver or the same driver may reverse over them. Elsewise, an individual may fall a 
great height from a cliff into the sea in the proximity of another swimmer where, seeing that 
aiding the victim would be futile, cause great pain,  and that the victim is certain to drown 
anyway, the swimmer decides the most humane course of action is to initiate the drowning 
themselves. Then there is the traditional burning lorry or policeman’s dilemma,
14 in which a 
lorry driver is trapped in the cab of his burning vehicle after an accident. The police, fire-
fighters and ambulance service are at the scene, but it is clear he will burn to death before he 
can be freed. He is in agony. He begs a policeman (who happens to be armed) to shoot him 
                                                           
11 At appeal the minimum time the court required Miss Inglis to serve was reduced from over nine years to five 
years. 
12 n.9 above  per Lord Chief Justice Irwin at para. 38 
13 n.9 above  per Lord Chief Justice Irwin at para. 57 
14 C Mackellar ‘Human Dignity and Assisted Dying [2007] 18(3) Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 355 358  
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rather than let him burn and the officer does so. All the examples exhibit the choice between 
killing someone and leaving them to die in unbearable pain. Some indicate the request and 
consent of the victim whilst others depict the defendant taking matters into their own hands. 
But they can all be seen as acts of mercy. However, such cases are not regular occurrences 
and a greater catalogue of case law exists concerning those cases of mercy killing perpetrated 
against the ill and fragile, as in Webb, Inglis, GIlderdale and Marshall.  
 
It  is  these  actions,  in  which  the  killer  is  related,  by  birth,  marriage,  or  a  close  loving 
relationship, and has endured many shared experiences with the victim, which fall within this 
thesis definition of the  ‘domestic mercy killing’. In these cases there is a tradition of the 
judge examining the influences the relationship has had upon the defendant, which often 
leads to the acceptance that they were acting from love and compassion. Often, this enables 
the use of the defence of diminished responsibility, or at least mitigates the sentence passed in 
some way. Physician Assisted Suicide is also a focus of this work but is considered later in 
detail.
15 For this thesis, ‘domestic mercy killing’ comprises the following elements. First, the 
existence of a close, loving relationship in which experiences and understandings between the 
defendant and the victim have been nurtured. Second, cases where the court accepts, to some 
degree, the mental impact of the victim’s condition upon the defendant. Finally, where the 
victim has been suffering long-term from their condition, it is permanent, affects their quality 
of life and is often fatal. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
15 See chapter 6.  
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2.1 Peacetime and Wartime Mercy Killings – Similarities and Differences 
 
Despite  the  differing  sentences,  the  above  judgements  exhibited  a  consideration  of  the 
defendant’s experiences, circumstances and the victim’s condition as pivotal regarding their 
actions.  Yet  mercy  killings  are  always  treated  as  unlawful  homicides  regardless  of  the 
motivations of those actors involved.
16 Applied in peacetime, the civil law has developed in 
order to cope with varying expectations and to weigh accordingly the importance that should 
be paid to the surrounding circumstances when the courts pass judgement. During war, whilst 
the crime is similar ,  these influencing factors are markedly different. The relationships, 
bonds, behaviours and duties placed on soldiers develop in isolation from civ ilian life, and 
their profession is practiced beyond the ambit of peacetime considerations. It was in the light 
of such influences that Capt. Semrau committed the mercy killing, for which he was charged 
with murder.  
 
However, some considerations seen in  the peacetime cases are comparable. Capt. Semrau, 
like Frances Inglis,
17 killed the victim without a thought to the feelings of anyone else. He did 
not  consult  with  the  victim,  their  family,  or   his  military  comrades,  much  to  the 
disappointment of Captain Sh affigullah.
18 Likewise, he felt he had a duty to fulfil his 
obligation towards other soldiers whom he believed shared a common bond, much like the 
duty George Webb felt he owed to his wife,
19 and Francis Inglis felt she owed to her son.
20 
Yet the influences of Semrau’s circumstances are entirely isolated from those experienced in 
the aforementioned cases, not originating from a familial bond or other civilian pressures but 
                                                           
16 Report on Murder Manslaughter and Infanticide [2006] Law Com. 304 Part 7 see 7.4, 7.6 and 7.7 
17 n.9 above per Lord Chief Justice Irwin at para. 59 
18 Bill Gravgeland ‘Insurgent was ’98 per cent dead’ Afghan officer tells Semrau court martial’ Globe and Mail 
June 22
nd 2010 
19 Helen Cater ‘’Mercy killing’ husband George Webb released from prison’ The Guardian 26
th January 2011 
20 n.9 above per Lord Chief Justice Irwin at para. 57  
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from his experiences as a warrior and soldier. This does not mean they are not potentially 
relevant or commensurate with the issues affecting the defendants in domestic mercy killings. 
The circumstances affecting the soldier can be broken into three categories, psychological, 
practical and cultural. 
  
The culture informing the combatant is crucial to understanding these influences. On a macro 
level the influences on the belligerents, not only the combat troops, but also their political 
masters  and  the  considerations  of  wider  society  behind  their  decisions,  allows  an 
understanding  of  why  the  conflict  is  being  fought.  On  a  micro  level  it  allows  an 
understanding of why the participants behave in that way.
21 The particular cultural influences 
affecting the individual can be described as the effects of the ‘frenzy’ of war, the nature of the 
combat, and the cultural foundations which inform the participant’s behaviour during combat. 
The natural instincts of the warrior and their customary practices have long influenced their 
actions, and it can be seen that many of these customs and instincts are present in the case of 
Captain Semrau. 
 
2.2 Psychological Factors: The ‘Frenzy’ 
 
Factors  which  influence  this  ‘frenzy’  sit  in  four  main  categories.  The  natural  bloodlust 
accompanying  the  violence  of  combat,  the  emotional  ravages  combat  exerts  over  the 
combatant, the de-humanisation process which soldiers are subject to, and often from the 
personal nature of the combat which brings a host of emotional motivations for the fighting, 
such as revenge, hatred, pride and honour. This frenzy has many times seen men acting in 
                                                           
21 Patrick Porter ‘Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying Was [2007] Parameters 45 
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manners unconstrained by thoughts for the dignity or protection of their enemies, wounded or 
dead. 
 
‘Standing over him so they’d gloat and stab his body 
So he triumphed 
And now he was bent on outrage, on Shaming Hector. 
Piercing the tendons, ankle to heel behind both feet, 
He knotted straps of rawhide through them both 
Lashed them to his chariot, left the head to drag 
And mounting his car, hoisting the famous arms abroad, 
He whipped his team to a run at breakneck on they flew, 
Holding nothing back. And a thick cloud of dust rose up 
From the man they dragged, his dark hair swirling round 
That head so handsome once, all tumbled low in the dust 
Since Zeus had given him over to his enemies now 
To be defeated in the end of his own fathers.
22 
 
Such actions are not permissible under the protections  afforded to the dead and wounded in 
the Geneva Convention,
23 but the Convention takes no account of the ‘frenzy’ which had so 
clearly taken over the actions of Achilles in his triumph and may also affect the contemporary 
soldier. 
                                                           
22 Homer, The Iliad Translated by Robert Fagles, (Penguin Baltimore 1990) 554 
23 Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the sick and wounded 1949 Art.16 para.2 ‘As far as military 
considerations allow, each Party to the conflict shall facilitate the steps taken … to protect [the killed] against … 
ill-treatment.’ Geneva Convention Additional Protocol I 1977 Art. 34(1) ‘The remains of persons who have died 
for reasons related to occupation or in detention resulting from occupation or hostilities … shall be respected’. 
Geneva  Convention  Additional  Protocol  II  1977  Article  4  of  the  1977  Additional  Protocol  II  provides: 
1. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their 
liberty  has  been  restricted,  are  entitled  to  respect  for  their  person  [and]  honour  … 
2. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the persons referred to in 
paragraph I are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever:  
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The battlefield of the ancient and medieval world was an unregulated combat zone, in which 
no thought was spared for the distinction between combatants and those hors du combat. 
‘…[T]he killing fields were the domain of the cavalry mopping up scattered infantry and foot 
soldiers  following  up  despatching  the  wounded  and  worthless.’
24 Such  killings  appear 
ruthless  and  hardly  fit  with  the  contemporary  notions  of  mercy  killings  motivated  by 
sentiments of compassion, but this is the dilemma the modern soldier faces. This soldier is 
devoted to two operations requiring contradictory actions, one which comprises of killing the 
enemy and the other which demands he protects those no longer able to fight.
25 It is logical to 
question the ability of the frenzied soldier, who has recently been in a life and death struggle 
with the enemy, to make a clear demarcation between fighting and protection.  
 
Blood lust may be an inherent part in our human psyche, linked to a negative desire to destroy 
and heightened by our instinctual will to live when in combat.
26  However, this marriage 
between our  combative  destructive tendencies and the will to liv e which then initiates a 
frenzy is a questionable theory when applied to th e actions of individuals during combat,
27 
‘…it  is  a  large  step  from  what  may  be  biologically  innate  leanings  towards  individual 
aggression to ritualised, socially sanctioned, institutionalised group warfare.’
28 Whatever the 
origins of this frenzy the numerous accounts of this state of being are evidence enough of its 
existence in certain individuals. To avoid the unruly frenzy is one reason why discipline is 
drilled into fighting troops during training. But even military trainers understand that it still 
                                                           
24 Sean Mcglynn By Sword and Fire: Cruelty and Atrocity in Medieval Warfare (Orion London 2008) 89 
25 S Dalby ‘Warrior Geopolitics: Gladiator Black Hawk Down and the Kingdom of Heaven[2008] 27 Political 
Geography 442 
26 Sigmund Freud Beyond the Pleasure Principle  1922 (reprinted Liverlight Publishing Corporation 1961) 
27 B Einreich Blood Rite: Origins and History of the Passions of War (Granta Book 2011) 91 
28 C B Kroeber and B L Fontana Massacre on the Gila: An account of the last major battle between American 
Indians, with reflections on the origin of war (University of Arizona Press 1986) 72  
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serves  to  embed  an  aspect  of  the  ‘terrible’  into  troops.
29 It  is  when  this  terrible  aspect 
overflows the confines of it’s purpose that a ‘frenzy’ manifests. 
 
One such episode of ‘frenzy’, which affected a soldier’s ability to demarcate between persons 
and times when it was acceptable to kill and when it was not, was witnessed by a young 
British officer during the Great War, after his troop stormed and captured a German trench. 
The young Officer struggled to come to terms the mindless brutality of his Sergeant. 
 
“Look here, we took a lot of prisoners in those trenches yesterday morning. 
Just as we got into their line, an officer came out of a dugout. He’d got one 
hand above his head, and a pair of field glasses in the other. He held the 
glasses out to S______,… and said, ‘Here you are Sergeant, I surrender.’ 
S______ said, ‘Thank you, sir’ and took the glasses with his left hand. At 
the same moment he tucked the butt of his rifle under his arm and shot the 
officer straight through the head. What the hell ought I to do?” 
“I don’t see that you can do anything” I answered slowly, “what can you do? 
Beside I don’t see that S______ is really to blame. He must have been half 
mad with excitement by the time he got into that trench. I don’t suppose he 
ever thought what he was doing. If you start a man killing, you can’t turn 
him off like an engine. After all, he is a good man. He was probably half off 
his head.”
30 
 
 
 
                                                           
29 The Story of the Gurkhas in the Falklands Being Cannibals –See laptop version for reference. 
30 Guy Chapman A Passionate Prodigality (Holt Rhinehart and Winston, New York 1966)  99-100  
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2.3 The influence of the battle upon the soldier’s state of mind 
 
Capt. Semrau, did not callously gun down a readily surrendering enemy, but it is naïve to 
assume that he would not be suffering from a heightened state of aggression in the minutes 
following  the  intense  fire  fight  which  could  have  affected  his  decision  making.  The 
possibility  for  aggression  to  linger  and  cause  one  to  lose  control  is  legally  accepted, 
especially when the aggression stems from a history of violence directed at the defendant. R v 
Ahluwalia
31 evidences this principle. The defendant had suffered years of violence from her 
husband prior to killing him, the judge correctly informed the jury that, 
 
‘…in considering acts done and words used, they were to take account of the 
whole history of marriage and not confine their attention to what was said or 
done on the night of the killing.’
32 
 
In a similar way, the mental impact of war on the soldier is well documented, with Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder brought on by conflict increasing as a result of the recent wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.
33 Whilst the soldier in a battlefield mercy killing will not necessarily be 
suffering from the condition, it evidences the mental costs upon the individual due to such 
intense experiences. Previously held concepts of right and wrong might begin to change, and 
the classroom morality lessons many officers and soldiers are subject to   may  seem less 
                                                           
31 R v Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 899 
32 ibid. per Lord Taylor at 899 
33 National Audit Office  – Ministry of Defence  Treating Injury and Illness Arising on Military Operations 
Session  2009-2010  HOC  294  London:  Stationary  Office  Feb  2010  15  fig. 3  –  Between  October  2006  and 
October 2009 there were 1,736 military personnel diagnosed with mental health conditions returning from the 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq  
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applicable in the real situation.
34 An infantryman who participated in the massacre at My Lai 
during the Vietnam war in which several hundred civilians were killed, recalled,   
 
‘I remember seeing people being butted in the head with rifles. But you start 
losing your sense of what’s normal. You don’t give up your morals, but you 
become a lot more tolerant. We believed this behaviour pretty common place. 
I didn’t think we were doing anything different from any other unit. You really 
do  lose  your  sense…not  of  right  and  wrong  but  your  degree  of  wrong 
changes.’
35 
 
A  prolonged  history  of  violence  may  have  an  even  deeper  psychological  impact.  Capt. 
Semrau was himself an infantry soldier, and it is not known whether he had killed any othesr 
in combat prior to the mercy killing. However, it is likely that he had, and that he had seen 
numerous men killed and severely injured, and that these deaths and injuries were the result 
of violent, yet legal, confrontations.
36 It is plausible therefore, to assume that the longer Capt. 
Semrau was exposed to such situations the greater the impact was on his concepts of not only 
right and wrong, but also of what behaviour was considered taboo, including the killing of  
another human. 
 
For the combat soldier the taboo of killing is broken during conflict, with of all the passions 
of revenge and self -preservation heightened.  However, whilst  the taboo against killing  is 
                                                           
34 Office of the Judge Advocate General - National Defence Code of Conduct for CF Personnel Canada p.A1 
concerning lesson plans for Code of Conduct  
35 Micheal Bilton and Kevin Sim Four Hours in My Lai (Viking New York 1992) 79 
36 The legality of such killings can be better understood as killings which are not illegal rather than being seen as 
those which are expressly legal. The ‘laws of war’, such as the Geneva Conventions, do not specifically outline 
when it is permissible for a soldier to kill another, rather they outline when, where and who it is not permissible 
to kill. Likewise, UK law does not sanction killing, but rather outlines when it is not permissible namely, ‘under 
the Queen’s peace’ -  killings during time of conflict therefore are not covered by such a prohibition.  
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founded  on  the  wrongness  of  allowing  personal  sentiments  of  anger,  revenge  and  pride 
overtake ones actions, the mercy killing is based upon notions of compassion and duty. One 
action is based on behaving detrimentally towards the victim the other on the belief that the 
action  is  for  their  benefit.  It  is  of  course  conjecture,  but  the  soldier  who  has  already 
experienced the breaking of this prohibition might find it easier to justify killing based on 
more kindly foundations.  
 
2.4 Preparing the soldier for battle – dehumanisation 
 
Perceptions  of  right  and  wrong  which  have  been  developed  through  civilian  experiences 
norms and rules apparently change during the intensity of war. The natural bloodlust which 
can arise, and the emotional strain and moral erosion that war entails is further compounded 
by the de–humanisation process that the soldier undergoes during training.
37 This involves 
breaking down the individual’s notions of the taboo, namely that which prohibits killing, a 
perfectly sound precept in times of peace in civilian life, but a hurdle to military effectiveness 
in times of war. 
 
‘…once you start, it’s very easy to keep on. Once you start, the hardest – the 
part that’s hard is to kill, but once you kill, that becomes easier, to kill next 
person and the next person and the next one. Because I had no feelings or 
emotions  or  no  nothing.  No  direction.  I  just  killed.  It  can  happen  to 
anyone.
38 
 
                                                           
37 Jonathon Glover Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (Pimlico London 2001) 48 
38 n.35 above  at 8.  
50 
 
The process of dehumanisation starts before the soldier experiences combat. This is not a new 
phenomenon, people must be prepared and readied in order to accept the actions which invert 
all of their previously held moral beliefs. In war it becomes right to kill, right to steal and right 
to pillage and loot. People are inherently adverse to breaking such inbuilt social boundaries, 
such that in Vietnam it was found that many soldiers could not initially bring themselves to 
fire upon the enemy.
39 
 
Soldiers must undergo a transformation to become reliable killers. In primitive, small scale 
societies this transformation was s ymbolised through ritualistic practices, the drums would 
beat, the men would dance, fast and or chant and finally , when they took on the role as a 
warrior,  it was often customary to   be  adorned with  headdresses, masks or body paint to 
signify the transformation.
40 The transformation process  to convert  a normal member of 
society into a warrior is evidenced throughout history in both fact and  myth. It was not 
unusual for individuals to liken themselves to a wild animal, in acceptance of the animalistic 
and  brutal  acts  they  would  have  to  commit   and  the  need  to  leave  behind  them  their 
humanness.
41 Scandinavian ‘berserkers’ renowned for their ferocity, donned bear furs before 
they became warriors. The word beserk itself translates to ‘dressed in bear skins’.
42 In Celtic 
myth,  Cuchulain  morphed  into  a  monster  of  terrifying  aspects  before  he  went  into  battle 
during which his savagery was insatiable.
43 
 
Modern  processes  of  dehumani sation  are  far  more  disciplined.  R elentless  drilling  and 
exercises  form the process by which the recruit leaves behind his civilian persona a nd 
                                                           
39 David Grossman On Killing: Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill: The Psychological Cost of Learning to 
Kill in War and Society (Little Brown 1995) 
40 n.27 above at 21. 
41 Georges Dumezil Destiny of the Warrior (Univeresity of Chicago Press 1970) 38 
42 n.27 above at 22. 
43 H R Ellis Davidson Myths and Symbols in Pagan Europe (Syracuse University Press Syracuse 1988)  84  
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becomes a ‘military man’. Modern ‘boot camps’ have been created in order to create a soldier 
with a well-honed ‘emotional edge’,
44 in order to ease the killing experience for the recruit.
45 
 
‘The hopeful candidate is subjected to a new catastrophic experience which 
breaks  down  to  a  large  extent  his  previous  personality  organisation.  His 
previous valuations fail and in order to find a new basis for self respect, he 
must adopt new standards…’
46 
 
As the soldier becomes inculcated with his new personality as a warrior within the new group 
he is associated with, he ‘hyper invests’ in the group, that is to say he takes on their values in 
place of his previous values. Such an investment in highly specialised groups leads to a level 
of alienation and heightened xenophobia; in order to kill the soldier must become emotionally 
attached and objectify the enemy.
47  
 
Capt. Semrau was a combat soldier who  had undergone the rigours of the dehuman isation 
process that occurs during a recruit’s basic training. He was operating in a culture of killing, 
where the taboo of killing had been purposefully broken and inverted. Judging him against the 
standards of the ordinary civilian who had not been processed in this way is problematic 
because killing is a larger step for the civilian to take. The moral constraints acting on a 
civilian who kills from compassion are heightened compared to the soldier who has been 
trained to kill, and it is thus a smaller step to take for the soldier, trained to kill, to deliver a 
coup de grace in the moments after a firefight than for a civilian in the domestic setting.  A 
                                                           
44 R Wayne Eisenhart ‘You can’t hack it little girl: A discussion of the covert psychological agenda of modern 
combat training’ [2010] 31(4) Journal of Social Issues 13 15 
45 Jojurda Verrips ‘Dehumanisation as a double edged sword: From boot camp animals to killing machines’ in G 
Baumann and  A Gringrich (Eds.) Grammars of Identity/Alterity (Berghahn Books 2004) 150  
46 S Stouffer Measurement and Prediction. The American Soldier Vol. IV (Wiley New York: 1950) 389 
47 D Winslow ‘Misplaced Loyalties: The Role Of Military Culture In The Breakdown Of Discipline In Two 
Peace Operations’ [2004] 6(3) Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 345 356  
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soldier’s  moral  revulsion  at  killing  has  been  eroded  by  the  psychological  processes  that 
accompany the transformation of recruits into soldiers. However, the training of recruits is not 
only aimed at dehumanising them to make them reliable killers, but also to instil discipline 
and an adherence to an orderly level of conduct, especially in situations of heightened tension. 
The soldier is trained to conduct himself to a professional standard, which perhaps lessens the 
weight of the argument that can be used to partially excuse the battlefield mercy killer based 
on the dehumanisation process. 
 
2.5 The nature of the combat and its effect upon the combatant 
 
‘If war is an act of force, it belongs necessarily also to the feelings. If it does 
not originate in the feelings, it reacts more or less, upon them, and the extent 
of  this  reaction  depends  not  on  the  degree  of  civilisation,  but  upon  the 
importance and duration of the interests involved…in short even the most 
civilised nations may burn with passionate hatred of each other.’
48 
 
Combat can have a very personal effect on the individual’s outlook towards his treatment of 
the enemy. The cause of and background to the conflict can colour perceptions, hence tribal 
hostilities can, when aggravated, cause massacres born from a legacy of resentment.
49 This 
type of hostility was perhaps most violently evidenced by the Rwandan genocide and other 
violence between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes.
50 The Afghan conflict can ,  in part,  also  be 
                                                           
48 Von Clauswitz, K On War translated by Graham J J (Digiread Publishing 2008) 24 
49 For instance, the intermittent hostilities between Israel and Palestine, Armenia and Azerbaijan and India and 
Pakistan.  However, ‘tribal warfare’ as understood by westerners may be a western construct and in many ways 
is no different from the warfare which as traditional taken place in Europe between nations states, and indeed 
many of the recorded tribal warfare can be seen as arising from Western interference with the ‘tribe’ in the first 
instance. R B Ferguson ‘Tribal Warfare’ in N Scheper-Hughes  Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology 
(Blackwell Publishing 2004) 
50 See P Y Reyhan ‘Genocidal Violence in Burundi: Should International Law Prohibit Domestic Humanitarian 
Intervention?’ [1996] 60 Alabama Law Review 771  
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regarded as a tribal conflict since there is a subdued but long held resentment between the 
Taliban and the Government formed from the former Northern Alliance, at play between 
members  of  the  Afghan  Army  and  the  Taliban.
51   This  type  of  conflict  has  occurred 
throughout history, and when soldiers party to the feud kill it is from feelings of revenge, 
anger, and righteous retribution and not the mercy and compassion associated with a mercy 
killing. The chroniclers of the Franco - Flemish War at the turning point of the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries have left behind a host literature evidencing the intense long held hatred 
the protagonists held for each other.  
 
‘The Flemings did not know how to distinguish him from the others lying on 
the ground, for they would have more gladly killed him than anyone else.’
52 
 
In these instances, any number of atrocities might be subjectively justified because of the 
soldier’s overwhelming emotions and often both combatants and civilians are killed with 
equal glee, even when the protagonists claim the protection of moral piety. 
 
‘Remember, Lord, what the Edomites did on the day Jerusalem fell. “Tear it 
down”  they  cried,  “tear  it  down  to  their  foundations!”  Daughter  Babylon, 
doomed to destruction, Happy is the one who repays you according to what 
you have done to us. Happy is the one who seizes your infants and dashes 
them against the rocks.’
53 
 
                                                           
51 Neamattollah Nojumi The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilisation, Civil War and the Future of 
the Region (Palgrave New York 2002) 
52 Annales Gananses 71 – Showing that these conflicts are not a modern phenomenon, this depicts the Flemish 
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However, when two ‘sides’, be they states, tribes or political factions, go to war, an ‘us and 
them’ mentality is created. It may not arise from primitive ‘tribal’ resentment, but it can be 
seen to exist. In the same way that it is important to dehumanise the individual soldier so he 
becomes a reliable killing machine, it is equally important to objectify the enemy, making 
them less like ‘us’ in order to ease the killing process.
54 Before the individual or state attacks, 
that individual or group must become the enemy, individuals do not kill simply because they 
have weapons, rather they kill because they have reasons to kill, in war it is because the 
protagonist has become an enemy. 
 
‘In the beginning we create the enemy. Before the weapon comes the image. 
We  think  others  to  death  and  then  invent  the  battle-axe  or  the  ballistic 
missiles with which to actually kill them.’
55 
 
The opposition becomes the enemy based on a host of justifications particular to the values of 
the  protagonist  society.  Discourse  for  such  judgements  centres  on  themes  such  as  good 
motives versus the evil motive for the combat, the just cause combating the unjust cause and 
assigning the opposing party as guilty and one’s own party as innocent.
56  The current ‘War 
on Terror’ illustrates this point. Certain states and regimes have been termed ‘evil’
57, and 
singled out as the instigators of terrorism, perpetrators of weapons offences and implementers 
of oppressive policy measures and doctrine at odds with western democracy. This evil label 
has allowed and justified a number of specific policies, and in the case of Iraq, invasion and 
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55 S Kenn  Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination (Harper & Row San Francisco 1986) 10 
56 Nico Carpentier and Daniel Billereyst ‘Fighting Discourses – The construction of the self and the enemy: 
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57 The ‘Axis of Evil’ North Korea, Iraq and Iran  
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war  committed by the forces of ‘good’, a set of affairs many argue was pre-decided but 
required justifications to implement.
58 
 
Labelling and objectifying the enemy is not new, the concept of the jus ad bello, the just war, 
was favoured by medieval European rulers as justification to commence war. The elements of 
such a justification are similar to the objectifying dialogue often heard in modern conflict. For 
instance, Saints Aquinas and Augustine emphasised the need for the protagonists good intent, 
‘to  be  just  war  must  be  waged  with  the  correct  authority,  for  instance,  to  rescue  the 
poor…from the hands of the sinner’.
59 Justifications for war often took the form of the good 
needing to punish evil, ‘it is generally to punish these things, when force is required to inflict 
the punishment’
60  These concepts of justice, the righteousness of good and the predominance 
of freedom are still evident in rhetoric used today to amalgamate the collective strength of a 
society when a nations sends its troops to war as is evident in George Bush’s speeches on the 
invasion of Iraq. 
 
‘I believe that God has planted in every human heart the desire to have 
freedom. And even when that desire is crushed by tyranny for decades it 
will rise again.’
61 
 
A soldier’s understanding of why he is fighting in any conflict will generally be influenced by 
the rhetoric of his political leaders, and this will require the objectification of the enemy as an 
alien entity embodying the converse of the individual’s beliefs. For instance, the soldier in 
                                                           
58 M Ryan ‘Inventing the ‘axis of evil’: The myth and reality of US intelligence and policy making after 9/11 
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Afghanistan, where Capt. Semrau served, may understand the reasoning for his deployment 
as being designed to bring, freedom and democracy to the region and to protect his own 
nation form the locally trained terrorists. The soldiers will, generally, understand themselves 
to be in the right and the enemy, to be in the wrong. The enemy are the perpetrators of 
deceitful roadside bombings,
62 who commit atrocities upon the civilian population, especially 
those who cooperate with NATO and Afghan National Army forces. Conversely, the average 
Taliban fighter, is likely to see the conflict as a war against an aggressive invasion, by evil 
‘infidels’ who offend their customary way of life. They carry out roadside bombings as their 
most effective weapon against the overwhelming brutal force of NATO,
63 who uses cowardly 
indiscriminate airstrikes, and feel justified in punishing collaborators perceived as traitors.  
 
The combined pressures of battle, the natural tribal instinct to kill the  enemy and the overt 
objectification of that enemy, places the battlefield mercy killing of the injured enemy soldier 
into context. It can be speculated that the soldier may not see his enemy as his equal, but as 
inferior and alienated from what he understands as  man’s common humanity. The enemy’s 
moral outlook, methods of fighting and reasons for fighting are, in his eyes, the antithesis of 
his own beliefs. Having already been dehumanised to the point where he can kill his enemy,. 
this objectification has the possibility to further erode the demarcation between killing during 
conflict  and  enacting  a  battlefield  mercy  killing,  and  when  considered  alongside  the 
compassion  shown  by  a  defendant  during  a  mercy  killer  is  evidence  to  suggest  that  the 
criminal standard to which mercy killers are held is too high for such a soldier. 
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2.6 Conflict as a personal experience 
 
Conflict can become a personal experience for the combatant if he begins to attribute a sense 
of personal  wrongdoing  to the enemy  even though  individual soldiers  may have no true 
quarrel  with  each  other,  there  being  no  wider  background  between  the  two  prior  to  the 
combat. This would seem appropriate in the case of Capt. Semrau since he and his Canadian 
mentors,  unlike  the  ANA  were  not  involved  in  ‘tribal’  hostilities.  Here,  the  combat  can 
become personal through seeing friends killed or wounded by the enemy, and hostility from 
the civilian population, which the soldier may believe they are protecting. A US Vietnam 
veteran recalls the death of a friend and the reaction of the locals. 
 
‘Both his feet were blown off, both legs were torn to shreds – his entire 
groin area was completely blown away. It was the most horrible sight I’ve 
ever seen … I talked to the mechanized platoon leader who is with us and he 
said that as he left the area to return to his fire base, the people in the village 
he went through were laughing at him because they knew we had been hit. I 
felt like turning my machine-guns on the village to kill every man woman 
and child in it.’
64 
 
Resentment arising from prolonged exposure to such events was a driving factor behind the 
atrocity at My Lai, where the platoon involved had lost four dead and thirty-eight wounded in 
the  month  leading  to  the  atrocity.  The  history  of  Capt.  Semrau’s  combat  activities  is 
unknown, but for the purposes of this thesis, it is fitting to presume that he, or another mercy 
killer engaged in combat of the intensity in Afghanistan, would be likely to have witnessed 
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ordeals and felt the resentment of the Afghan civilian population at some time.
65 Possession 
of this personal enmity, mixed with the other attributes contributing to the frenzy  of war 
could make the actor respond , if not  callously, then with  more  detachment towards the 
injured enemy soldier than he would have otherwise. It may cause him to not weigh carefully 
enough  the consequences of his action s on the victim,  their family and the benefits that  
attempting to give aid might deliver. 
 
Whilst Semrau may not have acted from personal hatred arising from tribalism, others around 
him may have, and it is wrong to think this would  not have affected his actions. Group 
pressures are known to be a major cause of misconduct whilst on operation,
66 as seen with the 
case of the detainees at Abu Gharib whilst in the custody of the United States military.
67 
Also, as a foreign officer tasked with leading vengeful natives, the existence of a strong 
coercive force urging the officer to act decidedly in order to gain their respect, or regain 
authority, should not be ruled out. Semrau   may have feared that providing the le gally 
required treatment for the wounded insurgent would cause a loss of respect and authority on 
his part, however this is merely informed speculation and no authority for this point of view 
has been found in the literature. 
 
 It is argued that these categories of ‘battle frenzy’ influence a person’s behaviour during war. 
They  occur  naturally.  Some,  like  Achilles,  become  intoxicated  with  the  victory  and 
exhilaration of battle, soviet soldiers fighting the Mujahideen in Afghanistan commented, 
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‘We’ll never walk, or make love, or be loved, the way we walked and loved 
and were loved over there. Everything was heightened by the closeness of 
death:  death  hovered  everywhere  and  all  the  time.  Life  was  full  of 
adventure: I learnt the smell of danger…We’re homesick for it, some of us, 
it’s called the ‘Afghan syndrome’’
68 
 
2.7 From personally impacting to psychologically damaging 
 
Other effects such as the mental trauma that the sights and experiences war can have upon the 
soldier should also be considered as these could affect his appreciation of his later actions. 
These psychological effects could be seen in the same manner as domestic cases of mercy 
killing in which the defendant’s mental condition is considered relevant, such as in Webb,
69 
Inglis
70  and  Marshall.
71  They  are  the  result  of  the  accumulation  of  mental  anguish 
particularly since, after witnessing the lingering painful death of a wounded comrade, the  
battlefield mercy killer may not be willing to watch another go through such pain, be they 
friend or foe. In the domestic setting, t his was a significant consideration in the case of 
Marshall,  who  had  previously  watched  her  husband  die.
72 Yet  the  concept  of  ‘tribal’ 
hostilities and personal grievance do not fit with the motivations of mercy implicit in the 
aforementioned cases. Rather they indicate that the taboo of killing is weakened to such a 
degree that soldiers can, to an extent, become unconcerned with the demarcation between the 
protected  and  the  enemy.  Such  symptoms  may  enable  the  defence  of  diminished 
responsibility to mitigate the murder conviction if the soldiers experiences can be shown to 
                                                           
68 Svetlana Alexievich Zinky Boys: Soviet Voices from a Forgotten War translated by Julia and Robin Whitby 
(Chatto & Windus London 1992) 78  - 79 
69 n.6 above  
70 n.9 above 
71 n.2 above 
72 n.1 above.  
60 
 
have influenced his perception of his actions, or he is ‘unable to understand the nature of his 
conduct.’
73 
 
In this context Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), commonly found in soldiers both 
serving and retired, has been accepted as a cause of an abnormality of mental functioning 
stemming from a recognised medical condition.
74 In R v Gray it was accepted that PTSD 
resulting from the Ladbroke Grove Train crash where the defendant had suffered a minor 
injury  to  his  back  was  sufficient  to  trigger  the  defence.
75 The defendant later stabbed a 
stranger  to  death  and  the  court  accepted  the  plea  of  manslaughter  on  the  grounds  of 
diminished responsibility. It was the trauma of the rail accident which was used to explain his 
mental condition at the time of the act. Accordingly, it follows that PTSD arising from severe 
combat experiences might be enough to   trigger the  use  of the defence.  The  Australian 
judiciary has already allowed its use in R v Nielsen and R v Walsh, both cases where Korean 
war veterans have been suffering with the condition.
76 In Nielsen the PTSD arising from his 
experience of war caused him to dehumanise his victim which meant he could not control his 
actions and did not possess the awareness to know not to attack his victim. In Walsh, the 
defendant appealed against his conviction on the basis that at the time he carried out his 
attack he was suffering from a flash back to a particular combat instance in which he was 
defending himself from the attack of a Korean soldier. However, PTSD was not the only 
mental condition they suffered from, both where homeless and suffering from a variety of 
other mental conditions. 
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However, issues arise which challenge the use of diminished responsibility in cases of mercy 
killing on the battlefield. First, is the issue of whether the bond between the victim and the 
defendant can be shown to be sufficiently close as to have credibly affected the defendant’s 
reasoning in the same manner as the civilian cases. This may be easier to prove in cases 
where the relationship is between two comrades, but harder in cases like Semrau’s where the 
victim  is  an  enemy  fighter,  although  it  has  been  argued  that  the  shared  culture  between 
soldiers may be seen as creating this bond.
77It may however not be an issue if the soldier can 
rely upon the defence of PTSD as the basis for utilising the defence, although doubts remain 
here also. PTSD may be relevant when the defendant acts in a civilian or family context but 
its use should be doubted when ap plied to those who commit offences   whilst in their 
professional capacity. For example, the defence of diminished responsibility is not available 
to doctors when they act in their professional capacity regardless of their experiences. 
 
In R v Adams
78 it was agreed that doctors have no special defence available to them. They are 
expected to do everything in their duty to uphold the ethical standards of their profession and 
care for their patients.  Likewise then, the soldier’s use of PTSD to utilise the defence is 
questionable. Soldiers are trained to cope with the pressures of combat whilst upholding their 
duty to the laws of war. As their profession, like the doctor, deals with actions relating to the 
highest  moral  concern,  life  and  death,  it  could  be  argued  that  any  discrepancies  in  their 
professional conduct should not be able to be mitigated under any circumstance. Indeed, this 
is the case with police officers who cannot gain compensation for their inability to work 
because  of  the  traumatic  scenes  they  have  experienced.
79 The  concept  of  ‘professional 
standards’ and the role this concept may play in the treatment of the soldier is repeatedly 
encountered  in  this  work,  and  the  comparison  between  the  legal  position  of  medical 
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practitioners during end of life treatment  and decision making, and the battlefield mercy 
killer are considered in detail later.
80 
 
2.8 Cultural Factors 
 
Another  factor  which  informs  the  battlefield  mercy  killer’s  behaviour  is  the  cultural 
environment in which they find themselves. The military norms governing the soldier evolve 
in  isolation  to  mainstream  society,  and  flowing  from  their  training,  which  involves  the 
aforementioned  process  of  dehumanisation,  the  professional  soldier  traditionally  treats 
violence as a skill to be practiced and honed to prepare them for battle,  
 
‘They strive to out do each other in handling weapons. They realise that 
without practice the art of war did not come naturally when it was needed. 
No athlete can fight tenaciously who has never received blows; he must see 
his blood flow and hear his teeth crack under the fist of an adversary, and 
when he is thrown to the ground he must fight on with all his might and not 
lose courage… a soul subject to terror has fleeting glory. He who is too 
weak for this burden, through no fault of their own, will be overcome by its 
weight…’
81 
 
This type of violent practice informs the soldier’s behaviour, but unlike in a case of domestic 
killing, it should not be taken as evidence that they are predisposed to violence and thus 
battlefield mercy should be seen as an extension of this characteristic because such mercy 
emanates from other sentiments as shall be seen. Further, any imprisonment should represent 
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the need to protect the public.
82 Soldiers who are trained and ordered to fight should not be 
treated  like  thugs  and  brawlers  with  a  penchant  f or  assault,  which  is  an  undesirable 
comparison because there is little compassion evidenced in brawling. On the one hand is an 
individual who is ordered to violence by the state, and on the other is one who acts violently 
against the state’s conventions. 
 
2.9 Initiations and Rituals 
 
The shared experiences of soldiers, creates a bond and mystique which is concerned with the 
warrior culture. The induction, or rite of passages that the ‘warrior’ passes through are often 
similar to those his enemy experiences. For example, in the middle ages a mutual respect 
between knights was often found
83 due to the common rites found throughout the Christian 
west. All would swear to uphold Christianity, go through symbolic cleansing and dressing 
rituals, attend mass and take solemn oaths of one kind or another.
84 In the modern day this 
initiation occurs during basic training and the British Army practice of ‘beasting’, pushes 
recruits  beyond  their  physical  limits  as  punishment  for  any  perceived  infraction  by  an 
individual  in  the  group  to  create  the  one  and  all  bond.
85 ‘Beasting’  is  designed  to  be  a 
‘degrading  social  experience’
86 which  makes  a  soldiers  allegiance  to  the  group  stronger 
through discouraging him from making mistakes and engaging in non-conformist behaviour. 
In addition, often the group are punished for the actions of a single individual. The physical 
intensity of ‘beasting’ is such that in recent years its legality has been questioned as at least 
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one  infantryman  has  been  known  to  have  died  as  a  result.
87 Initiation  rituals, known as 
‘hazing’,  are  also  common  place  within  military  organisations.  They  often  involve  acts 
against or by the individual which expose them to harm or potential harm and risk, and which 
the individual must brave in order to be accepted into the group.
88 Such practices are in 
widespread use across the globe, from Norway
89 to Russia,
90 America
91 and the United 
Kingdom. 
92 
 
Instead of the normal moral pressures of family and community, soldiers across the globe are 
influenced by military discipline ,  which often involves  unofficial  ‘beasting’  or  ‘hazing’ 
practices. This  in  turn is  reflected in  the way in which the soldier perceives the enemy, 
knowing that they too have gone through similar experiences leading to respectful though 
deadly treatment of one another. This sentiment, which may be considered as ‘fair play,’ 
abounded among the pilots of the first world war, and is exemplified by this statement from a 
military  airman,  ‘I  resolved  today  that…I  would  never  shoot  at  a  Hun  who  is  at  a 
disadvantage’
93 
 
When an enemy soldier is dying, this mutual respect could be paid in treating the wounded 
man in the same way the actor would wish to be treated. Indeed, because of the perception of 
a shared experience and culture, it may be felt that one owes a duty to the other to carry out 
the merciful act. 
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‘We entered the City, and passed over dead bodies, and some that were not 
yet dead…I found three [soldiers] which were leaning against the wall, 
their faces totally disfigured, and neither saw, heard or spoke; and their 
clothes  did  yet  flame  with  the  gunpowder  which  had  burnt  them. 
Beholding them with  pity there happened to  come an old  soldier, who 
asked me if there were any possible means to cure them, I told him no: he 
presently cut their throats without choler. Seeing this great cruelty, I told 
him he was a wicked man, he answered me that he prayed to God, that 
whenever he should be in such a case, that he might find someone that 
would  do  as  much  to  him,  to  the  end  that  he  might  not  miserable 
languish.’
94 
 
The above statement may be at odds with what a civilian may see as a soldier’s duty to aid 
those injured persons they may come across. Thus it may inspire an initial revulsion to the 
account of a battlefield mercy killing, in much the same way as the ‘green’ physician in the 
above exert did when he encountered his first taste of the aftermath of battle. However, such 
civilians  have not  accepted by means  of  their profession the possibility of  an imminent, 
unexpected death or serious injury as does the soldier whose perception of their duty to aid 
the battle wounded differs compared to the duties civilians may feel are owed to an injured 
person in a domestic, peacetime situation. It is not to say that the soldier is requesting death 
or aid in dying, but that each recognises the limits of their mortality and the close proximity 
with which they must confront this eventuality in practicing their profession.  
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‘The way of the Samurai is found in death. When it comes to either/or, there 
is  only  the  quick  choice  of  death.  It  is  not  particularly  difficult.  Be 
determined to advance. To say that dying without reaching one’s aim is to 
die a dog’s death is the frivolous way of sophisticates. When pressed with 
the choice of life or death, it is not necessary to gain one’s aim.’
95 
 
Soldiers engaged on active service are prepared to die both by the training they receive and 
their  own  expectations.  Civilians,  lacking  the  bonds  of  this  experience  have  no  way  of 
recognising or establishing a course of action regarding a mercy killing  upon an injured 
civilian they may come across. They cannot call upon what may be perhaps termed as a 
‘commonality’ between individuals in which there is an innate understanding between the 
victim and the mercy killer of the perils and consequences of the task they both engage in. It 
is difficult for the civilian who comes across an injured person to reason that, ‘we are similar 
in our beliefs and experiences and because of this shared ethos it can be logically presumed 
that a mercy killing is more likely to be the wish of this person than prolonged agony and 
possible permanent disability. Of course this is simplistic and an almost finite number of 
possibilities exists which may influence a person to become a mercy killer. 
 
2.10 The shared experiences of soldiers and the familial relationship  
 
However, domestic cases which fit what could be called the ‘typical mould’ like Inglis and 
Webb,  evidence  killers  who  face  another  kind  of  battle  which  may  be  compared  to  the 
battlefield  mercy  killers  quest  to  judge  the  best  course  of  action  upon  encountering  a 
seriously  wounded  soldier.  They  involve  a  killing  between  two  people,  in  some  kind  of 
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loving familial relationship, influenced by the duties they feel they owe to one another.
96 A 
soldier, like Semrau, cannot be said to hold a close relationship , in the familial sense of the 
word, to the enemy soldier who he kills, yet a relationship does exist . It is born from the 
shared experiences of soldiery and combat and creates an understanding, a reliance upon the 
decency of the other. This relationship is not new , oath taking in western Europe among 
knights ensured that their lands would not be attacked by each other whilst on crusade and 
that their families would be cared for.
97 That Semrau felt ‘…bound by a soldier’s pact to 
quickly end the battlefield suffering of the grievously wounded’
98 reflects this. The sentiment 
can be as strong, if not from emotion but feelings of duty and honour which are exonerated in 
the military, as those formed between the actors in a domestic case.  In Vietnam, a US sniper 
who  came  across  an  injured  pilot  who  he  knew  would  not  survive  acted  on  a  similar 
sentiment to Capt. Semrau. He delivered a coup de grace on the grounds that it was, 
 
‘…necessary according to the code of the warrior, an honourable fighting 
man puts his comrades out of their misery.’
99 
 
The mental impact of war and the relationship amongst the agents in battlefield mercy killing 
infers that it has many of the same characteristics as a killing committed in peace time.  
Starkly different are the natures of the ailment of the suffering victim, being directly related 
to the nature of the activity they are engaged in. In Marshall, Inglis and Webb the victims had 
been suffering for many months, each with little chance of recovery. An instance like the 
Semrau case, represents a victim having abruptly entered the hopeless state, and what is more 
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his wounds were inflicted by the actors own forces. Again, the duality of the expectations 
upon the soldier are exposed: he must kill the enemy when alive, but not kill him when 
almost dead. The legal maxim that ‘all wounded and sick should be collected and cared 
for,’
100 does not represent the inherent ethos of the warrior, which may be more akin to never 
kicking a man when they are down. The domestic mercy killer rarely encounters a victim 
having just entered that state, nor, unlike the soldier, do they have the means at hand by 
which to enact the killing. The circumstances of the mercy killing in these instances are 
substantially different from domestic civilian cases and makes the default stance of offering 
aid to all those wounded hard to match with reality. 
 
2.11 The immediacy of the trauma, the circumstances of the battlefield mercy killing 
and the practicalities of legal duties 
 
However, questions do arise over the weight given to the mitigating effects of the immediacy 
and duality of the soldiers situation. These are based upon the concept of professional duty 
which was previously seen to raise doubt over soldiers’ utilising the defence of diminished 
responsibility caused by PTSD in which they were compared with medical practitioners who 
cannot use the defence. This is because they are both acting in their professional capacity and 
therefore are trained to deal with the situations they encounter. Likewise, they are expected to 
perform their duty to professional standards. Previously, it has been seen that the standards 
expected from the soldier may be so high as to take no consideration of the stress of their 
situation upon their actions.
101 It is true that the  courts have been unwilling to lessen the 
degree of criminal liability attached to the soldier when they act criminally, in part due to the 
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influence of sustained stress during active military operations.
 102 However, these cases relate 
mostly to the use of self–defence and the use of excessive force rather than to acts emanating 
from a sense of compassion.  Even so, it has been that the soldier who honestly believes what 
he is doing is right, should not and need not be treated as a murderer. 
 
“The common law is wide enough to achieve a just result without leaving 
the matter to the executive and, where its principles allow this, it should be 
done. In reducing the crime to manslaughter it is not the intention of the 
soldier which is relied on but his honest belief as to his duty. As to the use of 
excessive force,  an unreasonable but honest man who killed might be guilty 
of manslaughter only."
103 
 
In Capt. Semrau’s case it could be argued that he honestly believed what he was doing was 
right for a number of reasons. He did it for his troops safety, they were in a dangerous area 
and were held up whilst awaiting aid for the victim. He may have also acted for the success of 
the mission as they could not achieve their objective, which could potentially save more lives 
than the mortally wounded victim. And finally, from an intention to save the victim further 
suffering. These factors might indicate that his actions were not born from evil motives. The 
fact that he had a gun in his hand during an intense situation, and that he acted without malice 
could be seen as significantconsiderations as to his liability. 
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In R v Clegg,
104 the defendant shot and killed the victim at a checkpoint in Northern Ireland, 
after the vehicle the victim was travelling in failed to stop and several warning shots had been 
fired. His conviction for murder  was ultimately upheld, suggesting that whilst the law  could 
accommodate a lesser charge for the soldier, the professional standards expected of him whilst 
duty bound are of the highest order and situational pressures are not enough to mitigate this 
expectation., 
 
"…this court considers, and we believe that many other fair-minded citizens 
would share this view, that the law would be much fairer if it had been open 
to the trial judge to have convicted Private Clegg of the lesser crime of 
manslaughter on the ground that he did not kill…from an evil motive but 
because,  his  duties  as  a  soldier  having  placed  him…armed  with  a  high-
velocity rifle, he reacted wrongly to a situation which suddenly confronted 
him in the course of his duties. Whilst it is right that he should be convicted 
for  the  unlawful  killing,…we  consider  that  a  law  which  would  permit  a 
conviction for manslaughter would reflect more clearly the nature of the 
offence which he had committed."
105 
 
The imposition of  strict  legal duties may not be practical when they are expected to be 
practiced during the grim realities of warfare and in the aftermath of battle. Whilst the courts 
are unwilling to accept any mitigation, it must be accepted that the nature of  warfare is and 
always has been chaotic, intense and confusing. This makes the courts upholding of high 
professional standards at all times , and the default stance of aiding any wounded  persons, 
difficult to reconcile with reality. In the days when warriors fought in serried ranks and tightly 
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packed formations, there was no chance to collect the wounded, they were stranded where 
they lay or were trampled underfoot.
106 Throughout history the terribly afflicted have been 
dispatched whilst the fighting raged, especially when no hope of aid was available to them.  
Knights were often spared, but this was from altruism and the promise of a hearty ransom,
107 
and was indicative of the innate class bias affecting the treatment of the actor and victim in 
battlefield mercy killings which dichotomises the issue.  
 
‘…the  French  had  not  so  many  to  look  after…the  Zouaves  lessened  the 
number of the Russian wounded by a pretty free use of the knife and bayonet 
after the battle was over.’
108 
 
When the immediate suffering of the dying on the field of battle is evident even pious men 
have  resorted  to  acts  of  mercy  killing.  The  following,  is  the  reply  of  a  Padre,  who 
accompanied British forces on the beaches on D-Day, when he was asked whether he offered 
prayers to the dying, 
 
‘Yes, but I also kept a loaded revolver in my pocket and if the agony of the 
young man was too much, I would end the prayers by shooting him through 
the temple.’
109  
 
The immediacy of the situation, and the urgency of the soldier’s suffering, prompts the need 
for  an  instant  reaction.  The  soldier  has  little  time  to  weigh  his  options  or  consider 
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alternatives, he can await aid, which may be futile, too late, and leave the victim to die 
suffering, or the other extreme sees him shooting or bayoneting the victim and quickly ending 
his suffering. The lengthier the wait before making the choice leads to lengthier suffering. 
This immediacy is one factor that sets apart the mercy killing on the battlefield from its 
domestic counterpart. The effects of the victims suffering experienced by the domestic actor 
are less immediate and more cumulative. 
 
The  lack  of  a  medical  diagnosis  of  the  victim’s  condition  is  another  factor  which  sets 
Semrau’s case apart from the typical domestic situation. This medical diagnosis plays an 
important  role  in  understanding  the  gravity  of  the  act  in  the  eyes  of  the  court.  In  R  v 
Gilderdale,
110 the defendant was cleared of the charge of attempted murder by the jury and a 
guilty plea to assisted suicide was accepte d. The victim, the daughter of the accused , had 
been diagnosised with ME for sixteen years and required regular medical treatment for the 
complications arising from the condition. In Marshall the victim had been diagnosed with a 
number of ailments, including being recognised as deaf and blind. In Webb, the victim, the 
defendant’s wife, suffered from both mental and physical conditions,
111 believing she had 
many conditions, and actually suffering from very real ones, including cancer, incontinence 
and from transient ischaemic attacks.
112 In all of these cases the, nature of the medically 
diagnosed ailments affecting the victim were taken into consideration, influencing the courts 
view of the compassionate motive of the defendant, and ultimately leading each defendant to 
escape a  jail term.
113 However, in Inglis the medical diagnosis can be seen to have acted to 
her detriment  despite her compassionate motive. She acted  contrary to  the  advice of the 
                                                           
110 R v Gilderdale [2010] unreported see Sandra Laville ‘Mercy killing mother cleared of murder after helping 
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111 n.6 above per Lord Judge at para 5 
112 Commonly known as ‘mini strokes’. 
113 n.6 above at para. 27 However, George Webb was initially sentenced to 2 years imprisonment but on a ppeal 
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doctors, who claimed that a good chance existed of the patient’s condition improving.
114  
This no doubt affected the outcome of her trial, a conviction for murder and a sentence to 
serve a minimum ten years imprisonment, reduced to five on appeal.  
 
Semrau represents a situation one step removed from Inglis, in that no medical opinion at all 
was given on the victim’s condition before he acted. No medical personnel, or anyone who 
was qualified to assess the victim’s condition was present on the patrol, as would be typical 
of many such  groups.  Of course, potentially an experienced combat veteran may have a 
reasonable idea of the likelihood of survival. It is likely, though not certain, that Semrau had 
seen previous serious wounds. However, in a combat zone where even medical practitioners 
are now surprised at the survival of many of the wounded, the judgement of a lay combat 
soldier would not withstand scrutiny.
115 Yet it is also likely that he was influenced not only 
by the prospect of the solider suffering prior to his ultimate death  and possibly suffering 
physical abuse at the hands of his adversaries but also by the certainty that if he survived he 
would experience extreme physical disability that would be hard for a soldier to take. 
Regardless, Capt.  Semrau seemingly diagnosed the ailment and the amount of suffering 
himself, subjectively, judging how much suffering and how badly injured the victim was. In 
Inglis such a subjective evaluation of the victim’s condition was criticised by the judge as 
ignoring the wishes of other stakeholders, and wrongly judging that she possessed knowledge 
of the desires of a victim unable to communicate. But the case of Semrau is distinguishable 
from Inglis in this particular instance. Inglis was subject to the full weight of the law because, 
 
‘…perhaps most significantly of all, her previous unsuccessful attempt to kill 
Thomas produced a deterioration in his condition without which, as far as we 
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can see, the possibility of the withdrawal of hydration and nutrition would 
have been most unlikely to arise.’
116 
 
Her  own  actions  had  led  to  the  futility  of  the  victim’s  condition.  They  may  have  also 
exacerbated her feelings of grief and hopelessness because she knew that she was partly 
responsible for the condition. Similarly, Semrau, commanding the attack on the ambushers 
and requesting air support had led to the condition of the Taliban victim. Unlike the facts of 
Inglis,  his  initial  actions  or  first  attempt  to  kill  the  victim  were  not  unlawful,  he  was 
legitimately engaged in combat. A situation by which a crime committed by the defendant led 
to the defendant committing another crime against the victim is markedly different from a 
situation in which the victim has entered into the suffering and mortal state through the legal 
actions  of  the  defendant  and  then  is  ‘put  out’  of  this  state  by  the  illegal  actions  of  the 
defendant. Yet breaking the actions down to the legal semantics fails to reflect the morality of 
the situation. Both Semrau and Inglis had knowledge which influenced their actions, the 
legitimacy of how influential this knowledge was is what ought to be questioned. Part of this 
knowledge would be the life or experiences their victims might be subjected to if instead they 
continued medical treatment. 
 
2.12 Medical treatment for the grievously wounded 
 
Frances Inglis knew that the only way her son would be legally permitted to die would be 
through  the  withdrawal  of  hydration  and  nutrition,  which  she  believed  was  a  ‘barbaric 
death’.
117 Her actions constituted a method by which he would be spared this fate. Likewise, 
Semrau, or the soldier in Semrau’s position, could be informed by the inherent rational fear 
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soldiers  hold  about  being  grievously  wounded  during  battle.  Medical  facilities  have  not 
always been a feature of the armed forces, popular imagination depicts the battlefield being 
filled with the screams of the wounded, this coincides with a tradition of neglect towards the 
provision of aid which has a long tradition. Often delivering the coup de grace was seen as a 
humane way to treat the wounded who today must be protected. The killing of the French 
survivors on the field at Agincourt has been justified in this way. 
 
‘[If] they did not bleed to death, [many of the French wounded] would have 
succumbed to the combined effects of exposure and shock during the night, 
when temperatures might have descended into the middle 30’s Farenheit. It 
was, therefore, not arbitrary brutality when, in crossing the battlefield the 
next morning, the English killed those whom they found alive. They were 
almost certain to have died, in any case, when their bodies would have gone 
to join those which the local peasants under the Bishop of Arras, dug into 
pits  on  the  site.  They  are  said  to  have  buried  about  six  thousand 
altogether.’
118 
 
Even when a permanent armed force was  created the need for a professional took place 
medical contingent was still a secondary consideration. The New Model Army of 1645 saw 
the attachment of surgeons not physicians to the army for the first time, and the Standing 
Army  increased  this  provision  by  adding  a  surgeon’s  mate  to  each  regiment.
119 The 
establishment of Field hospitals near the front and g eneral hospitals for recuperation was 
another development, yet extensive treatment of the wounded was far from welcomed by the 
senior command. The wounded and sick were often seen as malingerers and cowards, senior 
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command allocated very little resource to their care and even less attention. What concern 
was shown to them was often harsh and unrepenting as recorded regretfully by Florence 
Nightingale during the Crimean war. 
 
‘To know that fifty to ninety were dying daily, to be sitting idle in the midst 
of them and to be told by one against whose whim we had to appeal that 
‘these needed no nursing as they were not wounded’!! To pass daily through 
the corridors filled with sick and dying creatures, to hear their moans and see 
their crying necessities.’
120  
 
Aristocratic sentiment towards the enemy wounded was often even more severe than towards 
their own troops, such that General Filangeri at Messina 1848 sentenced a physician to death 
for aiding the enemy wounded.
121   
 
However, even though disregard has often been shown towards the common infantryman who 
is  stricken  on  the  battlefield  the  nature  of  their  wounds  and  medical   knowledge  has 
historically meant that the victims wounds were beyond the help of modern medicine. The 
wounds inflicted in battle are particularly traumatic and the potential for infection to enter the 
wound whilst the wounded soldier l ies  on the field of  battle is high. For instance, the 
weaponry and equipment used in medieval Europe meant that even wounds considered as 
relatively minor today could be fatal. 
 
‘Many [of the French] would have suffered penetrating wounds, either from 
arrows or from thrusts through the weak spots of their armour. Those which 
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pierced the intestines emptying its contents into the abodomen where fatal; 
peritonitis  was  inevitable.  Penetrations  of  the  chest  cavity,  which  had 
probably carried in fragments of dirty clothing, were almost as certain to 
lead to sepsis. Many of the French would have suffered depressed fractures 
of the skull, and there would have been broken backs caused by falls from 
horses in armour at speed. Almost all of these injuries we may regard as 
fatal, the contemporary surgeons being unable to treat them.’
122 
 
Even by the nineteenth century, medical knowledge in Europe had not caught up with the 
power of the military technology, ‘a shell broke the thighs of soldier who is since dead’.
123 
Wounds easily treatable today were often fatal, surgeons could only treat what they saw, and 
abdominal bullets wounds gave the victim a fifty per cent chance of survival.
124 The various 
conditions suffered by the soldier were unknown and confused. 
 
‘Shock  was  recognised  clinically  but  ill  understood…There  was  no 
conception  of  the  modern  concept  of  the  wound  shock,  due  to  loss  of 
blood or other bodily fluid. There was uncertainty about the treatment of 
shock. Stimulants were advocated by some, in the form of brandy or other 
spirits: depressants were advocated by others in the form of opium.’
125 
 
Knowledge of the historic treatment of the wounded and the terrors of being wounded endure 
and it is suggested that modern day soldiers will to some degree be influenced by the failures 
of  the  past.  Some  may  be  prepared  for  death  but  it  is  far  harder  to  prepare  for  intense 
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suffering and debilitating, incapacitating wounds. On modern operations the British soldier is 
supported by a corps of medical resources,
126 and the wounded are treated and evacuated as 
soon as possible. Amputees who would not have survived in the recent past  now often do, 
and even by today’s standards seventy five cases of ‘unexpected survival’ have occurred,
127 
out of five hundred and twenty two seriously wounded personnel serving in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.
128 This ability to save lives   so close to death has an effect on the actions of the 
battlefield mercy killer. Preparation for sudden injuries and living with disfigurement, mental 
and physical disability and the need for constant care can be harder than coming to terms 
with death.
129 Indeed, the soldier may take solace from the fact that in the past they would 
have died from terrible wounds, believing this to be  preferable to their fate in the present. 
Semrau, treating the victim as he himself wished to be treated if the positions were changed, 
was acting on this sentiment. Informed by the inherent understanding of the suffering soldiers 
face when seriously wounded, and that medical aid could be some time away,
130  his actions 
may be morally justified. No soldier, in his mind, would want to awake to the life that this 
victim would awake to, and no soldier can suffer that fate, worse than death, if they are 
unable to awake. 
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129 H C Hanger, B Fogarty, T J Williams, R Sainsbury ‘Stroke patients views on stroke outcomes: death versus 
disability’ [2000] 14(4) Clinical Rehabilitation 417. This claim is supported by a study of twenty four stroke 
victims, as strokes often come aboutly suddenly with little warning. There was a striking preference for sudden 
painless death in the groups. Painless death was preferred to even a minor stroke disability in over one-third of  
individuals, whilst 20% would prefer severe disability rather than painless death. Sixty-nine per cent of stroke 
patients and 82% of controls ranked death as preferable to severe disability. 
130 Semrau and his patrol had marched approximately twenty miles on the day of the mercy killing.  
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2.13 Conclusion 
 
An important note should be made on the argument of the shared commonality and influence 
of isolated ‘military’ experiences  which affect  the actions  of the battlefield mercy killer. 
Throughout it has been argued that, the isolated experiences, the rituals, customs and the 
strains of war affect and unite the warriors in a way which may be perceived as creating a 
common bond or relationship between them. However, the impact of these experiences upon 
the defendant in any such case will not be identical. What is being established is the general 
commonality between soldiers, and not a singularity which makes each individual and each 
military organisation in the same mould.
131 It is a broad investigation into military culture,  
the existence  of a distinct and lasting set of beliefs and values which in turn inform the 
soldier’s perception of right and wrong. These beliefs and values will not be identical in their 
substance  or  their  effect  upon  soldier,  but  there  are  similarities  enough  to  evidence  a 
commonality between the warrior caste in different societies. 
 
When  contemplating  what  justice  is  for  the  battlefield  mercy  killer,  many  of  the  same 
considerations taken into account when deliberating upon a ‘domestic mercy killing’ such as 
Marshall or Webb are relevant. That is to say that when the law is applied to the soldier’s 
situation, the many psychological  influences  affecting them should be seen as  mitigating 
considerations as is the case with many domestic mercy killers. However, to superimpose the 
case law from domestic situations upon the soldier could inflict harsh justice upon them. 
Consider, for example, the detrimental view the courts take on acting contrary to medical 
advice, evidenced by Inglis. Applying this to the soldier, who does not even consult with 
medically trained personnel, but makes the diagnosis of the victims situation on his own, 
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could mean a sentence for murder and a mandatory life sentence being imposed, even if they 
had no previous, immediate or accessible means to consult medical opinion as the defendant 
did in Inglis. Whilst the court should consider these mitigating circumstances they should not 
see  the  two  acts  as  identical,  for  the  pressures  and  standards  upon  each  of  the  different 
defendants are too different to apply the domestic considerations directly upon the battlefield 
case. The soldier, whilst under the stress of the battlefield should not be judged according to 
the exact same criteria as the domestic mercy killer because the soldier has a different attitude 
towards killing and has immediate access to the means.  
 
This difference occurs for several reasons. First, the duality of the situation in war is more 
confusing than in peacetime as the soldiers role is to both to kill and preserve life, sometimes 
he must kill his enemy and at other times he must protect them, the civilian need only ‘not 
kill’. The taboo is clearly defined to the civilian but less so to the soldier, this is a factor 
which  is  markedly  different  to  anything  the  courts  would  consider  in  a  domestic  mercy 
killing case.  Second, the immediacy of the situation during battle and  the availability of 
weapons with which to carry out the act of killing presents a new challenge. The victim 
quickly enters into the grievous state and the actor is immediately confronted with this, unlike 
the general perception of the long suffering or hospitalised victim in domestic cases. There is 
little time for the military  actor to  weigh their  choices,  and the  court should  accept  this 
immediacy as a relevant factor. Third, the soldier’s cultural experience is markedly different 
from the civilian cultural experience, and this informs their perceptions of what they feel may 
be morally ‘right’ if not the legal course of action. These perceptions of right, just and legal 
are discussed in more detail later. Following this, it may be that the emotions affecting the 
two  types  of  defendant  differ.  It  is  easier  to  morally  exculpate  the  civilian  acting  from 
emotions of compassion and sympathy, compared to the soldier, who whilst acting from these  
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motives is also affected by the vengeance, anger and aggression which war naturally causes. 
That is not to say they are malicious murderers, but rather that the emotional dilemma they 
face is more complex than simply attributing their actions to a compassionate or sympathetic 
motive. Finally, a point which should be made individually, but is intrinsic in all of those 
before, is the extremity of the situation within which the soldier finds himself. These factors 
should lead the court to view the case in the light of domestic mercy killings, to allow the 
imposition  of  perhaps,  a  different  charge,  the  application  of  the  defence  of  diminished 
responsibility or the at least the mitigation of sentence. Yet, they should also mean that the 
court accepts that such an instance is markedly different from situations which the domestic 
common law has developed to deal with, and that black and white application of case law 
may lead to an injustice. The pressures  and influences on the battlefield are similar, but 
heightened in a way that the civilian case law cannot easily address. 
 
The contrary view is that the full weight of the law should be applied to battlefield mercy 
killers because their actions should be seen as pure murder, in no slight part because they are 
trained professionals with a duty to uphold the ethical standards of the profession of arms. 
Semrau did not take into account the wish of his victim, did not offer him medical aid and 
acted arbitrarily in making his decision. This is an obtuse stance, ignoring the duality, the 
immediacy and the complexity of circumstances that the soldier is presented with, and is 
much dependant on several factors which are integral to the development of this thesis. First, 
the strict adherence to the ‘sanctity of life’ principle which, although has begun to be seen as 
sometimes  unnecessary,
132is still pervasive in legal and moral argument on the matter . 
Second, any battlefield misconduct, such as mercy killing,  carries with it an overt political 
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taint.  This  has  yet  to  be  mentioned  but  is  discussed  in  detail  later.
133 The damage that 
misconduct can do to the reputation of the military and the legitimacy of the State’s rationale 
for the conflict will certainly influence the type and means of justice the soldier is expected to 
face. If it is seen that an example must be made of the battlefield mercy killer, then a harsh 
imposition of justice may be favoured. Finally, this harsh stance rests upon the inability of the 
law to understand the nature of this act, and to accept that context and circumstance are 
integral to its understanding. The inability to marry good intentions with criminal intention is 
something that affects the mercy killer, both domestically and on the battlefield to a greater 
degree than in other offences.   However, in order to deliver true justice to the soldier it must 
be considered which has greater value, the morality of the soldier’s compassionate act or the 
black letter of the law and intention. 
 
To conclude, as in domestic mercy killing cases, the mental condition and the entirety of the 
individual’s circumstances should be understood when applying the law to the mercy killing 
soldier. However, the law should  also  accept that the soldier is experiencing exceptional 
circumstances which the common law is not equipped to provide an equitable remedy. In the 
interests  of  justice  the  courts  should  take  these  influences  into  account  when  passing 
judgement on the battlefield mercy killed. 
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Chapter Three 
 
How to try the mercy killing soldier? 
Evaluating the common law, international law and the military justice system 
concerning their ability to adequately deal with the battlefield mercy killer 
 
An Overview 
 
After considering the different influences which are at play when a soldier commits an act of 
battlefield mercy killing, the question remains as to what is the best judicial system by which 
to try the soldier. There are three competing branches of law which may be suitable. First, 
under  the  civil  criminal  law  he  could  be  charged  with  murder.  Semrau,  was  tried  under 
Canadian law, and thus charged with the offence of second degree murder, which has no 
equivalent in English law, a difference discussed elsewhere.
1 Second, military justice could 
impose disciplinary charges whilst hearing the charge of murder in a court martial. Third, his 
breach  of  the  Geneva  Convention  could  lead  to  a  prosecution  for  war  crimes  und er 
international law. Each  of these systems  potentially  leads to both negative and positive 
outcomes for the actor and the reputation of that particular system. A brief overview of the 
whole followed by a deeper break down of the parts will be helpful in u nderstanding how 
each system interacts with the other and how each may bridge gaps or leave  holes that the 
others try, inadequately, to fill.  Through this analysis a better understanding of the justice the 
soldier may possibly receive under each approach will be gained, and thus the best means to 
try the soldier can be evaluated. 
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3.1 Justice for the Soldier: Institutional Justice or Moral Responsibility 
 
Giving the soldier legal justice can differ from the perception of what is a morally way just 
way to treat the battlefield mercy killer. Legal justice is delivered in accordance with the 
institutional rules of the criminal justice system, taking into account the appropriate criminal 
doctrine. Such doctrines generalise culpability under the concept of intention. Simplified, that 
is to say that the defendant is guilty of all offences committed through actions they intended 
without lawful excuse. Further, the definition of the offence itself is narrow; the actus reus is 
fulfilled by simply committing those defined actions.  
 
The combination of these two narrow concepts produces an outcome which is devoid of any 
contemplation of other influences on the act other than the action itself and, for instance, the 
intention to hit, kick, stab, take, etc. Both are focused on a narrow concept of responsibility 
which is attributed by asking first, were these, specified, actions performed; second, were 
those actions intended? If both questions are answered in the affirmative then the defendant’s 
guilt is proclaimed and ‘justice’ is served. Of course, such a generalised method is ideal to 
process acts which can be committed in a number of different ways and under many different 
circumstances but which would still be considered criminal. In this way, individuals within 
wider  society  know  whether  they  are  permitted  to  behave  in  a  certain  way,  it  promotes 
consistency and certainty and in a vast number of circumstances it is an appropriate means to 
deliver a justice that corresponds to the social condemnation of the offender’s behaviour. 
 
However, this approach fails to take into account the many other influences that inform a 
person’s  behaviour,  those  forces  which  caused  them  to  behave  that  way.  Many  of  these 
influences are not easily attributable to the defendant, being either totally out of their control  
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or because they are unaware that such forces are informing their actions. Without considering 
these circumstances the criminal justices system’s treatment of a defendant under it’s narrow 
interpretation is often in conflict with how the offender should be treated and labelled. In the 
following chapter the likely treatment of the battlefield mercy killing soldier by differing 
courts, legal systems, doctrine and procedure and the institutional justice each might deliver 
to the soldier, will be judged against the a concept of what might represent justice for the 
soldier if all of the wider influences impacting upon him when he committed the killing were 
considered. The effect of these wider influences is to inform the observer of the soldier’s 
moral responsibility for the action; how wrong or right he was to act in that way at that time. 
Moral responsibility is thus closely related to the concept of fair justice to the soldier in line 
with  them  being  treated  as  they  truly  deserve  and  not  in  line  with  them  being  treated 
comparably to  offenders whose actions  are very different  but  similarly  categorised under 
normal institutional justice. It is in effect another means to assess blameworthiness, full blame 
is assigned if an offender intended the act and is its single cause but blame is reduced if the 
act is not wholly intended or has multiple causes.
2 Such an assessment can produce a different 
evaluation of the defendant’s blameworthiness than the criminal justice system. 
 
The most obvious relevant influences which affect the soldier enacting a battlefield mercy 
killing  are  those  were  considered  in  the  previous  chapter,  namely,  ‘frenzy’,  the  isolated 
military culture, the psychological impact of war and the relationships soldiers have with one 
another. Such factors will have an effect on the soldier’s moral responsibility for the act. 
Before we consider the adequacy of the ‘justice’ to the soldier delivered by applying the 
following procedure and doctrine, first it is important to consider why the soldier’s moral 
responsibility should be an important consideration to evaluating the treatment of the soldier.  
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The foundation of the concept of moral responsibility lays in theories of determinism,
3 but 
can here be whittled down to the simple question of whether a person can only be truly and 
wholly morally responsible for their actions when instead of committing the act in question 
they could have made another choice or acted in another manner?
4  Moral responsibility is 
associated with wrongdoing, in the same way as criminal culpability, it seeks to attribute 
responsibility to those who can be legitimately blamed, in this way, criminal penalties 
represent this condemnation when someone commits a criminal act for which society holds 
them wholly to blame. But when a person has acted improperly because circumstances have 
made it impossible to do anything but act in that manner it might be said that the o ffender’s 
moral responsibility is substantially lower. 
 
Take for instance the soldier behaving from ‘frenzy’, acting from an irresistible impulse over 
which he has little or no control. The previous chapter contained an account of a trench 
clearance  by  British  soldiers  during  the  Great  War.
5 The  Sergeant  in  a  young  officer’s 
company  killed  a  surrendering  German  shortly  after  combat,  but  the  Sergeant  was  not 
condemned by the officer’s companion, rather his responsibility was downplayed because, 
‘After all, he is a good man. He was probably half off his head.’
6 The fact that a person was 
acting because of external influences on his mentality is not an unknown consideration in the 
criminal law. When it is found to be a cause in the actions of the defendant then special 
defences such as diminished responsibility, discussed in depth latter, can apply.
7 The reason 
that in such circumstances the actors moral responsibility is lessened, is because to attribute 
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7 Cross reference to criminal law chapter and page on diminished responsibility.  
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moral responsibility a belief must exist that ‘indignation or resentment would be a fitting 
response…’, and in these situations this is not the case.
8 
 
But this formulation can be taken further than merely excusing the attribution of full moral 
responsibility upon those who act uncontrollably or because of some impulse. The furthest 
extent of this philosophy is a circular argument, that no one can be truly morally responsible 
for their actions, because nothing can be causa sui, the cause of itself, in as much as nothing 
happens in isolation but rather all circumstances are affected by other goings on, and to be 
truly responsible for one’s own actions one would have to be causa sui.
9 Even when it is said 
that  a  person  has  acted  from  ‘reason’,  reason  indicating  that  one  acts  from  a  mentally 
conscious standpoint and is capable of having moral responsibility attached to their acts, it is 
argued  that  mental  consciousness  is  informed  at  any  given  moment  by  the  particular 
individual’s surroundings. Nor is it possible that a person can choose to be conscious of the 
way one is, true moral responsibility can only be attributable to an individual if they had 
intentionally brought about the way they are.
10 
 
The clearest problem with this polemicized standpoint is that if practiced it would inevitably 
lead to the view that criminals are morally blameless,  
 
‘…the human mind has not even an iota of power of creative adaptation to 
environmental  demands  and  that,  consequently  all  human  conduct  is 
accidental;…thus  this  view  implies  that  we  can  speak  of  the  criminal, 
                                                           
8 R.J. Wallace Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Harvard University Press 1994) 77 
9 Galen Strawson ‘The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility’ [1994]7(5) Philosophical Studies 24 27 
10 Galen Strawson ‘The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility’ [1994]7(5) Philosophical Studies 24 32  
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disregarding the very causation of the criminal, as of non-criminal behaviour, 
in the individual case.’
11 
 
In turn this raises questions as to whether it is justifiable to punish offenders. Punishment 
itself is justified by the social acceptability and desirability of retribution or deterrence,
12 if 
the perception of a person’s moral responsibility is diminished to a minimal degree on the 
basis of the limiting effect of all the circumstances upon an actor up until that point, then the 
rationale  for  punishment  and  attributing  blame  could  not  exist.  Nor  does  such  a  view 
correspond  with  a  primary  function  of  attributing  responsibility  in  the  first  place,  which 
originates from the need of the group to protect itself from inimical acts of individuals which 
if  allowed  to  be  carried  out  freely  would  threaten  the  group’s  existence.    Rather,  when 
considering how to attribute moral responsibility to a person, a rational approach should be 
considered, which takes into account  both  the relevant  circumstances  of the offender but 
which also recognises their duty to exercise some control over their actions regardless of the 
circumstances. 
 
‘Chance hereditary, environment  have settled  many things  for us;  we are 
hedged about by bounds we cannot pass; but these bounds are not so narrow 
as we are sometimes taught, and within them we have a considerable degree 
of freedom and responsibility.’
13 
 
                                                           
11 S Sheldon Glueck Mental Disorder and Criminal Law: A Study in Medic – Sociological Jurisprudence (Little 
Brown and Co, Boston 1927) 444 
12 Cross reference to the last chapter on retribution and rationale for punishment and why it is 
inconsistent with punishing the offender. 
13 S Sheldon Glueck Mental Disorder and Criminal Law: A Study in Medic – Sociological Jurisprudence (Little 
Brown and Co, Boston 1927) 445  
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It is not too far to reason that humans possess a capacity for consciously guiding their own 
conduct in line with legal sanctions, but in certain circumstances this capacity is expected to 
stretch  too  far.  For  instance,  in  situations  like  the  battlefield  mercy  killing,  where  the 
circumstances of its commission are crucially important and which is so unique so as to 
nullify  the  benefits  brought  about  by  the  pragmatism  of  the  generalised  approach  of  the 
criminal  justice  system,  the  tendency  in  legal  thought  to  attribute  agency,  and  thus 
responsibility, to the individual alone denies the existence and relevance of collective agency 
and the influence of wider circumstances to the detriment of fair justice.
14 In these situations, 
considerations of the defendant’s moral responsibility will have the effect of tempering the 
view of the mere application of institutional justice which would deem the killing as murder, 
attaching all of the negative penalties and connotations associated to that label even though it 
was committed from the dual considerations of mercy and compassion. Furthermore, moral 
responsibility can be interpreted in light of positive responses also, for instance a person may, 
to some degree be praised for some actions, even those which some would attach blame and 
resentment to. The compassionate mercy killing of a mortally wounded soldier is one such act 
which evokes opposing responses.
15 
 
In the previous chapter, the influence of the military culture on the actions of the soldier was 
considered. This culture and the affects it has on the soldier’s behaviour are vitally important 
when considering what level of moral responsibility should be attributed to the soldier after 
they  commit  a  battlefield  mercy  killing.  It  is  this  culture  that  makes  the  mercy  killing 
soldier’s  actions  different  from  the  civilian  who  kills  during  peacetime;  they  are 
considerations which are unique to the soldier, circumstances which don’t affect the ordinary 
                                                           
14 C Soares ‘Corporate Versus Individual Moral Responsibility [2003] 46(2) Journal of Business Ethics 143 148 
15 John Fischer and Mark Ravizza Moral Responsibility: Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral 
Responsibility (Cambridge University Press , Cambridge 2000) 23  
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person. However, under a narrow legal  application  the institutional  justice the  act  would 
receive fails to contemplate or give credence to such circumstances.  
 
Similarly, the psychological impact of battle considered in the previous chapter is another 
circumstance  affecting  the  actions  of  the  soldier  which  represent  a  set  of  reasonable 
considerations when assessing the justice which the soldier would likely receive. This is not a 
factor  relevant  in  a  civilian  killing  during  peace  time,  in  response  to  which  the  law 
surrounding homicide has developed, but nonetheless there is an inability to acknowledge this 
difference.  Again  a  narrow  application  of  the  law  negates  such  circumstances  as  being 
relevant in the application of the justice that is delivered. This results in a clash between the 
blameworthiness attributed to the soldier under the justice system he is tried by and the level 
of moral responsibility that the collective feel is truly attributable to him. 
 
It  is  this  conflict  between  moral  responsibility  as  the  foundation  of  just  treatment  to  the 
battlefield  mercy  killer  and  the  institutional  justice  that  he  would  actually  receive  which 
informs the premise in  this thesis that the current justice a battlefield mercy killer could 
expect to receive would be inadequate. It will be seen that, contrary to what shall be called 
public  opinion,  currently  the  battlefield  mercy  killer  will  be  either,  treated  too  harshly, 
labelled incorrectly or the act itself will not be adequately appreciated. This, as shall be seen 
is due in part to the system under which the soldier will be tried, and in part due to the use of 
poorly fitting doctrines, which are adequate for more general types of killing but not for 
soldier’s accused of battlefield mercy killing.    
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3.2 The Case of Baha Mousa 
 
In the recent case involving the death of a detainee in Iraq,
16 the British soldiers in whose 
custody the victim was were tried for various offences ranging from murder and causing 
actual bodily harm to military offences. The cases involving the death of Baha Mou sa gave 
rise to questions from the three branches of law, none of which when answered gave a 
satisfactory and clear conclusion as to the correct legal treatment of the defendants. Whilst 
this case did not involve a mercy killing, it did involve a victim wh om the laws of war 
regarded  as a protected person, an d whose death was beyond what is  permissible during 
conflict. It also involved soldiers who were on operation in a zone of considerable violence. 
 
The Baha Mousa case, although it does not represent a battlefield mercy killing, does 
represent military misconduct which could have been tried under three very different systems 
of law and thus three very different types of justice could have been delivered. It is helpful, as 
no case of battlefield mercy killing has come before the courts of England and Wales, but 
Baha Mousa has enough procedural similarities to identify some of the main areas of 
contention if ever one should. 
 
Baha Mousa  was  an  Iraqi  civilian, who was detained and died in  the  custody of  British 
soldiers in 2003.  The hotel clerk was arrested on the 14
th of September 2003, thirty six hours 
later he was found dead. A post mortem revealed ninety-three separate injuries, including a 
broken nose, broken ribs and serious kidney damage.
17 Seven soldiers faced court martial 
accused of military, common law and international criminal law offences. The charges of 
                                                           
16 The Baha Mousa case which was the subject of various trials, which shall be discussed at length in the 
following pages. 
17 Robert Fisk ‘The Story of Baha Mousa’ The Independent (London 12
th July 2009)  
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manslaughter  and  occasioning  actual  bodily  harm
18 (ABH)  and  battery
19 against Corporal 
Payne and Sergeant Stacey respectively, are of particular interest.  
 
Such a case evidences perfectly the differing routes that may be taken to bring the defendant 
in a battlefield mercy killing to justice and also what sort of justice each of these r outes may 
deliver. As previously mentioned, the common law concerning domestic mercy killings has 
not developed in order to cope with an instance of mercy killing on the battlefield. This 
effectively leaves a problematic ‘space’ which requires the application of justice. However, it 
is how justice is applied and the type of justice that is delivered which is of importance to the 
mercy killer. There is a stark difference between the routes open to the domestic mercy killer 
and the routes that may be taken for the battlefield mercy killer.  
 
3.3 Uses of Civil Criminal Law in military crimes 
 
It may be that using the civil criminal law of England and Wales produces suitable outcomes 
but unwanted consequences for those administering a battlefield coup de grace. As mentioned, 
treating the crime in the same way as R v Webb, R v Marshall and R v Inglis could either lead 
to the mitigation of the sentence passed on the soldier through the imposition of manslaughter 
by diminished responsibility, or a lengthier jail sentence and unwarranted stigma.
20 When the 
court considered the psychological impact the victim’s condition had upon the defendant and 
the nature of their relationship, as in Webb and Marshall, manslaughter convictions were 
passed.  However,  in  Inglis,  the  past  experiences  of  the  defendant,  namely  her  previous 
attempt on her son’s life and her refusal to heed medical advice, meant she suffered the full 
weight of the law; a murder conviction, and mandatory life sentence was passed. In Inglis it 
                                                           
18 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s.47 
19 ibid s.39 
20 See Chapter 1, 1.6 p.12  
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may be said that the conviction led to a moral stigma being attached to the defendant, which 
may be regarded as too heavy. Incorrect attachment of moral stigma is implicit in asking 
whether the common law should be used to prosecute soldiers in times of war.  
 
That the common law was used to prosecute the men raises concerns about the different legal 
perspectives  possible  about  such  actions,  and  how  the  application  of  different  legal 
procedures and interpretation can potentially change perceptions of the act. For example, 
international lawyers may view Sergeant Stacey’s violent acts in the case of Baha Mousa as 
war crimes
21 or perhaps torture.
22 However, instead of the imposition of these grave charges, 
they were dealt with through a common law charge of occasioning actual bodily harm, the 
type of which may be used to prosecute assaults on the underground.
23 But war in Iraq bears 
no resemblance to peacetime in London; by dealing with the action as a breach of military 
discipline the distinctions between the gravity of the breaches and the severity of the crime is 
lost. The soldier has a duty to protect and behave appropriately whilst on operations , which 
outstrips his civilian counterpart. Likewise, a manslaughter charge for an act likened to 
torturing to death is inappropriate if torture is understood as an act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person , often for such 
purposes as obtaining a confession or punishing him for an act he has or is  suspected of 
having committed.
24 A charge of manslaughter can infer that the result of the actions was 
                                                           
21 Statute of Rome Art. 7 
22 ibid. at Art.8(2)(b)(ii) 
23 n.4 above. 
24 UN Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment Part I Article I states 
‘For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination 
of  any  kind,  when  such  pain  or  suffering  is  inflicted  by  or  at  the  instigation  of  or  with  the  consent  or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.’  
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unintended,
25 or  that  it was  the result  of  reckless  behaviour. However,  the subsequent 
inhuman treatment charge brought against Payne infers that he was indifferent to the amount 
or result of the suffering that he caused his victim.
26 Furthermore, the actions committed by 
the soldiers become more serious when one considers that the victim was owed a duty of care 
by the soldiers who were his custodians, especially as he was attacked in their custody, not 
during a flashpoint whilst on patrol during confusion and high tempers. The common law has 
developed primarily to administer justice in civilian circumstances and does not always 
translate effectively to offences during military operations war crimes are unlike domestic 
crimes, being more serious, and treating them as domestic crimes is u nresponsive to this 
behaviour.  
 
3.4 Criminal stigma and the inadequacy of the domestic criminal law concerning war 
crimes 
 
In Payne, applying the common law trivialised the conduct of the defendants. The offences 
held within the common law are not specific, nor do they attach the correct label to clearly 
identify what the defendant has done. Equally murders committed during war are not fully 
encompassed by the civill crime of murder, which will generally be imposed in times of 
peace. 
 
‘It would not be sufficient to criminalise these offences in accordance 
with  the  penal  code  relating  to  homicide...There  should  therefore  be 
                                                           
25 Jack K Weber Some Provoking Aspects of Voluntary Manslaughter Law [1981] 10 Anglo American Law 
Review 159 160 
26 International Criminal Court Act 2001 Art. 8(2)(a)(ii)  
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specific  provisions  relating  to...[crimes]...against  humanity  and  war 
crimes in international legislation.’
27 
 
The stance of the International Criminal Court means that it is only used as a court of last 
resort in  cases  where a  national court is  unable or unwilling to  prosecute the  case. This 
presupposes the existence within the national legislation of legal concepts which cover the 
particulars of a war crime. In Payne, it meant that the ABH charges were brought against 
defendants who had been involved in the systematic physical and mental degradation of the 
victim, and it is argued that this is inadequate. Those that advocate the priority of the national 
court often argue that this allows a minimalist and therefore effective means of remedying the 
breach through the most efficient means.
28 But this approach has two clear disadvantages. 
First,  the offences  in  the  criminal  law  correspond  only  roughly  to  the definitions  and 
requirements foreseen under international law . For instance for the p urposes of  Payne, 
compare the offences of torture, found in the Statute of Rome, and occasioning actual bodily 
harm. 
 
‘"Torture"  means  the  intentional  infliction  of  severe  pain  or  suffering, 
whether  physical  or  mental,  upon  a  person  in  the  custody  or  under  the 
control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;’
29 
                                                           
27 M Bergsumo M Harlem N Hagashi ‘Importing Core International Crimes into National Law’ [2010] 1FICHL 
1 3  
28 S J Hankins ‘Address to the Forum for International Criminal and Humanitarian Law’ (Oslo: 27
th/10/2006) 
29 n.7 above at Art. 7 s.2(e)  
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There  is  no  statutory  definition  of  what  constitutes  ABH,  hence  the  common  law  and 
sentencing guidelines
30 are required for a more definite comprehension, but it is clear that that 
it can describe a crime of the magnitude of torture. 
 
‘Whosoever  shall  be  convicted  upon  an  indictment  of  any  assault 
occasioning  actual  bodily  harm  shall  be  liable  ...  to  be  kept  in  penal 
servitude’
31 
 
‘For this purpose we think that "bodily harm" has its ordinary meaning and 
includes any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort 
of the prosecutor. Such hurt or injury need not be permanent, but must, no 
doubt, be more than merely transient and trifling.’
32 
 
Likewise, consider how international law describes and contextualises the criminal killing of a 
wounded adversary, in which it is also linked to acts such as mutilation and torture. 
 
‘In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious 
violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against persons taking no 
active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have 
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, 
detention or any other cause: ‘ 
 
                                                           
30  Sentencing  Council  Assault  Definitive  Guideline  2011  available  at 
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Assault_definitive_guideline_-_Crown_Court.pdf  last  accessed 
27/1/2012 
31 n.4 above. 
32 R v Donovan [1934] AER 207 Per Swift J  
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‘(1)Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, 
cruel treatment and torture;’
33 
 
If  the  battlefield  mercy  killing  was  treated  thus,  then  not  only  would  the  killer  be  over 
stigmatised by the murder conviction, they would then also be labelled as a war criminal, the 
same label used for those accused of genocide such as Slobodan Milosevic and his ilk. The 
second disadvantage to the minimalist approach which advocates the use of national civil 
laws first concerns criminal penalties. Just as the law may not correctly label the criminal, 
either being too harsh or too soft with its inference to guilt, the punishments available may 
not be commensurate with the seriousness of the international crimes.
34 
 
As touched upon, there is also the problem of too little stigma being attached in some cases 
whilst too much is attached in others . Donald Payne  aggressively killed a man under his 
protection from a wicked motivation and was charged with manslaughter  because national 
law was used to prosecute him. As suggested previously, manslaughter convictions can have 
less stigma attached to them than a murder conviction, and it is also forwarded that they have 
less stigma attached to them than the label of war criminal , which Payne’s acts could also 
have been construed as. However, for a battlefield mercy killer acting from compassion, it is 
possible that if either international or national criminal law was followed then the criminal 
label attached to the offender would have far greater negative connotations attached to it. If 
the decision in Inglis was persuasive, the defendant would be charged with murder, attaching 
a  greater  stigma  and  penalty  than  incurred  by  the  manslaughter  conviction  in  Payne. 
Motivation is of course not normally considered by the courts, but that does not mean that it 
is fair to inflict upon the soldier acting from a genuinely compassionate, motivation in order 
                                                           
33 Statute of Rome 1998 Art. 7 s.2(c)(1) 
34 n.13 above at 7  
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to aid the victim a greater punishment than the solider acting callously to the intentional 
detriment  of  his  victim.  Indeed,  as  shall  be  seen  in  cases  of  assisted  suicide,  when  a 
compassionate motive exists it can play a part in the decision as to whether it is appropriate to 
prosecute in the public interest.
35 
 
Previously, it was stated that the use of the national courts trivialised the seriousness of the 
crime. But, it can argued that instead of trivialising the act, using the domestic courts in such 
cases also protects the soldier from receiving the heavy stigma which would be allocated in 
an international criminal court. Compare the circumstances in Payne with the gruesome acts 
of Nazi henchmen or members of similar totalitarian regimes. The henchmen are acting from 
ideological hatred, against a whole class of persons. Whereas, individuals like Payne may be 
best considered as bad eggs, who are perhaps pushed further away from their previous moral 
boundaries through combat stress and peer pressure. The preamble of the Geneva Convention 
states that the label of war crime should be reserved for grave breaches of international law. 
Payne,  when  understand  in  light  of  this  reservation,  does  not  present  facts  that  are 
comparably grave, such as genocide or the systematic torture or rape of certain classes of 
people. To deem misconduct as such could thus damage the deterrent effectiveness the label 
‘war criminal’ possesses. 
 
Because  of  the  differing  context,  treating  soldiers  engaged  in  an  operational  military 
environment the same as those in a civilian environment can do both the solider and the 
victim  a  great  injustice,  the  definitional  inability  of  common  law  offences  to  match  the 
morality of wartime actions makes the transference conceptually unsound. Interpreting such 
crimes thus is a broad interpretation, and effectively gives universal jurisdiction to common 
                                                           
35 The Director of Public Prosecutions Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting 
Suicide 2010  
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law crimes such as occasioning ABH and murder, by converting them into crimes against 
humanity. This presupposes that there is a universal understanding of the nature of these 
crimes and thus there are universal international pre-emptory norms in which some behaviour 
is unacceptable and thus should be dealt with in the best possible manner by the national 
government.
36 For instance, when the Spanish government used civil law offences  to bring 
charges against General Pinochet for crimes in Ar gentina and Chile it had to use terrorism 
laws as his act were difficult to reconcile with Spanish domestic law.
37 There was no means 
to prosecute him for being a tyrannical and murderous dictator and thus  it was neccessary to 
bastardise  existing  law;  Pinochet  was  not  however  a  terrorist  in  the  way  the  word  is 
commonly understood. In the same way as in Payne, where the actions of the soldiers did not 
match up the common understanding of ABH, in a battlefield mercy killing, the act is not one 
which  many  people  would  consider  as  stereotypical  murder,  particularly  when  the 
compassionate motive is taken into account It embodies a different set of values to those 
usually  associated  with  the  offence.  The  transference  of  the  common  law  crime  to  the 
battlefield  mercy  killing  is  a  mismatch  which  raises  many  questions  about  the  moral 
culpability of the action.
38 
 
3.5 Overview of the criminal law’s worthiness to prosecute military misconduct 
 
The use of common law crimes is not the best way to impose sanctions on the battlefield 
mercy killer. First, it is difficult to marry the nature of the act with any comparable offence 
and this risks incorrect labelling and stigmatisation. Second, in doing so the crime is given a 
broad interpretation, and as such certainty and clarity are lost in the application of the offence, 
because they essentially deal with crimes with which people hold a common understanding of 
                                                           
36 M Del Caria, M Carrasco & J A Fernandez ‘Re Pinochet’ 93 American Journal of International Law 690 696 
37 ibid. at 696 
38 See chapter 8.  
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the wrongdoing and which take place in context specific situations. However, the use of war 
crimes legislation in all but cases of the gravest breaches has the adverse effect of weakening 
its deterrent effectiveness. Whatever the complications and inadequacy of this approach, it is 
accepted that there remains a need to exercise criminal jurisdiction, even if it is of a national 
nature, over those responsible for the grossest human rights abuses. But in the case of the 
mercy killing soldier there is often no ‘gross’ abuse of individual rights and thus the reason 
for applying the law in such a manner is ill founded. 
 
One solution may be to enable the law to recognise certain offences in war as extraordinary 
crimes which are accompanied by diminished levels of culpability.
39A further solution has 
been to incorporate distinct statutory provisions which deal with the issue of war crimes. This 
has already happened in the UK.
40 However, as shall be seen, the use of war crimes is yet to 
be effectively evaluated because of the reluctance national governments have with admitting 
that members of their arm ed forces committed a war crime, in  Payne  the defendant was 
charged  with  a  war  crime  under    International  Criminal  Court  Act  2001  as  well  as 
manslaughter.
41 Members of the armed forces may however also be tried by a   military court 
martial and they may be subjected to specific disciplinary charges. 
 
3.6 Military Discipline 
 
Semrau, like Donald Payne, was tried in a military court and charged with the two military 
offences of disgraceful conduct and negligently performing a military duty,
42 plus the civil 
                                                           
39 George Fletcher ‘The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt’ [2002] 
111 Yale Law Journal 1499 1543 
40 n.12 above at s.51(1) 
41 C K Hall ‘Universal Jurisdiction: New Uses for an Old Tool’ in M Lattimer & P Sands (Ed.s) Justice for 
Crimes Against Humanity (Hart Publishing 2003) 213 
42 National Army Act 1985 s.93 and s.124 respectively  
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offence  of  second  degree  murder.  The  close  similarity  of  the  military  justice  systems  of 
Canada and the United Kingdom allows sound comparisons to be made between Semrau and 
a British soldier accused of a battlefield mercy killing in a UK court martial.
43 
 
The primary aim of military justice is to administer discipline in order to maintain the 
efficiency of the army based on a doctrine of superior orders. Civil crimes can  also be heard 
in a court martial, and Donald Payne was charged with committing a civil offence contrary to 
section 70 of the Army Act 1955, that is to say manslaughter. Such crimes are often regarded 
as threatening military discipline and effectiveness rather than as being primarily concerned 
with criminal behaviour.
44 Capt. Semrau also faced a civilian charge, that of second degree 
manslaughter. It could be argued as evidenced by the sentiments of the judge that the court 
primarily saw the act as a breach of military discipline rather than a crime in itself. 
 
‘We need discipline and we need to keep our professionalism, that’s what 
distinguishes us from every other guy with a gun in this country.’
45 
 
As with the common law system there are possible problems caused by military system when 
dealing with cases of battlefield mercy killing. Both have the potential to blur the distinction 
between the gravity of the wrong doing and the severity of the criminal label and sanctions 
attached to them. Whereas, the common law system does this by using ill-fitting offences to 
marry with the international requirements, service law does this by imposing a distinct set of 
disciplinary charges upon defendants which are only applicable to service personnel. Three of 
                                                           
43 The history of this link is discussed in Chapter 4. 
44 See Chapter 7. 
45 Lt. Col. Perron the Judge in the Semrau case as cited in Christie Blatchford ‘For the jury ion Semrau case the 
penalty did not fit the crime’ Globe and Mail 19
th July 2010  
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the defendants in the Payne case were charged with negligently performing a military duty,
46 
an offence which is comparable to the military charge brought against Capt . Semrau and, as 
discussed previously, evidences that there is a high expectation that soldiers will uphold their 
professional standards.
47 However, given that such military charges were so evident in Payne 
and constituted the only offence Semrau was convicted of, it could be said that maintaining 
high  professional  standards  is  being  trumpeted  above  imposing  the  appropriate  criminal 
sanctions. Further, the use of such charges is wide and varied. For instance, in Semrau and 
Payne the charge was used in a case of mercy killing and one involving an act charged as a 
war crime. Military charges are incapable of distinguishing the nature of the act involved and 
perhaps  military  authorities  are worried about  the use of criminal  sanctions  which could 
undermine the integrity of their force.  
 
The military authorities in Payne spoke about the victim’s death in ‘worryingly euphemistic’ 
terms,
48 confirming their fear that the ‘uncomfortable facts of the case’ would potentially 
undermine  the  operational  effectiveness  of  the  Army.
49 It  appeared that their concerns 
focused upon the reputation of the institution rather than any direct outrage at the killing, 
which  took  place  during  an  unlawful  ‘conditioning  process.’
50 Likewise,  although  it  was 
accepted that Capt. Semrau had shot an injured enemy combatant and therefore a protected 
person, the court found Semrau guilty on a solitary charge concerning military discipline. The 
military judge emphasised that he had failed in his duty as an officer to set an example to his 
subordinates. 
 
                                                           
46 Army Act 1955 s.29A(b) 
47 See chapter 1, 6 and 8. 
48 Peter Bradley & Gerry Simpson ‘The Death of Baha Mousa’ [2007] Melbourne Journal of International Law 
340 344 
49 ‘General  Dannatt  Speaks  after  Close  of  Cpl  Page  Court  Martial’,  Defence  News  (UK)  30
th  April  2007 
available from http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/Archive last accessed April 2nd 2011 
50 ibid.  
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‘How can we expect our soldiers to follow the laws of war if their officers 
don’t? How can we expect the ANA to follow the laws of war if the officers 
mentoring them do not?’
51 
 
A focus on military discipline can overlook the gravity of the crime, but military proceedings 
can also be a fairer way to try the solider for offences occurring under operational stress. 
Soldiers’ experiences during war are different to civilian experiences during peace; thus both 
the legal application of rules and the process of judicial administration should be different. A 
soldier tried before a jury of twelve civilians is not sitting before his peers. A soldier before a 
Board of military officers is tried by those with an understanding of the particular culture of 
the soldiery. Semrau received sympathy from his military contemporaries,
52 and as an officer 
he was judged by his peers. The use of military justice is mitigated because it can deal with 
the soldier in a manner th e civil common law cannot. The defendant is treated inclusively 
rather than exclusively, his actions are judged by a set of principles he himself is subject to 
rather than those which are   abstract from his circumstance,
53 which  is one of the main 
distinctions between the civilian and military contexts. However, this is not to be taken to 
mean that the soldier should be judged purely on the moral foundations of the military 
environment, these beliefs are not enough to negate criminal liability as the tri al judge in 
Semrau  pointed  out,  ‘Decision  based  on  moral  preference  cannot  prevail  over  lawful 
commands.’
54 
 
                                                           
51 n.31 above. 
52 Bill Graveland ‘Comrades attend court martial of captain charged in shooting death of insurgent’ Globe and 
Mail June 21
st 2010 
53 See chapter 8, especially the argument on the abstract nature of intention as the means of providing legal and 
moral blame. 
54 Friscolanti  M  ‘Captain  Robert  Semrau  dismissed  from  the  forces’  Tuesday  October  5
th  2010  found  on 
http://www2.macleans.ca/2010/10/10/05/capt-robert-semrau-dismissed-from-the-forces/ accessed 13/1/2012   
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A further concern of the military justice system is the supposedly inherent unfairness of the 
procedure.  The command structure which dominates the system has been seen to influence 
the manner in which the court makes decisions. Only officers sit in the court martial, the same 
officers who are responsible for disciplining non – commissioned ranks. The possibility of 
favourable treatment to their own and less  favourable treatment to their subordinates is a 
matter  which  is  considered  elsewhere,
55 however, it has been seen that in conflict itself, 
favourable  treatment  has  often  been  shown  to  the  ‘higher’  warrior  caste.
56 Moreover,  the 
whole court martial procedure has been consistently criticised for lacking accountability and 
being arbitrary.
57 Many court roles have been intertwined in the role of a single commissioned 
officer, and the lay character of the court raises doubts over its ability to adequately deal with 
the legal complexities of criminal cases. 
 
In conclusion, the difficulties which make the court martial an unsuitable means for trying the 
mercy killing soldier can be summarised as follows. The courts dual function of administering 
both discipline and justice  could be seen to be side lining justice for discipline and perhaps 
even the preservation of reputation. This gives rise to questions over the supposedly arbitrary 
nature of the court and the manner in whic h this can taint the treatment of the defendant. 
Conversely, the advantages of the court martial system mean that the battlefield mercy killer 
would be tried by those who have experienced the same cultural influences of military service, 
training and indoctrination. Their actions could be better contextualised by those that try them 
than by the civilian jury of the Crown courts. These matters are the basis for the evaluation of 
the ability of service law to provide an adequate legal redress to the battlefield mercy killer. 
 
                                                           
55 See chapter 7. 
56 See Chapter 1. the recollection of the sparing of enemy Knights for ransom and the details of the treatment of 
the Russian Officers compared to the infantry during the Crimean war are but two examples more shall be seen 
in chapter 7. 
57 See chapter 7, 7.1,7.2 &7.3.  
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3.7 International Law 
 
The battlefield mercy killer can also be subject to international law because his killing of a 
protected person constitutes a war crime under the Statute of Rome 1998. 
 
2. For the purposes of this Statute “war crimes” means: 
 
(a)Grave  breaches  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  12
th  August  1949, 
namely any of the following acts against person or property protected 
under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention. 
 
(i)  wilful killing; 
 
(iii)  wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health; 
 
(iv)  Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or 
having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion; 
 
Any victim so badly wounded will be seen to have surrendered and therefore to kill him 
would breach Art 2(a)(iv). The victim in Semrau’s situation had no means of defence and it 
can be assumed that they surrendered at discretion,
58 meaning an unconditional surrender of 
their resistance or aggression as they were in no condition to respond at all.  On these grounds 
it is postulated that there exists the possibility for the mercy killing soldier, to be convicted of 
a war crime, and potentially be sent to the International Criminal Court for trial. 
                                                           
58 n.7 above at Art 8 (2)(a)(vi)  
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3.8 The label of ‘War Criminal’ and politicised justice 
 
First,  however,  there  is  again  an  argument  for  ensuring  the  label  that  is  attached  to  the 
convicted is one which can be said to fairly match the magnitude of his actions. The label of 
‘War Criminal’ and  the attachment of war crimes should be reserved for highly specific 
behaviour, such as actions of mass atrocity. In this way only large scale offences carried out 
from political motives would be prosecuted as war crimes, rather than individual breaches 
which are capable of being committed by any one individual during any time of war for a host 
of  motivations  and  which  fall  far  below  the  level  of  the  stereotypical  war  criminal.  The 
preamble to the Statute of Rome makes clear that such sanctions should only be imposed on 
the most serious crimes.
59 Although this is a somewhat ambiguous term, a common consensus 
in the international community sees such crimes as those which are committed in a systematic 
manner
60 or on a large scale ,  or those instigated or directed  by Government or by any 
organisation or group.
61 If such an interpretation is correct this would exclude, ‘…isolated 
inhumane acts committed by a perpetrator acting on his own initiative and directed against a 
single victim.’
62 Hence, it is not appropriate to try the battlefield mercy killer, or even those 
such as Corporal Payne under the Statute of Rome in the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
 
The Statute itself defines ‘serious’ as an intention to destroy individuals or whole groups of 
human beings;
63 acts carried out as part of a widespread systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population,
64 or by the large scale commission of war crimes.
65 These are co-
                                                           
59 n.7 above see Preamble ‘The States Party to this Statute affirm that the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished….’ 
60 Report  of  the  International  Law  C ommission,  UN  GAOR,  48th  Session,  Supp  No.  10,  45  UN  Doc. 
Art.51(10)(3). Systematic means that it must be pursuant to a preconceived plan/policy. 
61 ibid. at Art.51(10)(5) 
62 Hwang P ‘Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ [1998] 
22 Fordham International Law Journal 457 467 
63 n.7 above at Art.6 
64 n.7 above at Art.7  
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ordinated multifaceted attacks, not a single action carried out from compassion, duty or even 
pragmatism  but  from  political  motives  beyond  any  comparison  with  the  mercy-killer’s 
motivation. To apply them to individual breaches not motivated by any evil intention, could 
potentially weaken both the gravity the label ‘war criminal’ holds, and over stigmatise certain 
individuals. Clearly a difference exists between a mercy killer who commits a compassionate 
act, which can be defined as a breach under Art 2(a)(iv), and an individual who played a key 
part in the mass execution of thousands of innocents from political and ideological beliefs. 
However, the use of the label war criminal is currently used for both. Nazi atrocities and their 
contemporary examples stand as ideal types for the atrocities the public attaches the label war 
crime  to.  It  would  over  stigmatise  the  mercy  killer  the  label  of  war  criminal  is  itself  a 
punishment. The domestic courts rarely talk of the need to overtly punish the actor in a mercy 
killing,
66 whereas a prosecution under war crimes legislation would punish the solider far 
beyond his civilian counterpart. Of course, the Soldier who commits a mercy killing could be 
said to be bound by a stricter duty than the civilian. As touched upon  previously they must 
adhere to professional standards, however, even when they breach these standards this usually 
falls within the jurisdiction of military disciplinary procedures.
67 It is a far leap from a failure 
to uphold ones professional duty  to becoming a war  criminal, and one which the mercy 
killing would fall far short of. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
65 ibid. at at Art.8 
66 R v Webb [2011] EWCA Crim 152 per LJ Eady at 17  
67 See Chapter 1 on professional standards and chapter 6 where the duties of the physician and soldier are 
compared.  
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3.9 Politicised Justice 
 
War crimes are usually reserved for ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community.’
68 Reconceptualising a mercy-killing as a war crime is an undertaking which 
could lead to a devaluation of the significance of war crimes and to an undermining of the 
political and legal justifications for the conflict. For instance, Semrau was engaged in a legal 
war, fighting on the side generally seen as the non-aggressorr,
69 but war crimes are normally 
attributed to parties within the ‘aggressor’ state, for instance the Bosnian commander Ratko 
Mladic.
70 Being considered in the same light as Nazi war criminals has an obvious effect on 
the legitimacy and reputation of the military, and the legitimacy of the conflict.  The state’s 
use of force is dependant in many ways on public support for the government who have taken 
the  decision  to  enter  the  conflict.  A  conflict  in  which  human  rights  abuses  have  been 
perpetrated against the civilian population by the British troops whose mission was to break 
the yoke of tyranny which oppressed that civilian populace could quickly lose support.  One 
such example is the US public support for the war in Vietnam during which misconduct by 
US service personnel was consistently reported. 
 
‘Normatively it is desirable for political leaders in a democracy to commit 
national resources in ways generally approved by the populace. Large scale 
military commitments should, if at all possible, meet with the approval of 
public opinion.’
71 
                                                           
68 n.7 above see Preamble 
69 The author accepts that this view is open to interpretation. Evidence fo the assertion can be found  from  the 
aims NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is to protect the Afghan peoples; build the capacity of Afghan Armed 
forces to enable self security; to counter the insurgency and to deliver stronger governance. ISAF’s Mission in 
Afghanistan http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topic_69366.htm? Last accessed 15
th June 2011. 
70 David Rohde  Endgame: the betrayal and fall of Sbrenica, Europe’s worst massacre since World  War II 
(Westview Press Colorado 1998) 
71 S Vebra, R A Brody E Parker et al ‘Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam’ [1967] 2 The American Journal 
of Political Science Review 317 317  
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In Payne the defendant was charged with war crimes;
72 the inhuman treatment of a protected 
person.
73 However this was through national legislation which brought certain activities into 
line with the Statute of Rome. He too was fighting in a legal war but, like the military mercy 
killer, could potentially have stood in the same dock as someone like Slobod an Milosevic if 
the case had been referred to the International Criminal Court, casting a shadow on  Britain’s 
reasons for and handling of the conflict.
 74 No doubt this is one reason the trial was kept in 
Britain,  and  furthermore  not  in  the  Crown  Court  but  in  the  military  tribunal,  where  the 
defendant was judged by his military contemporaries and not the civilian public.  
 
The use of war crimes generally denotes ringleaders and advocates of ‘evil’ ideology. If war 
crimes are understood thus,  then it is  easy  to  consider the potential damage a ‘civilised’ 
country’s military reputation may face when they prosecute their own agents, engaged on a 
legitimate mission, rather than with its own laws but sanctions inextricably linked to evil 
dictators. It can be argued that Payne did indeed commit war crimes, but as it was an isolated 
instance, unlinked to any wider official ideology and only relating to the passions of a small 
group of individual’s, it may be more appropriate to label such cases as serious misconduct 
rather than war crimes because a wider ideological or political aspect of their actions is not 
present. Again, it is argued that labelling misconduct as a war crime can undermine the force 
a conviction for a breach of the various international treaties can have. It is worth noting that 
Semrau did not face any war crimes charges, and was instead dealt with through national civil 
criminal law administered by a military court but their application is foreseeable. 
 
                                                           
72 Robert Verleack ‘“Historic Prosecution” for Armed Services’ The Independent 20
th September 2006  
73 n.12 above at  Art.8(2)(a)(ii) 
74 The author accepts that the legality of this war is also open to interpretation but makes the assertion based on 
the legality of UN resolution 1441. For the purposes of this work the war is understood to be widely condemne d 
as immoral rather than illegal, debate over the demarcation of this labelling cannot be discussed here.   
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However, the national government also risks losing support from its international allies, and 
for these two reasons it is argued that there is a distinct political flavour to the justice which 
may be served to the battlefield mercy killer by the use of international law in an international 
court such as the ICC. For instance, many states party to the ICC did not approve of British 
involvement in the invasion of Iraq. There may have been a feeling that Britain should be 
held politically accountable for its actions, and bringing a British soldier to trial in the ICC 
could be one way of doing just that.
75 This could effectively turn the issue of the actions of a 
single individual into a vendetta between states.
76  
 
3.10 Victor’s Justice? 
 
‘The victor will always be the judge, and the vanquished the accused’
77 
 
Since the concept of the modern war crimes tribunals, time and again it has been seen that the 
victors impose the law over the defeated and as such it is members of the defeated regime 
who are generally considered war criminals. In cases where the national courts have to punish 
their own they often take a more timid approach. For instance the Treaty of Versailles
78 had 
provisions within which it allowed for the prosecution of the Kaiser
79 and twenty-one 
thousand other german officers,
80 but not a single mention, nor plan , existed for any of the 
                                                           
75 Dempsey G T ‘Reasonable Doubt: The case against the proposed International Court [1998] 311 Cato Policy 
Analsysis 5 
76  Manidami  M  ‘Beware  Human  Rights  Fundamentalism’  Mail  and  Gaurdian  Online  March  20
th  2009 
http://mg.co.za/article/2009-03-02-beware-human-rights-fundamentalism Last accesed 11/01/12 
77 Herman Goering quoted in G J Bass  Stay the Hand of Vengence, The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals 
(Princeton University Press New Jersey 2000) 8 
78 Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 28 1919.  Hereafter the Treaty 
of Versailles 
79 ibid. at Art 227 
80 ibid. at Art 228  – 229. Art 229 actually makes provision for acts only when committed by German soldiers 
against the Allies. ‘Persons found guilty of criminal acts against nationals of one of the Allies and Associated 
Powers shall be brought before a tribunal of that nation.’  
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allies to be prosecuted. Furthermore it was only members of the victor states which would sit 
on the tribunals. 
 
‘[A] tribunal where the enemy would be the judge and party, would not be 
an  organ  of  law  but  an  instrument  of  political  tyranny  aiming  only  at 
justifying my condemnation’
81 
 
Yet  the  failure  of  international  law  meant  that  the  victors  instead  pressured  the  german 
national courts to bring these prosecutions. Because of their reluctance, and of the thousands 
of prosecutions envisaged only twenty-one german officers faced trial in the german Supreme 
Court.
82 This is another reason behind the highly politicised nature of this type of justice, as it 
can be used either to justify the reasons for war, or to enact a vengeance upon the vanquished 
party. Hence, it could also be called victors justice. The victors must finally legally validate 
their part in the conflict by criminally vilifying their enemies in the court of l aw in much the 
same  way  as  they  must  first  be  vilified  in  the  public’s  imagination.
83  The  trials  at 
Nuremburg
84 and Tokyo
85 after the Second World War could be seen as such. Heads of the 
military organisations of the respective regimes were made to answer for   the destruction 
casued throughout the war and of the acts against both military and civilian populations. ‘[I]n 
the last analysis, this trial was a political trial. It was only a victor’s justice’.
86 Conversely, the 
Allies in that war committed acts which  may have been seen as major war crimes by Japan 
and Germany if they had been defeated, such as the dropping of the atomic bombs on 
                                                           
81 Kaiser Wilhelm II quoted in Bass G J Stay the Hand of Vengence, The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals 
(Princeton University Press New Jersey 2000) 
82 Prinz B ‘The Treaty of Versaille to Rwanda: How the International Community deals with War Crimes’ [1998] 
6 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 553 554-556 
83 See chapter 1 concerning the objectification of the enemy. 
84 Agreement for the Prosecution of Major War Criminals of the European Axis – Nuremburg 1945 
85 International Military Tribunal for the Far East 1946 
86 Tojo Hideki quoted in Minear R H Victors Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial  (Princeton University Press 
New Jersey 1971)  
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Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the bombing of Dresden. However, the victors qualified these 
actions by defining them as legal acts of military necessity.
87 It is at least arguable that justice 
during war has always been thus. 
 
‘When  these  matters  are  discussed  by  practical  people,  the  standard  of 
justice  depends  on  the  equality  of  power  to  compel  and  that  in  fact  the 
strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they 
have to accept.’
88 
 
A state, such as Britain, which used the brutality of the regime in Iraq and Afghanistan as a 
vindication for its involvement in both conflicts, would it is suggested, be reluctant to either 
pursue or accept a application from the ICC concerning a soldier charged with misconduct. It 
is not in the victor’s interests to discredit the righteousness of their campaign.  Neither is it 
just  to  treat  the  battlefield  mercy  killer  in  this  way,  even  if  a  strict  interpretation  of 
International Treaties allows the possibility of such a route. Their trial would be subject to 
large scale international scrutiny, incomparable with the trials of domestic mercy killings. 
Further, the stigma attached to a war crimes charge is in itself far too weighty, they are the 
reserve of the ‘most serious breaches’ of human rights abuses,
89 which, it is argued are not 
constituted by the action of a battlefield mercy killing. 
 
3.11 Other effects of the use of International Law 
 
Referring a case to the ICC to be tried for international crimes can also damage the reputation 
of the nation’s own legal system. It could shed doubt upon the British system of criminal 
                                                           
87 See chapter 8 
88 Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War  
89 See the Preamble of the Geneva Conventions 1949  
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justice, as the ICC is supposed only to compliment national criminal justice systems when 
trial procedures are unavailable or ineffective. Furthermore, there is an argument that British 
citizens,  when  tried  should  enjoy  the  protection  of  British  laws  for  crimes  they  have 
committed abroad and can effectively come under the jurisdiction of the laws of England and 
Wales.
90 One such protection that would not be afforded to the defendant in the international 
criminal court is that of a trial by jury.
91 Juristic sympathy is a leading contribution to the 
mild treatment many domestic mercy killers receive when they face trial.  
 
“I do not normally comment on the verdicts of juries but in this case their 
decision  if,  I  may  say  so,  shows  that  common  sense,  decency  and 
humanity which makes Jury trials so important in cases of this kind”
92 
 
This  ‘humanity’ would  effectively be removed  by packing the defendant  off to  the  ICC, 
which employs an inquisitorial form of judicial investigation. Further, in the court of public 
opinion , once an application from the ICC is upheld, the defendant is often seen as guilty, 
although such an application is not itself a guilty verdict.
93  
 
A final problem with such a publicly held trial is the operational consequence resulting from 
such a hearing. Potentially, new regulations of the soldiers conduct whilst on operations could 
be proposed which limit their behaviour in certain situations and effectively place them in 
danger.  Such scandals often bring  about reactive regulation  as  a public attempt by the 
                                                           
90 Editorial ‘Judging the ICC: The cases for and against US participation in the International Criminal Court’ Los 
Angeles Times  16
th March 2009 
91 L Spooner Essay on the Trial by Jury (J P Jewett and Co. Boston 1852) 
92 Caroline Gammell, ‘Mother Kay Gilderdale found not guilty of murder attempt on ME sufferer daughter”, 
The Telegraph, 25
th January 2010, per. Bean, J. 
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authorities  to  distance  themselves  from  the  wrong  doing.
94 Such a possibility could be 
detrimental to British service personnel,  who it is argued are already too restricted by the 
current rules of engagement, which impose to o many limitations for them to offensively 
tackle insurgent threats in Afghanistan.
95  
 
Of course, this creates a dilemma in which the interests of the military personnel must be 
weighed  against  the  possibility  that  some  civilians  may  fall  victim  to  ‘bad  eggs’,  whose 
behaviour it is argued can never be stamped out. From Wellington’s ‘scum of the earth’
96 to 
the Abu Gharib scandal, extreme acts of cruelty will be committed during the most extreme 
of circumstances. That is not to say that it is right, but that such actions should be treated 
practically and relevantly and not over reacted to. War indulges the violent passions of man 
and  it  is  not  illogical  to  accept  that  no  matter  what  restrictions  are  implemented  on  the 
soldiers  conduct,  some  will  find  it  impossible  to  control  those  passions.  Justice  for  the 
individual victim of misconduct is important, but should not come through the widespread 
restriction of military behaviour, through the punishment of the individual perpetrator. Such 
justice, although encompassing some elements of a ‘noble deed’, overlooks the realities of the 
consequence of such justice, which is to perhaps endanger more than it preserves.
97 
 
3.12 The possible influence of European law 
 
A final legal concern should be touched upon. The actions of the British soldier carrying out a 
battlefield  mercy  killing  may  also  fall  within  the  ambit  of  the  European  Convention  on 
                                                           
94 Dubber M D ‘Regulatory and Legal Aspects of Penalty’ in Sarut A, Douglas D and Umphrey M., (ed.s) Law 
as Punishment Law as Regulation (Stanford University Press 2011) 25  
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96 Coss E J  For all the King’s shilling: an analysis of the campaign and combat experiences of the British 
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th March 2009)  
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Human Rights(ECHR). There is a view that human rights do not exist during war, because 
they are based on the civil norm whereas war takes place as an exception to the norm,
98 and 
thus the  inter arma enim silent leges maxim applies.
99 However, Article 2 of the ECHR, 
provides an obligation on the part of member states  to ensure that there is a frame work of 
laws  to  protect  the right  to  life  and  to  ensure  that  there  is  no  unjustifiable taking  of 
life.
100Killing during war is justifiable but battlefield mercy killing is not, f urthermore, the 
European Court of Human Rights has recognised the presence of a procedural obligation to 
investigate cases where an unjustifiable loss of life may have occurred.
101 This throws a 
certain amount of uncertainty over whether the ECHR would apply in the instance  of a 
battlefield mercy killing. 
 
Parties to the convention must secure everyone within their  rights and jurisdiction, but this 
only applies to the soldiers fighting for that particular party. It is unlikely that these rights are 
to be conferred upon the en emy who fall into the custody of the soldiers bound by the 
convention as it is still very much in doubt if the ECHR even confers rights upon civilians 
who are third parties to the conflict in states which are not party to the convention. 
 
‘It may seem surprising that an Act of the U.K. Parliament and a European 
Convention on Human Rights can arguably be said to confer rights upon 
citizens of Iraq which are enforceable against a U.K. governmental authority 
in the courts of England and Wales.’
102 
 
                                                           
98 Saby Ghoshray ‘When does Collateral Damage Rise to the Level of a War Crime?: Expanding the Adequacy 
of Laws of War Against Contemporary Human Rights Discourse’ [2008] 41 Creighton Law Review 679 
99 Which means that during war the law falls silent. 
100 R (Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner [2004] UKHL 10 
101 McCann v United Kingdom [1995] ECHR 31 
102 R (Al Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] QB 140 at 248 Brook LJ  
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In R (Al Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence,
103 the high court found that Baha Mousa’s 
convention rights had been violated because he was under the jurisdiction of a party to the 
convention  by  means  of  his  detention.
104 This  was verified by the Court of Appeal.
105 
However, Baha Mousa was actually detained by the British forces, and was in their custody. 
In Semrau, or a similar case, the victim is not in the actor’s custody. He is to be protected by 
him but he is not being detained as a suspected criminal with a view to prosecution, thus 
placing him under the jurisdiction laws of the protector is an unfeasible extension. However, 
stretching duties conferred upon the actor by his state during times of peace, to foreign field 
in times of war is a tenuous application of the law. 
 
3.13 Conclusion 
 
Soldiers accused of mercy killing should be subject to the most appropriate judicial system so 
that  justice  is  carried  out  in  relation  to  the  victim  and  the  defendant.  This  section  has 
identified the three branches of law which could be followed in a case of battlefield mercy 
killing.  Further investigation is required to explain all of the technicalities evident in each 
branch  of  law.  However,  at  this  point  the  use  of  international  law  by  which  to  try  the 
battlefield mercy killer should be eliminated, particularly with reference to war crimes. The 
justice that would be received by the battlefield mercy killer if his actions were interpreted 
thus would be highly prejudicial for several reasons. First, due to the highly politicised nature 
of war crimes proceedings and secondly, it is an ill-fitting doctrine in this circumstances 
because his actions can only loosely be interpreted as relating to the aim of treaties such as 
the Statute of Rome and the Geneva conventions. While they seemingly fit the criteria for a 
‘breach’ in substance and in spirit they do not. Finally, and following from this point, it 
                                                           
103 R (Al Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence [2005] WLR 1401 
104 ibid. at 1498 
105 n.88 above at 279  
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would be another example of an incorrect criminal label and too heavy stigma being attached 
to the soldier 
 
Semrau, did not involve a charge relating to war crimes, instead his breach of the convention 
was dealt with using the criminal law. It is accepted that there could be an instance in which 
it is feasible to charge the battlefield mercy killer with a war crime, this would be on the basis 
of the administration of a rather politicised form of justice. For instance, when a soldier on 
the ‘losing’ side effects a battle field mercy killing against a mortally wounded member of 
the ‘victorious’ side, the ‘victorious’ side may see war crimes as an appropriate means by 
which to punish the ‘cruelty’ of the enemy. However, this in itself further illustrates the 
ineptness of international law to deal with such an instance. 
 
The civilian criminal law and military justice are the most appropriate judicial regimes by 
which to deal with the soldier and as such require further exploration although they are not 
perfect mechanisms. The military justice system allows the soldier to be judged by his peers, 
and the common law allows the action to be judged on a level below war crimes, albeit 
possibly more harshly than it should be. The following two chapters will consider more 
closely the adequacies and deficiencies of both and explain the technicalities by which the 
mercy killing soldier may be brought to trial under each system and in their respective courts.  
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Chapter Four 
Marching Out of Step: 
The Common Law and the Battlefield Mercy Killer 
 
In England and Wales mercy killings are dealt with as homicide, they are unlawful killings. 
The distinguishing feature between whether the killing is treated as murder or manslaughter 
is the intention or mens rea, the mental element, of the crime. If the defendant is proven to 
have intended to kill or cause grievously bodily harm (GBH) then a conviction of murder will 
follow, if it is proven that they intended a different outcome through their actions, or they 
were reckless as to the death in some way then a conviction of manslaughter may be imposed 
instead. Further, a charge of murder may be mitigated by use of a special defence, such as 
diminished responsibility or provocation, which can reduce the conviction to manslaughter.  
In domestic mercy killing cases, using diminished responsibility often mitigates a charge of 
murder to a manslaughter conviction, but not always. For example, in Inglis the defence of 
diminished responsibility was unsuccessful and the court upheld her conviction for murder. 
Yet in some cases, a charge of murder may be dropped whilst a charge for assisted suicide 
might remain successful, as seen in Gilderdale. 
 
The municipal criminal law, the internal law of the state, was used to prosecute Capt. Semrau 
in Canada, rather than the international laws discussed in the previous chapter, but as noted 
previously, problems exist in treating the battlefield mercy killer in the same manner as the 
domestic mercy killer. It is not asserted that the contemporary law of murder in England and 
Wales is bad law, only that in the case of the battlefield mercy killer it is wrongly applied to a 
situation  which  the  imposition  of  the  offence  of  murder  or  an  alternative  inadequately 
represents. In considering how to deliver the most apt justice to the battlefield mercy killer,  
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this section is divided into three parts. First, there are the issues of where the mercy killer 
should be tried and why his actions should be considered illegal compared to legal killings 
during war. In Semrau, the killing was enacted by an enlisted service man, upon a foreign 
citizen in a foreign country,
1 yet the case was heard before a Canadian Court Martial in 
Canada. Before we detail how the law might deal with a battlefield mercy killer,  it is first 
necessary to ascertain how it is possible to apply the laws of one jurisdiction to crimes 
committed in a jurisdiction thousands of miles away.  
 
Second, it must be considered what types of charge, offence and defence may be applicable 
to the battlefield mercy killer, and which if any provide a just outcome for the defendant. 
Comparing the battlefield mercy killing with comparable domestic cases involving alleged 
mercy  killings,  there  are  three  possible  convictions  which  could  apply.  Each  of  these  is 
dependent upon either the defendant or the victim’s mental characteristics at the time of the 
killing.  First,  as  in  Inglis,  a  charge  of  murder  may  be  brought,  which  requires  an 
understanding the defendant’s intention and mens rea. Second, as in Webb and Marshall, 
there is a possibility the murder charge will be mitigated to manslaughter by means of the 
defence of diminished responsibility. This would require considering the mental state of the 
defendant regarding their mental health at the time. Finally, as in Gilderdale, assisted suicide, 
which as will be discussed would generally be practically difficult and portray improbable 
legal reasoning. This would require an insight into both the victim and the defendant’s mind 
set. This chapter focuses upon whether the battlefield mercy killer’s actions fall within the 
domestic criminal law’s ambit, and it is argued that the civilian domestic law as it stands does 
not offer the possibility of adequate justice to the soldier. Arising to deal with problems in 
peacetime, the law is not considerate of the contextual differences which are apparent during 
                                                           
1 The country was of course was Afghanistan but the nationality of the victim can not be stated with certainty 
because of the influx of foreign participants who fight for the Taliban. See Mendelsohn B ‘Foreign Fighters – 
Recent Trends’ [2011] 55(2) Orbis 189  
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wartime and affect the actions of the actor accordingly. Without reference to this difference it 
holds the soldier accountable to an incompatible standard of behaviour because it abstracts 
the  soldier  from  the  circumstances  in  which  the  killing  took  place  and  which  should  be 
considered when judging his actions. 
 
Before  discussing  the  use  of  domestic  legal  doctrine  can  take  place,  it  is  necessary  to 
ascertain whether the soldier’s action of battlefield mercy killing is a recognisable crime 
under  British  law.  There  are  two  distinct  issues  to  be  dealt  with,  where  the  crime  was 
committed and when the crime was committed. The first issue concerns whether and how the 
crimes of the soldier in a foreign country can be legitimately prosecuted under the laws of 
their sovereign state, which may be several thousand miles away.  The second issue, when, is 
concerned with the situation in which the killing took place. To be illegal, the killing must 
fall  within  the  ‘queen’s  peace’  a  circumstance  which  killings  during  battle  normally  fall 
outside  of.  Whether  and  how  the  battlefield  mercy  killing  falls  within  the  ambit  of  this 
concept is a necessary consideration. 
 
4.1 Legal Logistics: the jurisdiction of the criminal law and the battlefield mercy killer 
 
Behaviour deemed criminal in the jurisdictions of England and Wales may not be recognised 
as such under the laws of other nations. However, some actions, such as murder are almost 
universally prohibited.
2 In the case of the mercy killing  British soldier, this does not mean 
that they will face trial under the laws of that nation  in which the act was committed. It is 
more likely that they will be tried in the courts and under the laws of England and Wales.  
 
                                                           
2 International  Law  Commission  Report  on  the  Work  of  the  International  Law  Commission’s  48
th  Session 
(United Nations1996) 96  
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Where, in which location, the soldier is tried for his crimes could impact on the type of 
justice that is delivered to him. As was discussed in the previous chapter,
3 his crimes could 
also be considered as war crimes, and thus triable at the international criminal court. The 
justice delivered at the ICC, a national court where the soldier  is deployed on action or the 
soldier’s own national court will potentially differ. The ICC, as discussed, may present a 
highly  politicised  justice,  whilst  the  national  courts  of  the  state  in  which  the  crime  was 
committed could use the case for their own purposes, to generate support for the popular 
resentment  of external  forces  in  their own country and to  fulfil a desire for retribution.
4 
Finally, the soldiers own national courts may be biased by the political need for ‘damage 
limitation’  following  the  allegation  of  a  breach  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  by  its  own 
soldiers.  However, there is good reason to argue that the crime should always be tried in the 
soldiers own national court, because this is both most legally sound and will deliver a justice 
in line with the soldiers own understanding of right and wrong. In addition doing so places 
the judgement of his behaviour in the hands of his cultural peers on whose behalf he serves. 
 
It could be practically argued that the best place to try those charged with crimes is the nation, 
if not the locality, where the crime was committed because usually the offender and any 
relevant witnesses will be found there.
5 Traditionally in English law, up until the nineteenth 
century, under the doctrine of venue, the trial had to be conducted in the locality where the 
crime was committed, as the jury ought to come from that locality. This was also because of 
the absence of any overt imposition of state sovereignty over the punishment of criminal 
conduct, the sovereign punished crime which affected him, but the concept of criminal law as 
                                                           
3 See chapter 3 – 3.9. 
4 See Charles G Haines ‘General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political and Economic Influences in 
the Decisions of Judges’ [1923] 17 (2) Illnois Law Review 96 and S S Beale ‘What’law got to do with it? The 
Political, Social, Psychological and Non-Judicial Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal 
Law’ [1997] 1 (1) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 23 
5 Williams G ‘Venue and Ambit of the Criminal Law Part 1’ [1965] 81 Law Quarterly Review276  277  
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protecting  the  wider  society  did  not  begin  to  become  apparent  until  the  late  sixteenth 
century.
6 Furthermore, it could be said that the state in which the crime has been committed 
has the strongest interest in punishing the offender because, ‘[t]he territorial sovereign has the 
strongest  interest,  the  greatest  facility  and  the    most  powerful  instruments  for  repressing 
crimes.’
7 
 
The behaviour has breached their criminal rules, and letting it go unpunished by them could 
effectively undermine their legal authority, especially if the crime has no equivalent in the 
defendant’s home country.  
 
‘The basic philosophy behind the territorial theory is that a government in 
order  to  maintain  its  essential  sovereignty  must  be  the  only  power 
capable of effecting the maintenance of peace and order within its own 
boundaries.’
8 
 
However, this is not the case and today it may be argued that the crown courts have the 
authority  and  jurisdiction  to  try  any  indictable  offence  under  English  and  Welsh  law, 
wherever  they  are  committed.
9   There are three legal principles which are forwarded to 
explain this extra jurisdictional application of the law. First, the protective principle allows 
the state to act when one of its own citizens commits a crime abroad which is prejudicial to 
the governance of the state, for instance plotting treason. Second, the territ orial principle 
allows for prosecution of citizens for crimes committed abroad which have a discernible 
                                                           
6 Von Bar K L International Law Private and Criminal(Gillespie & Son  Bristol 1888) 625 
7 Lewis G C  Foreign Jurisdiction and the Extradition of Criminals  (1859) quoted in ‘Harvard Research on 
Jurisdiction of Crime’ [1935] 29 American Journal of International Law (Supplement) 
8 US v Rodrigues, 182 F Supp 479, 488 in Sarkar L ‘The Proper Law of Crime in International Law’ [1962] 11  
International Comparative Law Quarterly 446 448 
9 Supreme Court Act 1981 s.46(2)  
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impact on, for instance, UK territory, such as smuggling contraband.
10 Finally, there is the 
universal  principle,  which  is  clearly  at  the  heart  of  contem porary  theories  behind  the 
jurisdiction of national courts over war crimes charges. This principle allows for the crimes 
of a citizen in another jurisdiction to be tried in their home state, when they have committed 
crimes seen as so universally repugnant  that every state might have legitimate jurisdiction 
over them. 
 
The crime of murder under English law has a long history of extra -territorial jurisdiction. 
Initially this may seem confusing as customary common law definitions of the offence would 
seem to confine the offence to the ‘county[s] of the realm’. 
 
‘…when  a  person,  of  sound  memory  and  discretion,  unlawfully  killeth 
within any county of the realm any realm any reasonable creature…under 
the King’s peace, with malice aforethought…’
11 
 
A by-product of such a definition could lead to some acts of murder escaping prosecution. For 
instance, in R v Black
12 a literal application of this rule could have led to the prosecution of 
the  defendant  for  two  murders  in  Scotland  collapsing  as  Scotland  did  not  constitute  any 
counties of the realm until the Act of Union 1707, after the formulation of Coke’s definition.
13 
If the application of the law of murder was confined only to counties of the realm, then this 
would negate the possibility of offences committed by a mercy killing soldier on campaign in 
countries such as Afghanistan being prosecuted at home. Clarity is provided concerning those 
offences which have extra-territorial jurisdiction through express statutory provisions, that 
                                                           
10 Watson G R ‘Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction [1992] 17 Yale Journal 
of International Law 41 55 
11 Sir Edward Coke Institutes of the Laws of England  (1797) 
12 R v Black [1995] T.L.R. 128 
13 Hirst M ‘Murder in England or Murder in Scotland’ [1995] 54(3) Criminal Law Journal 488  
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have been evident long before the common law definition of murder spoke of confining the 
offence to a ‘county of the realm’. 
 
‘It is enough to say that certainly from the reign of Henry VIII this rule has 
been  subject  to  statutory  exceptions.  Crimes  of  the  present  day  which, 
though  committed  abroad,  can  be  tried  in  England,  are  treason, 
homicide…’
14 
 
Traditionally, the extension of this jurisdiction was in the King’s interest, perhaps in order to 
combat the occurrence of conspiracies against the regent from being formulated abroad.
15 
 
However, for some time it seemed that both offender and victim would have to be British. 
This qualification suggests that there was concern for protecting British citizens abroad, to 
ensure that they received ‘British’ justice when the act concerned two native citizens. In R v 
Chambers
16 the defendant was convicted of murdering another Englishman in Barcelona and 
R v Helsham saw the conviction of an Englishman for killing his English opponent in a duel 
in France.
17 
 
Contemporarily, the express  provisions within the Offences against the Person Act 1861 
clearly set out that murder alone, without any connection to treason or conspiracy is an extra – 
jurisdictional crime, triable in the courts of England and Wales. 
 
                                                           
14 R v Page [1954] 1 QB 170 Per Lord Goddard C.J. at 175. The Statute Lord Goddard referred to was 33 Hen 
VIII c.23 
15 Such as the so called Treason Acts 1543 
16 R v Chambers (1709) 1 Shower 6 
17 R  v  Helsham (1845) 2 C & K 53, 101 see also R v Sawyer (1815) Russ & Ry 294 where the defendant was 
convicted under the aging laws of Henry VIII (33 Henry VIII c.23)  
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‘Where any murder or manslaughter shall be committed on land out of the 
United Kingdom, whether within the Queen’s dominions or without, and 
whether  the  person  killed  were  a  subject  of  Her  Majesty  or  not,  every 
offence committed by any subject of Her Majesty in respect of such a case, 
whether the same shall amount to the offence of murder or of manslaughter, 
may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and punished in England 
or Ireland provided, that nothing herein contained shall prevent any person 
from  being tried in  any place out of England  or  Ireland for any murder 
committed outside of England or Ireland, in the  
same manner as such person might have tried before the passing of this 
Act.
18 
 
Furthermore, modern statutory enactments make it clear that the victim need no longer be a 
British citizen. Express statutory provision now exists for bringing the behaviour, which 
would have been indictable by the standards of English law, of those employed by Her 
Majesty’s  Government  whilst  abroad  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  national  criminal  law, 
regardless of who the victim is.
19  The mercy killing soldier could be construed as such an 
employee as he works within the military arm of the state and is on campaign in a state 
sanctioned operation. Total clarity concerning the jurisdiction of the criminal law to operate in 
instances of mercy killing on the battlefield in foreign, non-sovereign territories can be found 
in the numerous Army Acts and the surrounding case law. As will be dis cussed, service law 
holds that military personnel can be tried by court martial for allegedly committing an offence 
contained in the civil criminal law. 
 
                                                           
18 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s.9 to be read in accordance with Offences Against the Person Act 
1861 (Section Nine) Adaptation Order 1973 S.I. No. 356/1973 
19 Criminal Justice Act 1948 s.31(1)  
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‘…every person who, whilst he is subject to military law shall commit any 
of the offences in this section mentioned shall be deemed to be guilty of an 
offence  against  military  law,  and  if  charged  under  this  section  with  any 
offence (in this Act referred to as a civil offence) shall be liable to be tried 
by a court martial, and …’
20 
 
In R v Page,
21 a soldier was charged with killing an Egyptian national whilst serving in Egypt. 
It was argued that as the murder had not occurred in any ‘county of the realm’ he could not 
face a trial for murder. However, s.9 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 was tested 
and upheld and the court found that the law was applicable in cases of murder by service men 
serving abroad.
22 When this is added to the principle that ‘the Army carries the criminal law 
with it wherever it goes’,
23 there is no doubt as to the ability for the service man in Britain to 
be tried under the criminal law for crimes committed abroad.  
 
The Armed Forces Act 2006 only applies to those under it’s jurisdiction, for instance British 
Soldiers serving on campaign or in a base in a foreign nation. Those soldiers who are not 
serving in an official capacity at the time or are off base during times of peace are likely to be 
tried by the courts of the state in which they perpetrate the act.
24 However, the battlefield 
mercy killer who commits a crime in a foreign nation whilst operating under the auspices of 
the British government is almost certain to find themselves on trial before a British  crown 
court or court martial in the modern day.  
 
                                                           
20 Army Act 1955 s.41 
21 n.14 above. 
22 As a result Coke’s definition became seemingly obsolete and the Interpretation Act 1978 was used to deal 
with the mischief caused by the words‘counties of the realm’ 
23 Pritchard M J ‘The Army Act and Murder Abroad; [1954] 16 Cambridge Law Journal 232 241 
24 Glanville W ‘Venue and Ambit of the Criminal Law: Part 2’ [1965]  81 The Law Quarterly Review 400  
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The alternatives provide a less than attractive type of justice. The possibility of a war crimes 
trial at an international court, as previously discussed, potentially provides a highly politicised 
justice, influenced by the competing interests of the international community.
25 However, the 
political influence can also work on a national level if the soldier were to be tried in the courts 
of the state in which the alleged offence took place, for instance when the soldier is deployed 
on peacekeeping, reconstruction and provincial stabilisation missions, as in Afghanistan.  
 
In March 2012, a serving United States’ soldier, allegedly walked off his base in Afghanistan 
and into a neighbouring village. It is alleged he then shot sixteen Afghan civilians including 
women  and  children.
26 The  Afghan  government  called  for  the  soldier  to  face  trial  in 
Afghanistan.
27 This  incident  came  after several  others,  which  damaged  US  and  NATO 
relations with the Afghan people and government, including burning a Koran and videos of 
soldiers urinating on dead Taliban soldiers.
28 NATO support has been gradually waning 
within Afghanistan as the conflict continues into its eleventh year. Allowing the soldier to be 
tried in Afghanistan could have allowed the justice delivered to have been tempered with the 
public outrage of NATO deployment and anger at western forces. The trial could have been 
used to appease the discontented and portray the Afghan Government as independent from 
outside interference and sympathetic to the hostility of the population. It is likely he will be 
tried in the United States under a court martial. 
 
                                                           
25 See chapter 3 - 3.6 & 3.7 
26 Jean Schmidt ‘US soldier kills 16 Afghans in shooting rampage’ The Telegraph 11 March 2012 
27 Timothy Mak ‘Afghanistan demands public trial for accused soldier’ Washington Times Monday March 12
th 
2012 
28 Felix Martinez ‘Barak Obama’s Koran apology ‘calmed things down’ The Telegraph Monday March 19
th and 
Jean Schmidt ‘US investigators interview Marines filmed urinating over Taliban corpses’ The Telegraph 13
th 
January 2012  
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It is not to say that the soldier who is tried according to the procedures and laws of his own 
state is not affected by political influence. For instance, British soldiers are required to have 
respect for others and, 
 
‘…maintain the highest standards of decency and fairness at all times, even 
under the most difficult of conditions. External scrutiny, including intense 
media  interest,  is  now  an  attendant  part  of  all  aspects  of  military  life. 
Soldiering is about duty; so soldiers should be ready to uphold the rights of 
others before claiming their own.’
29 
 
It is clear that the modern military knows that it is under intense external observation, be that 
from other states with an interest in the conflict or from media agencies whose portrayal of 
any alleged misconduct may affect the political reputation of the mission and state involved. 
With  this  in  mind,  the  potential  interest  and  interference  from  external  agencies  will  be 
lessened if the proceedings are kept ‘in house’. Further they protect their soldiers from being 
targeted as war criminals by trying them under the domestic law of their own country. Of 
course this leads to claims that the justice administered in such circumstances is a ‘victor’s 
justice’ where only soldiers from the losing or oppressed side face the full force of the law.
30 
However, there is also traditional legal doctrine which accepts that the national laws of the 
soldier’s homeland are those which should be used in situations such as that which Capt. 
Semrau faced. 
 
                                                           
29  Values  and    Standards  of  the  British  Army  2008  available  on 
http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/v_s_of_the_british_army.pdf para. 15 Last accessed on 01/03/2012. 
30 Waldemer A Solf, ‘War Crimes and the Nuremburg Principle’ [1990] National Security Law 359 367-402 in 
M S Martins ‘National forums for punishing offences against International Law: Might US soldiers have their 
day in the same court?’ [1995] 3 Vancouver Journal of International Law 659 660  
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Dating back to the crusading armies of Europe, states would grant safe passage to armies of 
other nations to pass through their territory without fear of reprisal. Often this agreement 
inferred that the armies would keep their own discipline, for if not, hostages held by the 
transiently  occupied  state  would  be  forfeit.
31  Since  then,  there  has  been  the  gradual 
establishment of a principle that military forces ‘invited’ by the nation in which they are 
attendant  shall  have  legal  jurisdiction  over  their  troops  when  they  function  in  an  official 
capacity.  
 
‘A  crime  committed  in  a  foreign  territory  by  a  member  of  these  forces 
cannot be punished by the local or civil or military authorities, but only by 
the commanding officer of the forces or by other authorities of their home 
state.
32 
 
This premise is founded on ‘strong grounds of convenience and necessity which prevent the 
exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign organised force which with the consent of the territorial 
sovereign enters its domain.’
33  
 
On this basis it appears that the idea that dual jurisdiction, especially over military forces is 
regarded as detrimental.
34 Essentially, the intervention of outside foreign courts is destructive 
to military order, which relies on a discipline based service law for maintaining good ord er.
35 
The imposition of an overarching system of foreign national law could effectively negate this 
discipline based system and as such would be inconsistent with the control any sovereign must 
                                                           
31 J W Nesbitt ‘The rate of march of crusading armies in Europe’ [1963] 19 Traditio 167 
32  Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts (ed.s) Oppenheim’s International Law (4
th edition Longman London 1992) 
33 Charles Cheney Hyde International Law I (Little Brown and Company New York 1945)  sec. 247 
34  Archibald  King  ‘Jurisdiction  over  Friendly  Foreign  Armed  Forces’  [1942]  36  American  Journal  of 
International Law539 545 
35 See chapter 7.  
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have over its own armed forces.
36 Such a principle is internationally recognised. In the Casa 
Blanca  case,
37 the French and German governments debated over who controlled certain 
members of the armed forces stationed in Morocco. In 1909 the French Foreign Legion were 
legally stationed in Morocco, when three german members decided to desert. They headed for 
the German Consul, who offered them protection under German law. The Permanent Court of 
Arbitration  ruled  that  in  a  case  where  two  competing  legal  jurisdictions  compete,  the 
jurisdiction of the Corps of occupation should have preference concerning the treatment of its 
soldiery.
38  
 
In the modern conflict, treaties are agreed whereby it is accepted that each force invited to a 
foreign country in order to help fight, stabilise or peace keep, shall retain the criminal 
jurisdiction over its serving personnel if they commit a crime during duty. This was the case 
in the First World War,
39 Second World War during the occupation of many regions which 
had become mandates and protectorates of the allied powers after these conflicts. 
 
‘No  member  of  the  British  Forces  shall  be  subject  to  the  criminal 
jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  Egypt,  nor  to  the  civil  jurisdiction  of  those 
courts in any matter arising out of his official duties.’
40  
 
                                                           
36 n.34 above at 548-549 
37 Deserters of Casa Blanca: France v Germany The Hague, 22
nd May [1909] 
38 George Grafton Wilson Hague Arbitration General Cases (Ginn and Company London 1915) 86 
39 Indeed often the allied agreements made with France read almost ident ically. The British agreement with 
France on this matter read: ‘His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of the French Republic 
agree to recognise during the present war the exclusive competence of the tribunals of their respective Armies 
with regard to persons belonging to these Armies in whatever territory and of whatever nationality the accused 
maybe’  Whilst  the  American  treaty  reads:  ‘The  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Government of the French Republic agree to recognise during the war the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunals 
of their respective land and sea forces with regard to persons subject to the jurisdiction of those forces whatever 
be the territory in which they operate or the nationality of the accused.’  
40 Great Britain, Treaty Services No.6 (1937) Cmd. 5360  
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Returning to the US soldier who allegedly committed atrocities in Afghanistan, whilst the 
Afghan government sought a public trial in Afghanistan for the soldier, this will likely never 
happen. Present day, nations enter into Status Of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) when they are 
active in other countries. The United States SOFA with Afghanistan effectively means that US 
personnel are immune from criminal prosecution by Afghan authorities.
41 Britain, has never 
made an express agreement with Afghanistan concerning preserving criminal jurisdiction over 
their service personnel, but does benefit from a general NATO SOFA, which guarantees this 
jurisdiction unless otherwise stated.
42 Hence, the current practice of maintaining jurisdiction 
over service personnel whilst serving in another country by ‘invitation’, is in line with long 
established international practice. 
 
In conclusion, there is solid legal tradition throughout the development of the common law 
evidencing the gradual widening of the national jurisdiction to envelope crimes committed 
abroadupon foreign citizens, including those committed by service personnel. Added to this is 
the traditional acceptance of international law that foreign militaries that are ‘invited’ to serve 
in another country in an official capacity retain the right to try their own soldiers for offences 
committed in that country. Whilst all three possibilities, the soldiers national court, the court 
of the nation where the offence took place and the ICC have the potential to be externally 
influenced by factors beyond purely administering justice to the soldier, the soldier’s national 
laws and courts have the firmest legal claim and provide the highest degree of protection to 
the defendant from outside media, state and political influences on his treatment. 
 
However, where the crime was committed is not the only concern of the courts, but also when, 
for it is likely during times of war that the killing will fall outside the jurisdiction of the 
                                                           
41 R  C  Mason  ‘The  Status  of  Forces  Agreements  (SOFA):  What  is  it  and  how  has  it  been  utilized?’ 
Congressional Research Service (15
th March 2012) 7 
42 ibid. at 12  
132 
 
criminal law itself.  The question of ‘when’ does not regard what time of day but rather under 
what  circumstances  and  events;  whether  or  not  the  killing  took  place  under  the  ‘Queens 
peace’. In Britain a killing is only murder when committed ‘under the Queen’s peace’.
43  
 
4.2 The Queen’s peace 
 
During war people are killed. Belligerents on either side legitimately attack each other with 
the intention to kill. Yet these killings are not considered as murder for a multitude of reasons. 
Under English common law one such reason is that these killings take place during a time of 
war, outside of the ‘Queen’s peace’. 
 
‘Murder is when a man of sound memory and of the age of discretion, 
unlawfully killeth…any reasonable creature in rerum natura under the 
[Queen’s]  peace,  with  malice  aforethought,  either  expressed  by  the 
party or implied by the law, so as the wounded party etc., die of the 
wound or hurt etc…’
44 
 
Whether  or  not  the  killing  is  a  crime  depends  on  whether  or  not  it  happened  under  the 
Queen’s peace. Hence, if the victim was killed outright during the fighting no crime would 
have been committed, it only becomes criminal when the victim is a protected person and 
thus  falls  under  the  concept  of  the  Queen’s  peace.  Therefore,  before  the  mercy  killer  is 
indicted for murder, it must be shown that he was operating outside of the Queen’s peace 
when he enacted the killing. It is however, difficult to ascertain exactly when the Queen’s 
peace exists, and what the Queen’s peace means. 
                                                           
43 3 Co Inst 47 
44 ibid.   
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This ‘peace’ is an abstract concept to the soldier on operations, where practically it may 
become difficult to attribute the concept to any definite time or space, and when and in what 
circumstances  they  are  subject  to  the  ‘peace’.  For  the  soldier  the  peaceful  place  may 
instantaneously become a combat zone, and vice versa. The concept of protected persons and 
areas
45 infer that the soldier does not operate in circumstances which are outside of the 
Queen’s peace at all times when they are at war. But defining when the Queen’s peace occurs 
is difficult and requires insight into the development of the concept. 
 
In the past all societies, at least western societies, have experienced a period in which it was 
not  clear  where  actions  of  private  vengeance  against  injuries  stopped  and  where  public 
retribution for offences began.
46 Of course, this system of vendetta, blood feud and private 
wars  could  become  intolerable  if  not  checked.  Historically,  the  Monarch  was  initially 
concerned with acts of contempt to his authority,
47 homicides were not generally within the 
Monarch’s jurisdiction, and as such it was the right of the kinsfolk of the two parties to 
redress these matters. In a way, every man in the realm had his own ‘peace’ which was often 
dependent upon who land upon which the dispute took place. Of course, a great man’s ‘peace’ 
was  of  more  importance  than  a  common  man’s  ‘peace’.
48 As  such,  ‘peace’  could  be 
interpreted loosely as ‘space’ and each man was entitled to his own justice in the space he 
controlled. 
                                                           
45 The Laws of War which make it illegal to attack certain zones are numerous but some shall be given here to 
contextualise this point. Undefended places cannot come under attack – The Hague Convention Regulations 
1899 Art. 25. Zones which have been designated ‘no fire zones’ to which the civilian populace may seek refuge 
in are also not options for attack – The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in times 
of war 1949 Art. 14. Finally, fixed medical facilities of the opposing forces can never be attacked. – Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration for the Condition of the Sick and the Wounded in the Field 1949  Art. 19 
46 Pollock F ‘The King’s Peace in the Middle Ages’ [1900] 13 Harvard Law Review 177 178 
47 In 1 Hen c.10  the Crown Plea of furtum morte impunitum could be forwarded in cases of theft concerning the 
King. The defendnat was to be punished but at a later date by the king, common thieves on the other hand were 
left to the County and local courts. 
48 n.46 above at  41  
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The peasant had his own ‘peace’ in his home, the Earl’s ‘peace’ extended through their town 
and county, whilst the Queen’s peace, the most important of all was not only restricted to 
space also circumstance, extending in respect of persons, occasions and places, such as during 
wartime and the Highways of the land. The eventual widening of the Queen’s peace was in 
order to protect the monarch’s own interests and benefit the their own coffers. Since more 
offences came within the monarch’s domain, the more forfeitures and fines they could collect 
whilst legally restricting any possible contenders to their hegemony. Previously, it was very 
much the physical presence of a monarch which ensured protection from the violations of 
others. For instance, upon the death of Henry I, during the interregnum, there was no King to 
ensure the peace and widespread lawlessness went unpunished.
49 Law abiding citizen’s began 
to expect the peace to protect them as the right of every peaceable citizen.
50 
 
From these acts of self-interest comes the modern altruistic view that the first business of the 
executive power is to ensure order is maintained within its borders and that this should be 
done in a uniform manner.  From this, has grown the view that the Queen’s peace, does not 
only  prohibit,  but  also  protects  citizens  from  those  breaching  the  peace.  Contemporarily, 
‘Queen’s peace’ should be taken to mean those bound by the laws and customs of the State, 
which covers, as discussed previously, soldiers on foreign operations. The concept of the 
Queen’s peace has contributed to the establishment of the formal modern criminal system. A 
primary function of the criminal law is to protect organised society and the individuals who 
                                                           
49 Pollock F ‘The King’s Peace in the Middle Ages’ [1900] 13 Harvard Law Review 177 185 
50 n.46 above at 47  
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comprise it.
51 Thus an act might be said to be contrary to the Queen’s peace if the act is an 
offence against the state, a criminal activity that injures the state.
52 
 
Soldiers engaged with enemies during a time of war are acting outside the Queen’s peace, 
war is  one of those  ‘spaces’ to  which the  concept  of the ‘Queens  peace’  as  a means to 
regulate the citizens of the nation does not apply. The normal legal rules are suspended and 
further, those who are being killed are themselves not entitled to the protection of the peace as 
their acts are offences against the state. Their actions are neither peaceable nor lawful, as they 
are  enemies  of  the  state  and  can  be  construed  as  committing  some  type  of  recognisable 
offence. This sentiment was expressed in Page, where it was stated that combat represented 
an  occasion  under  which  citizens  were  no  longer  under  the  Queen’s  peace  and  thus  the 
offence  of  murder  was  not  applicable  to  soldiers  who  slew  enemy  combatants.
53 Lord 
Halisham’s obiter in the later case of R v Howe reiterated the sentiment when he excluded 
from the concept of murder the ‘killing of combatants engaged in combat’.
54 For instance, the 
soldiers engaged by Capt. Semrau’s patrol, could be said to be neither lawful or peaceable, as 
the Taliban, may fit within the concept of unlawful belligerents and their upper command 
could be seen as war criminals who commit crimes against humanity.
55 
 
However, when the enemy fall into the category of the protected persons, either through 
injury or capture,
56 it would seem the protection of the Queen’s peace does apply to them. 
They are no longer engaged in the criminal activity against the state. The ‘space’ and the 
                                                           
51 A  Levitt    ‘Some  Sociological  Aspects  of  the  Criminal  Law’  [1919]  13  Journal  of  Criminal  Law  and 
Criminology 90 93 
52 Stephen J F A History of the Criminal Law of England Vol.I  (C J Clay and Sons London 1888) 2-4 
53 R v  Page [1953] 2 All ER 1355 per Lord Goddard at 1357 
54 R v Howe [1987] AC 417 per Lord Halisham at 428 
55 Casey L A, Rivkin D B, Bartram D R ‘Unlawful Belligerency and it’s Implications Under International Law’ 
[2003]  The  Federalist  Society  for  Law  and  Public  Policy  Studies  found  on  http://www.fed-
soc.org/publication/detail/unlawful-belligerency-and-its-implications-under-international-law  Last  accessed 
13/02/2012  
56 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 1949 Art. 13  
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circumstances affecting that space have changed so, no longer are the soldiers justified in 
killing their opponents because they are acting in a manner which may injure the state and 
thus damage the Queen’s peace. They must now respect the protection given to them as 
protected persons and which brings them under the protection of the concept. The concept of 
the Queen’s peace is a practical tool for justifying prosecution for murder during peace time, 
but  when  the  concept  concerns  the  battlefield  mercy  killer,  again  the  argument  of  poor 
application of the law arises;  it is  a  case of making  the situation fit  the law rather than 
applying an offence which properly fits the behaviour. 
 
4.3 Killing during conflict and the self-defence doctrine 
 
As discussed, the common law definition of murder requires the offence to occur during the 
‘Queen’s’ peace. The law distinguishes between killings taking place in battle and killings 
taking place in peace time. However, when a person kills another during peacetime in self-
defence their actions are often legally justified, and whilst those who kill during battle are 
exempted from liability under the common law, as in that moment they are not operating 
under  the  Queen’s  peace,  this  exemption  is  often  explained  in  terms  of  self-defence.  Of 
course, it is important to point out that the soldier must also be operating under the rules of 
engagement, and when they operate outside of these their actions can become criminal.
57 The 
law therefore places the grievously wounded enemy combatant under the Queen’s peace from 
                                                           
57 R v Clegg [1995] 1 All ER 334 at 491 The defendant’s conviction was upheld because his actions were 
deemed to sit outside of the rules permitted by the ‘Instructions for opening fire in Northern Ireland’ para. 5 
"You may only open fire against a person: (a) if he is committing or about to commit an act likely to endanger 
life, and there is no other way to prevent the danger. The following are some examples of acts where life could 
be endangered, dependent always upon the circumstances: (1) firing or being about to fire a weapon; (2) planting, 
detonating or throwing an explosive device (including a petrol bomb); (3) deliberately driving a vehicle at a 
person and there is no other way of stopping him; (b) if you know that he has just killed or injured any person by 
such means and he does not surrender if challenged and there is no other way to make an arrest."  
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the moment they have surrendered at discretion, as they become protected persons under 
binding international law and are no longer active combatants.
58  
 
This exposes the duality of the soldier’s situation. They can legally, and are duty bound to kill 
the enemy, but within an instant this action becomes illegal and punishable by the heaviest 
criminal  sanctions  if  the  enemy  surrenders.  The  justifications  for  killing  functioning 
combatants and the prohibition for killing the incapacitated combatant are dependent upon the 
concept of intention. 
 
Normally in criminal law, it is the actor’s intentions or mens rea which distinguishes the level 
of criminal liability placed upon the defendant and their culpability; a lack of intention can 
mean that the defendant is unable to be found guilty of certain crimes.
59 However, the soldier 
intends to kill his enemy during act ive fighting and also intends to kill the wounded and 
suffering enemy soldier when performing battlefield euthanasia; these are two different 
actions which have the same result but only one is a crime.   
 
‘Famously,  the  law  of  murder  cannot  distinguish  between  the 
contract killer and the mercy killer and this is but one upshot of a 
process of moral exclusion that is as old as the modern criminal 
law.’
60 
 
In each case the intentions is parallel but the motivations behind the intention differ. One is 
acting from self-defence and professional responsibility, it being his job to kill the enemy, 
                                                           
58 Statute of Rome 1998 Art 2(a)(iv) They have also become hors du combat under the Geneva Convention 1949 
Additional Protocol I 1977 Art.1(1) 
59 This is of course not the case in crimes of strict liability. 
60 Alan Norrie Punishment, Responsibility and Justice, A Relational Critique (OUP, Oxford 2000) 180  
138 
 
and the other from a motive of compassion. It is the motivation for acting which distinguishes 
the two acts yet the law does not distinguish these acts and hence mercy killing is a crime in 
which the defendant  is  often convicted of murder.  The moral  justifications  that form  the 
foundations of the doctrine of self-defence are often used to explain why soldiers who kill the 
enemy during battle are acting neither morally nor legally wrong.
61 Killing in self-defence is 
an exception to the general rule making killing punishable
62 and there is a right to protect 
one’s bodily inviolability, recognised domestically by both the courts,
63 and parliament.
64  
 
Domestically, the defence rests on three tenants which are compatible with the experiences of 
the soldier. First, there must be a belief of a threat, based on subjective understanding of the 
circumstances.
65 A soldier who kills an enemy on a field of battle who has a gun but who is 
not actually firing at him, qualifies, because the victim is clearly a possible, plausible threat.
66 
Second, the threat need not be unlawful,
67 the soldier could be fighting other soldiers in a 
conventional war in which neither side is apparently acting illegally. Third, the force used by 
the person relying on self- defence must be proportionate, and one would expect a reasonable 
                                                           
61 St. Aquinas Summa Theologiae ‘But as it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for the public authority acting 
for the common good,…as it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as 
have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the 
case of a soldier fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although even 
these sin if they be moved by private animosity.’ St. Augustine From Augustine to Publicola Letter 48 ‘I do not 
agree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by him; unless one be a soldier,…provided it be 
in keeping with [the status of] one’s person.’ 
62 H L A Hart Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (John Gardener 1968) 13 
63 Blake v DPP [1993] Crim LR 586 – Self-defence only justifies use of force to protect oneself or prevent crime. 
64 Criminal Law Act 1967 s.3(1) ‘A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstance in the 
prevention of crime, or in effecting or in assisting the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of 
persons unlawfully at large.’ 
65 R v Gladstone Williams (1984) 78 Cr App R 276 
66 Of course, as stated the soldier operates under the laws of war. In conflicts such as Afghanistan they must 
Positively Identify (PID) the target as an  enemy combatant before opening fire. PID reduces the chances of 
mistargeting, which could result in both friendly and civilian casualties – Robert E Rasmus ‘The Wrong Target – 
The  Problem  of  Mistargeting  Resulting  in  Fratricide  and  Civilian  Casualties’  [2007]  available  on 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA468765&Locat last accessed 21/3/2012. However whilst these 
rules are essential in practice the practice of PID can be very difficult to implement in real situations and thus 
can endanger lives on both sides – Mark S Martins ‘Rules of Engagement For Land Forces: A Matter of training, 
not lawyering’ [1994] 143 Military Law Review 1 
67 Jonathan Herring Criminal Law Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) 612  
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man would say that during war lethal force is a proportionate response to the lethal force of 
the enemy.
68 Finally, the attackers need not strike first. 
 
‘A  man  who  is  about  to  be  attacked  does  not  have  to  wait  for  his 
assailant to strike the first blow or fire the first shot; circumstance may 
justify a pre-emptive strike.’
69 
 
Accordingly, once contact is made with the enemy, patrols need not wait to be engaged. If the 
target is clearly depicted as a legitimate combatant,
70 then an assault is justified.  
 
However, at common law self-defence cannot be used when the actor has placed himself in a 
situation leading to the attack,
71 whereas in the military context the soldier has placed himself 
at risk by the very nature of his profession. Indeed, it may be said that he has been required to 
do so and that this is his duty, failure to engage the enemy c ould plausibly be seen as 
disobeying a lawful command or failure to perform ones duty and punishable under service 
law.
72  In summary, this justification for the acceptance of killing during conflict compared to 
during peacetime is due to the soldier being engaged in a subjectively just enterprise and thus 
he acts in the belief that his actions respond to the initial danger. In individual instances of 
combat,  the soldier kills  to  protect  himself, his  comrades  and  to  legitimately  stop  the 
furtherance of the enemy cause. This type of justification cannot be used to excuse a battle 
field mercy killing.  
 
                                                           
68 R v Owino [1995] 2 Cr App R 128 
69 Beckford v R [1988] 1 AC 130 PC Per Lord Griffiths 
70 See Chapter 1 1.11. The difficulty in accurately finding who is and who is not a combatant. 
71 Manlik v DPP [1989] Crim LR 451 
72 Armed Forces Act 2006 s.12 and s.15 respectively  
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Consider the known facts of Semrau. His life was no longer in danger from the victim or his 
companions as the fire fight had subsided. His intention to kill remained after it could have 
plausibly been excused using self-defence, and the act of killing took place after the victim 
ceased to be a threat. However, seen in this light a duality is created in which violently and 
aggressively  seeking  out  active  enemy  soldiers  is  acceptable,  but  where  the  killing  of  a 
mortally injured enemy, precipitated from motives of compassion and kindness, cannot be 
excused. Although, motivated from kindness the mercy killer is punishable, whereas during 
battle his violence is praised. It would seem a moral difference exists between the two actions. 
Motive, however, is always irrelevant to the determination of guilt, the courts are primarily 
concerned with the actor’s intention to take life. 
  
‘A word to you about motive,… if you were sure, that [the defendant] 
had as his primary purpose, the ending of [the victim’s] life, then his 
motive for doing what he did can afford him no defence… All that, of 
course, is highly relevant to any consequences which might follow from 
a verdict of guilty, but it is not a defence to the charge.’
73 
 
The mercy killer may claim his ‘intention’ was to relieve the suffering of the victim, and that 
death was a by-product of this action,
74 but this is irrelevant to the courts formulation of guilt 
which deems virtually certain criminal consequences of any guiding motive as intentional.
75 It 
is the actors sound intention not their good motivation that can justify their killing during war, 
as well as the status of the combatant. 
 
                                                           
73 R v Cox [1992] 12 BMLR 38 at 46 Per Ognall J 
74 Dual effect  will be considered in the section comparing the battlefield  mercy  killer and the  medical 
professional in situations of end of life actions 
75 R  v Nedrick (1986) 83 Cr App R 267  
141 
 
In conclusion, the soldier who has committed a mercy killing, falls within the jurisdiction of 
Britain’s criminal law and has killed an enemy soldier outside the justifiable acceptances of 
the Queen’s peace. Furthermore, his actions be explained by the use of the doctrine of self-
defence. He is therefore triable for murder. However, whilst he is triable for murder under the 
domestic laws of Britain, this is not to say that these laws are the best means by which to 
bring justice to the mercy killing soldier.  It could be argued that the domestic civil criminal 
laws, and the common law which has grown around instances of domestic mercy killing are 
so far removed from the activities and culture of the soldier as to be insufficient. 
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Chapter Five 
The Battlefield Mercy Killing as Homicide 
 
The previous chapter dealt with how the mercy killer was indictable under British law and 
why the killing was considered murder in comparison with the legitimate killing of enemy 
combatants that take place during war. The mercy killing soldier will likely be charged with 
murder. However, this charge is often mitigated in domestic cases of mercy killing by the 
special  defence  of  diminished  responsibility  which,  if  accepted,  leads  to  a  conviction  of 
manslaughter. The focus of this chapter is not to criticise the law as it stands, although it does 
produce absurd results even in domestic cases, but rather to highlight why it is improper to 
apply the law to the battlefield mercy killing. Furthermore, it will postulated, that in certain 
circumstances,  such  as  if  the  enemy  was  a  fanatic,  perhaps  a  suicide  bomber  or  a 
fundamentalist avowed to fight to the death, then the law surrounding suicide and assisted 
suicide might become relevant. 
 
The  alleged  mercy  killer  Capt.  Semrau  was  charged  with  second  degree  murder  under 
Canadian  Criminal  Law.  The  Canadian  system  demarcates  murder  into  two  categories. 
‘[F]irst degree murder when it is planned and deliberate’,
1 and, ‘all murder that is not first 
degree  murder  is  second  degree  murder.’
2  This  demarcation  allows  both  parole  and 
sentencing discretion, and also defines the degrees of wrongness by describing the overtly 
criminal acts which constitute first degree murder, namely those which pose the most risk to 
the public.
3 That the killing must be ‘planned and deliberate’, loosely corresponds with the 
                                                           
1 Canadian Criminal Code s.231(2) 
2 ibid. at  s.231(7) 
3 ibid. at s.231(3) Contract killing, s.231(4) murdering a police officer, s231(5) (a) during a hijacking s.231(5) 
(e)&(f) resulting from a kidnapping s.231(5)(b)(c)&(d) resulting from a sexual assault   
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English concept of ‘intention to cause…’.
4 Whilst definitional differences exist, it was still a 
charge of murder, and a soldier in a similar position to Semrau would face an equivalent 
charge in the United Kingdom. Where the traditional definition of the offence runs: 
 
‘Murder is when a man of sound memory and of the age of discretion, 
unlawfully killeth…any reasonable creature in rerum natura under the 
[Queen’s]  peace,  with  malice  aforethought,  either  expressed  by  the 
party or implied by the law, so as the wounded party etc., die of the 
wound or hurt etc…’
5 
 
Of course, it is also necessary to demonstrate causation before liability can be established. In 
Semrau, the body of the victim was not recovered and the court was therefore unable to 
convict him of second degree murder. It could not be conclusively proven that his shots 
caused the death of the insurgent, even though he was found to have shot the victim.
6  Fatally 
wounded soldiers will  eventually die from their wounds regardless of the shots fired by a 
compassionate enemy. The difficulty is in finding which wounds caused their death. Factual 
and legal causation must be proven. 
 
5.1 Causation and the battlefield mercy killing 
 
For the act to be considered murder, causation must be proven, the defendants actions must be 
shown to be a significant and operating cause of the defendant’s death. In Semrau, it could 
not be proven that his shots caused the death of the insurgent. Whilst he was found to have 
                                                           
4Or ‘malice aforethought’ in Cokes definition. See further Galloway D ‘Criminal Liability and the Centrality of 
Intention’ [1992] 5 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 143 
5 3 Co Inst 47 
6 Steven Chase ‘Semrau not guilty of murder in death of wounded Taliban’ Globe and Mail (Ontario 19
th July 
2010)  
144 
 
fired two shots into his torso, it could not be conclusively proven that the victim died from 
these shots. In court the prosecution must show that the victim would not have died at that 
time ‘but for’ the actions of the soldier.
 7 The obvious problem in a scenario such as that in 
which Capt. Semrau found himself is that the victim was so terribly wounded he could have 
died at any instant.
 He was severely wounded, with a large hole through his torso and one 
shredded and one lost leg among other serious injuries, and it has been conjectured that such 
injuries were fatal, especially if they were not treated immediately. The shots Capt. Semrau 
fired may not have caused the death of the victim, who may have died from his other serious 
wounds before the effects of the shots took their toll. Yet, in a mercy killing in must be 
assumed, for the purposes of this thesis, that the shots, or actions of the combat soldier led to 
the death of the victim. 
 
It is enough for the death to have been accelerated for causation to be proven, on the basis 
that the victim would not have died at that exact moment ‘but for’ the defendant’s actions.  
 
‘Murder is an act or series of acts done by the prisoner which were intended 
to  kill  and  did  in  fact  kill  the  dead  [victim].  It  does  not  matter  for  this 
purpose that her death was inevitable and that her days were numbered. If 
her life was cut short by weeks or months, it is just as much murder as if it 
was cut short by years.’
8 
 
Generally,  the  circumstances  of  a  battlefield  mercy  killing  would  not  be  paralleled  in 
domestic cases. The situations tend not to display the immediacy presented in Semrau. For 
                                                           
7 R v White [1910] 2 KB 124 
8 R v Adams [1957] CLR 365 per Delvin J  
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instance, in Gilderdale,
9 Webb
10 and Marshall,
11 the victims suffered long term conditions; it 
was not a case of ending their life by minutes or hours but a more cons iderable shortening of 
their lives. For instance in Inglis,
12 the administration of a lethal dose of heroin was clearly 
significant and was the operating cause in the victim’s death, since he was not in an inevitably 
mortal condition. In these cases it is easy to apply both the ‘but for’ rule and a de minimis test, 
ensuring the action was more than minimal,
13 both of which would prove causation.   
 
A battlefield mercy killing of a fatally injured soldier involves shortening the victim’s life by 
considerably less time and there are also questions over what can be constituted as a ‘minimal’ 
action. Shots fired by a soldier accelerate the death, but to say they change the course of 
events regarding the victim more than minimally can be questioned. The victim will certainly 
die imminently, the shots accelerate this certainty but the outcome is not changed more than 
minimally, the time is affected slightly but the result remains unchanged. In this light the 
shots may not be seen as substantial cause of death. 
 
Quantifying what constitutes a minimal action, or a substantial cause in relation to the de 
minimis test is a complex task. In R v Adams,
14 the court said it mattered not if the action of 
the defendant cut short the victim’s life by weeks or months, this still constituted an unnatural 
hastening  of  the  victim’s  death  for  the  purposes  of  murder.  However,  the  mercy  killing 
soldier is faced with a victim for whom death is imminent, and his actions may hasten the 
victim’s death by only minutes or hours. In some professional spheres, in some circumstances, 
such a shortening is considered as less than minimal. Fr instance, when physician’s carryout 
                                                           
9 R v Gilderdale [2010] Unreported 
10 R v Webb [2011] EWCA Crim 152 
11 R v Marshall [2001] Unreported 
12 R v Inglis [2010] EWCA Crim 2637 
13 The Actus Reus for murder requires the defendants conduct to be ‘a significant cause of death’. 
14 n.8 above  per Delvin J  
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procedures for pain relief which foreseeably yet not intentionally cut the victims life short, a 
hastening of hours or even days is not considered an unlawful hastening. 
 
‘If, for example, because a doctor had done something or has omitted to do 
something, death occurs at eleven o’clock instead of twelve o’clock, or even 
Monday instead of Tuesday, no people of common sense would say, ‘oh, the 
doctor caused the death.’
15 
 
However,  physicians’  actions  are  considered  differently  and  are  subject  to  specific  legal 
sophistry, discussed later.
16 What makes the soldiers actions different is that he has the sole 
intent to kill the injured soldier, his actions are therefore a significant and operating factor and 
the victim would not have died at that instance ‘but for’ the defendant’s actions. 
 
Although there is room for debate over the  impact of the soldiers actions, establishing a 
causal link is dependent on more than proving the ‘but for’ rule and applying the de minimis 
test. No novus actus interveniens or intervening act must have occurred which broke the chain 
of causation. The actions of the defendant must directly relate to the cause of the victim’s 
death. In a battlefield mercy killing conflict arises over which act was the actual cause of 
death, either the initial legitimate attack or the subsequent killing.  
 
The victim is in a deathly situation, and would inevitably die regardless from the wounds 
inflicted by a legitimate attack. However, the court cannot start the chain of causation at the 
beginning  of  the  legitimate  commencement  of  hostilities  which  placed  the  victim  in  the 
mortal condition. No crime had been committed at this point, the infliction of serious wounds 
                                                           
15 ibid. 
16 See chapter 6 for a discussion on double effect and the Adams case.  
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upon the victim was carried out within the legal boundaries of international war. For a murder 
charge to be successful, the chain of causation must be regarded as starting from the point 
Capt. Semrau, or those in a similar position take their action after the cessation of hostilities 
when the victim falls under the protection of international law. Of course it can be argued that 
if the victim had not been put in that condition, then the mercy killer would have no need to 
act. But that argument can only stand if the actions, both the legitimate violence and the 
mercy  killing  are  understood  as  a  continuous  whole,  rather  than  being  broken  into  two 
separate  actions,  the  legitimate  hostilities  and  the  shooting,  which  falls  outside  the 
permissible actions of the soldier during war. 
 
Domestically there are two cases which open debate over the practicality of transposing the 
doctrine  of  causation  onto  a  serving  soldier  who  provides  the  coup  de  grace  to  a  fallen 
adversary during times of hostilities. In R v Malcherek,
17 turning off the victim’s life support 
machine was not the seen as the cause of death, rather it was the initial attack which caused 
her to be placed on life support. She was already brain stem dead and incapable of breathing, 
but was being kept alive via a ventilation machine. This may seem contrary to the law as 
applied to the battlefield mercy killer, who whilst not responsible for the behaviour which put 
the victim in their terminal condition, would be held responsible for the actions which lead to 
a  shortening  of  their  life.  However,  shooting  the  battlefield  victim  who  is  dying  and 
withdrawing life support from a patient who cannot live without it are different because in 
one situation the victim is still alive without assistance whilst in the other life would not be 
possible without assistance. The withdrawal is based on lawful omission of the physician’s 
duty to care for the patient in cases where the medical treatment no longer has any beneficial 
effect. The mercy killing soldier kills the victim, who is still alive without treatment, through 
                                                           
17 R v Malcherek [1981] 2 All ER 422  
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a positive act, there is no omission. These types of actions are not legally justified,
18 and can 
be interpreted as being a novus actus interveniens.  
 
A further domestic case also raises debate. In R v Chesire,
19 the victim had been shot in the 
leg and stomach, but was no longer in a life threatening position. Subsequent negligent 
medical treatment led to his death. The court still held the defendant, the perpetrator of the 
original attack, liable for murder, as the victim would not have be en in hospital and required 
treatment ‘but for’ the injuries inflicted by the defendant. The treatment in essence had not 
broken the chain of causation. In the theoretical scenario of the battlefield mercy killing, the 
victim is not in a stable condition but mortally wounded, there is no ‘but for’ consideration in 
as much as the victim would be in that position regardless of the defendant’s actions. Whilst 
the subsequent treatment of the victim by the defendant kills him, this cannot be attributed to 
original actions which took place during the initial hostilities. The defendant’s actions are the 
cause of death because they do not shorten life and are not lawful intervention. 
 
Despite these reservations, the mercy killing soldier would still be liable for murder. This can 
only be if the chain of causation is taken as starting from the point at which the victim comes 
under the custody and protection of the defendant’s forces and is separated from the initial 
attack on the basis of the legitimacy of that attack. This must be the case, for without proving 
a  causal  link  between  the  soldier’s  actions  and  the  victim’s  death  criminal  responsibility 
cannot be attributed to the action. In the eyes of the law, the defendant’s conduct had criminal 
consequences, and as a result should be punished at least to some degree. Proving the causal 
link  between  offender  and  result  allows  the  logical  application  of  such  a  punishment.
 20 
Causation  allows  the  evaluation  of  situations  for  the  purposes  of  attributing  criminal 
                                                           
18 See chapter 6 for further discussion on withdrawing treatment. 
19 R v Chesire [1996] Crim LR 595 
20 Ryu P K ‘Causation in Criminal Law’ [1958] 106 University of  Pennsylvania Law Review773 774  
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responsibility, or the consequences of actions.
21 It is ‘a matter of imputations’ as to which 
consequence can be attributed to which actor and how logical this imputation would be.
22 
 
However, it is the level of criminal responsibility that is attributed to the battlef ield mercy 
killer that seems unjust and not the doctrine of causation. 
 
‘It is now recognised in almost all cases that the problem is one of degree 
of fault and not of causation and that, I believe is a highly satisfactory 
result.’
23 
 
The doctrine of causation allocates fault by casting a wide net over the perpetrator’s actions. 
Under the principle of novus actus interveniens, the actions which led to the victim’s death in 
a battlefield mercy killing are considered only from the point at which he came under the 
defendant’s protection and do not take into account the battle he participated in and which left 
him mortally wounded. Further, the ‘but for’ test disproportionately accentuates the soldiers 
effect in hastening the victim’s death. For instance, in Semrau, it has been conjectured that the 
victim’s wounds were of a fatal nature and he was going to die, but the law does not allow for 
differentiation between an inevitable, lingering, suffering death caused by legitimate actions 
and an immediate merciful killing.  
 
Imposing these domestic rules on the battlefield mercy killer supports the argument of the 
non-empathetic nature of the law in this area,
 24  but further, it shows that in applying such law 
in particular to the battlefield mercy killing soldier, not only will it produce an absurd result, 
                                                           
21 Hart H L A & Honore T ‘Causation in Law’ [1956] 72 Law Quarterly Review 58 
22 Hall J Principles of Criminal Law (The Bobbs-Merrill Company1947) 256 
23 Goodhart A L ‘Appeals in Questions of Facts [1955] 71 Law Quarterly Review 402 414 
24 Grubb A ‘Euthanasia in England – A Law Lacking in Compassion [2001] 8 European Journal of Health Law 
89   
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but also an injustice. Just because the law lacks empathy does not make it bad law, yet it does 
mean that in applying it to unique situations, in which the empathy of the offender was a key 
factor behind their behaviour, that the consequence will be the deliverance of an institutional 
justice out of line with society’s appreciation of the action. However, whilst it is still likely 
that the mercy killing soldier will be charged with murder, there is good reason to believe that, 
at least in some cases, he might not have to suffer the mandatory life sentence and that his 
conviction  can  be  mitigated  through  the  use  of  the  special  defence  of  diminished 
responsibility, which has been utilised in many cases of domestic mercy killing. 
 
5.2 A Conviction for Manslaughter by means of Diminished Responsibility 
 
Below the level of murder a homicide may be considered to be manslaughter, of which there 
are  many  different  categories.  The  killing  of  the  victim  in  a  battlefield  mercy  killing  is 
undoubtedly a homicide, but the moral value of the action may mean that a murder conviction 
is unjust because it fails to appropriately reflect the level of criminal responsibility and overly 
stigmatises the soldier. The question of whether or not the soldier’s actions can fit with the 
domestically developed law of manslaughter should be investigated will now be considered. 
 
Manslaughter  may  be  categorised  as  either  involuntary  or  voluntary  manslaughter. 
Involuntary  manslaughter  covers  situations  in  which  a  person  kills  another,  but  does  so 
without the intent to kill them or cause GBH. Such actions fall into two brackets, deaths 
which are caused by gross negligence on the behalf of the defendant, and deaths which are 
caused  inadvertently  by  the  defendant’s  unlawful  act.  The  defendant  charged  with  gross 
negligence manslaughter faces a four stage test;
25 first there must have been a duty of care to 
                                                           
25 R v Adamako (1994) 3 All ER 79  
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the  deceased.  No  general  duty  towards  another  person  exists  but  it  can  come  about,  for 
instance, through terms of employment,
26 and where there are reasonable grounds to impose 
such a duty because of the principles of, proximity, justice, foreseeability and fairness.
27 In 
the case of the battlefield mercy killer, a duty is owed under international law.
28 Second, that 
duty must be breached, as was the case in the mercy killing soldier’s situation.  Third, the 
breach must cause, or significantly contribute to the death of the victim. The nature of the 
significance of the cause was discussed previously, and as such it can be said that the breach 
did significantly contribute to the victim’s death. Finally, the breach should be characterised 
as gross negligence; and therefore a crime. The actions of the soldier could be construed as 
such especially when considered in relation to the professional standards and duties soldiers 
have  to  uphold  international  laws  of  war.
29  As  such  the  soldier  who  kills  in  these 
circumstances acts in gross dereliction of his duties. 
 
The action may also be seen as unlawful act manslaughter, where the killing is the result of 
the defendant’s unlawful act. Such an act is one which all sober and reasonable people would 
realise would subject the victim to the risk of physical injury, though it need not be serious 
harm.
30 In the case of the battlefield mercy killing, the action was unlawful, in accordance 
with international law and a reasonable person would  clearly foresee it to pose the risk of 
injury to the victim. However, neither of these categories of involuntary manslaughter would 
be used to deal with the soldier accused of delivering a coup de grace to the mortally 
                                                           
26 R v Pitwood (1902) 19 TLR 37 
27 Donohue v Stevenson (1932) AC 582 
28 Namely under the general provisions of  the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Sick and Wounded 1949 
29 For  details  of  the  soldiers  duty  see  ‘Values  and  Standards  of  the  British  Army’  2008  available  on 
http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/v_s_of_the_british_army.pdf  last accessed on 01/03/2012. Para. 
15 ‘… All soldiers must act within the law and the nature of modern, complex, land based operations makes it 
essential that they maintain the highest standards of decency and fairness at all times, even under the most 
difficult of conditions. External scrutiny, including intense media interest, is now an attendant part of all aspects 
of military life. Soldiering is about duty: so soldiers should be ready to uphold the rights of others before 
claiming their own.’ 
30 R v Williams and Davies (1992) 2 All ER 183  
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wounded on the battlefield. That is because the soldier in such a situation has the intent to kill 
the victim. He intends to end his suffering through killing him. 
 
Therefore, the law regarding voluntary manslaughter may be applicable to the mercy killer.  
He has intended to kill the victim, or inflict serious harm, but there are mitigating factors 
which reduce the defendant’s culpability. For instance, the defendant may be able to rely on 
the defence of diminished responsibility, which is often used in cases of domestic mercy 
killing. 
 
To do so it must be proven that he was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning 
which substantially impaired his ability to;
31 understand the nature of his conduct;
32 form a 
rational judgement;
33 or exercise self-control.
34 Domestically, the use of this defence is a 
popular method to mitigate the mercy killer’s responsibility because 
 
‘… where someone commits a mercy killing in a moment of distress or 
despair. It might be argued that this person merits formal mitigation on 
the  basis  that  exigency  if  their  situation  edges  out  the  process  of 
reasoning while also blocking the inferences which would normally be 
drawn from their behaviour.’
 35 
 
However, this reasoning relates to the definition of diminished responsibility, in s.2 of the 
Homicide Act 1958 and not the way it is understood under s.52 of the Coroners and Justice 
                                                           
31 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s.52(1)(1)(b) 
32 ibid. at  s.52(1)(1A)(a) 
33 ibid. at  s.52(1)(1A)(b) 
34 ibid. at  s.52(1)(1A)(c) 
35 N Lacey ‘Partial defences to homicide: Question of power and principle in imperfect and less perfect worlds’ 
in  A Ashworth and B Mitchell (ed.) Rethinking English Homicide Law’ (Oxford University Publishing Oxford 
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Act. Under the previous definition, the defence was successfully used, between 1982 and 
1991 where, of twenty trials involving mercy killing which relied on the defence only one 
returned a murder conviction. This was in part due to the fact that the defendant in that 
particular  trial  initially  relied  on  the  defence  of  provocation  rather  than  diminished 
responsibility.
36 
 
The recent change in the legal definition of the defence has left it’s applicability in mercy 
killing cases in doubt.
37 Previously, the domestic mercy killer’s use of the defence relied upon 
the intensity of caring for their loved one, with all the relational emotions this involved, as 
bringing about the ‘abnormality of the mind’.
38 Medical evidence was required, but the court 
maintained  the  discretion  to  interpret  each  case  on  its  own  merits.
39 The reforms of the 
Coroners and Justice Act make a medical diagnosis essential before the defence can be 
utilised,
40  and in a number of cases, such as Webb, this does support the use of the defence. 
 
‘…  there  is  a  significant  body  of  research  that  demonstrates  the 
negative psychological impact of being a full-time carer for another 
person who is suffering from both physical and psychiatric disorder. In 
my  view,  that  psychological  effect  will  have  been  compounded 
uniquely by the complex relationship that must have existed between 
Mr Webb and his wife, whose own psychiatric difficulties, together 
with  her  suicidal  drives,  will  have  further  undermined  Mr  Webb's 
mental health.’ 
41 
                                                           
36 R v Cocker [1989] Crim LR 740 
37 n.31 above  at s.53 has replaced the Homicide Act 1957 s.2  
38 Homicide Act 1958 s.2 
39 R v Walden [1959] 1 WLR 1008 
40 n.31 above  at s.52 (1)(1)(a) 
41 n.10 above  at para. 16  
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On the battlefield a soldier’s mental condition can certainly be affected by the trauma of war, 
but whether or not this type of mental impact must be considered in conjunction with the 
proximity  of  the  relationship  between  the  victim  and  defendant  is  uncertain.  The 
psychological trauma of the battlefield upon the defendant may need to be coupled with a 
relationship with the victim for the defence to succeed. 
 
The experience of war has effects on the individual that may cause them to act differently 
from the reasonable man in civilian times of peace, and their mental health may be affected 
via a recognised medical condition such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
42 The effects of 
war upon the participant’s perception of right and wrong and levels of acceptable behaviour 
were discussed in previous chapters.
43 However, the focus on the nature of the relationship 
the defendant had with the victim is often crucial in the defence’s success in the domestic 
courts. 
 
George Webb used the defence in civilian life after caring for his wife for a number of years. 
He obviously had a close and loving relationship which had been in existence for decades, the 
deterioration of which could plausibly affect his mental reasoning. It would be difficult for a 
soldier like Capt. Semrau to evidence a comparable relationship with the victim and thus 
successfully employ the defence. The victim is an enemy soldier with whom the defendant 
assailant has no intimate relationship. However, his isolated conditioning, in common with all 
soldiers across the globe, innately imbibes him with a common understanding that can be 
construed as type of close relationship,
44 and could perhaps, although it is an imperfect match, 
                                                           
42 National  Audit Office  – Ministry of Defence  Treating Injury and Illness Arising on Military Operations 
Session 2009 – 2010 HOC 294 London: Stationary Office Feb 2010 15 fig. 3 
43 See chapter 2. 
44 See chapter 2 on the influences of war and soldiering on the individual  
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be used as the means to compare the act with those in a case like Webb. For instance, a soldier 
charged with pre-meditated murder in a US case of battlefield mercy killing expressed such a 
familial sentiment towards his victim. 
 
‘My intention was to ease his pain, and that’s how I felt. I felt like it 
was my brother that was lying there with those wounds, I remembered 
what I was taught, what I was shown by my leaders about what was 
right and what was wrong.’
45 
 
Being a full-time carer for a loved one and suffering the ‘negative psychological impact’
46 of 
that occupation is contextually different to the bonds of brotherhood occurring in war, but this 
does not mean that the defendant is not acting under abnormality of mental functioning, only 
that the lack of a clearly proximate relationship makes it hard to match with civilian instances 
in which the defence was utilised.  
 
Whilst the potential diagnosis of the battlefield mercy killer and the domestic mercy killer do 
not match, the abnormality of the defendant’s mind as occurring from potential PTSD may be 
enough for soldiers to utilise the defence, although to do so may distance them from the 
actions of the domestic mercy killer. The courts have previously allowed a wide variety of 
medical conditions as evidence of the abnormality of mental functioning. For instance, in R v 
Vinagre,
47 prior to the legislative change, the defendant suffered from a strange condition 
called ‘Othello Syndrome’ which caused morbid jealously for no apparent reason and resulted 
in him stabbing his partner to death and he thus qualified to use diminished responsibility as a 
                                                           
45 United States v Alban – Cardenas 29 (Headquarters, 1
st Cavalry Division, Jan 14 2004) Testimony of Staff 
Sergeant Alban – Cardenas at 124 
46  n.31 above  at para.16 
47 R v Vinagre (1977) 69 Cr App R 104  
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defence.  Such a wide application of the defence makes it likely the soldier suffering with 
PTSD may find that the defence is applicable to him. 
 
Evidence  of  PTSD,  has  been  forwarded  as  evidence  of  diminished  responsibility  in 
commonwealth jurisdictions. In R v Nielsen,
48 it was asserted that the defendant’s Korean war 
experiences had left him with PTSD and depression. In this vein, it may also be possible to 
argue that the culture of military life has also affected the defendant’s reasoning. This not just 
based  on  the  understanding  of  a  familial  relationship  being  comparable  to  the  bonds  the 
defendant has with other warriors through the existence of an isolated culture. In Nielsen, the 
defendant argued that his experiences had led to him ‘de-humanising’ his victim in the same 
way  which  soldiers  are  taught  to  dehumanise  their  enemy.
49 However,  in  Nielsen,  the 
defendant failed on appeal to get the courts to accept that he could justly qualify for using the 
defence. 
 
The initial cause for the reform of the defence of diminished responsibility in the UK was its 
evolution  far  beyond  the  permissible  causes  of  its  original  definition.
 50 It  has  long  been 
argued that liberal use of diminished responsibility displays an abdication of responsibility in 
cases where a responsibility ought to remain.
51 This responsibility is certainly more evident in 
the mercy killing by a soldier of a wounded enemy compared to a husband upon his wife. The 
defendant in the latter instance is subject only to  a prohibition against killing, whereas the 
soldier is also subject to an imposed duty to protect the wounded.
52 Whether or not this would 
agitate his circumstance is another unknown and uncertainty remains over applications of the 
                                                           
48 R v Nielsen (1990) 47 A Crim R 268 
49 See chapter 2. 
50 Ministry of Justice Murder Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for reform of the law 2008 Consultation 
Paper (CP 19/08) 14 
51 J E Williams ‘The Homicide Act 1957 and Diminished Responsibility. An Abdication of Responsibility’ 
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52 n.28 above at  Art.12  
157 
 
modified defence and it’s malleability in relation to mercy killing, especially with the onus 
the new act places on a substantial medical diagnosis. The court is primarily occupied with 
malicious intent and bad motives rather than whether the defendant was trying to alleviate 
suffering. 
  
‘The appellant's  responsibility was diminished, not extinguished. He 
knew what he was doing and that what he did was unlawful; and the 
possible consequences of what he was doing when he was doing it’ 
53 
 
But, in domestic cases juries have often been sympathetic to the mercy killer, seemingly 
taking into account the defendant’s circumstance and motive.
54 Whether a battlefield mercy 
killer could successfully use this facility depends on whether the soldier is willing to utilise 
the defence. They may feel that their actions did not stem from an abnormality of the mind, 
and that their actions were totally justified. For example, at his trial for pre meditated murder 
for delivering a coup de grace to an injured Iraqi suspect in 2004, US soldier Capt. Maynulet 
informed the court that he stood by the morality of his actions. 
 
‘He was in a state that I didn’t think was dignified. I had to put him out of 
his misery…It was the right thing to do. I think it was the honourable thing 
to do. I don’t think allowing him to continue in that state was proper.’
55   
 
Of course many domestic mercy killers may feel the same way and utilise the defence none-
the-less because there is no alternative. In such a case where the defendant does not wish to 
                                                           
53 n.10 above  per the Lord Chief Justice at 17 
54 R D Mackey ‘Diminished Responsibility and the mentally disordered’ in A Ashworth and B Mitchell (eds) 
Rethinking English Homicide Law (Oxford University Publishing Oxford 2000) 79 
55  United States  v Maynulet No. 04 – 9847, 242-243 (Headquarters, 1
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utilise the defence of diminished responsibility, the murder charge will be followed through, 
but  there remains  an area of law, that concerning suicide, which provides  some possible 
avenues of exploration concerning the liability of the defendant. 
 
5.3 Suicide: The battlefield mercy killing as a suicide 
 
Suicide is not illegal, it involves circumstances ‘where the deceased intended to take his own 
life.’
56 Often, the victim acts alone on these intentions, however, in some instances the suicide 
involves the actions of others. When other parties are involved in a suicide, their involvement 
can be interpreted as criminal.
57 Thus sometimes, where the victim of a battlefield mercy 
killing has previously displayed a settled intention to die justice  might be better served to the 
battlefield mercy killer, if it was possible to lay some responsibility for their actions at the feet 
of their victim. This might occur where, by chance of luck and bad the victim killed outright, 
but left lingering painfully alive and the mercy killing itself only comes about because of their 
suicidal intentions. This section will therefore focus on the attributes of the victim as suicidal, 
rather than the  defendant’s  actions  as  a  killer,  in  order  to  understand  why  the  criminal 
sanctions of murder may be too harsh a punishment. It is not to say that the mercy killing is a 
suicide, it cannot be because the soldier performs the last action which kills the victim, but 
rather sometimes the victim’s intentions were suicidal and thus full responsibility for their 
deaths does not lay with the defendant. There are several relevant types of suicide that may be 
relevant to the mercy killing soldier; victim precipitated suicide, suicide pacts and assisted 
suicide, and the suicidal nature of some types of combatants has a long tradition in war.  
 
                                                           
56 Jan Neelman & Simon Wessely ‘Changes in Classification of Suicide in England and Wales: time trends and 
associations with coroner’s professional backgrounds’ [1997] 27 Psychological Medicine 467 
57 Suicide Act 1961 s.2  
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‘And while the attention of our men is engaged in that matter, in another, 
Adiatunnias,  who  held  the  chief  command  with  six  hundred  devoted 
followers whom they call soldurii; the conditions of whose association are 
these –  that they  enjoy  all the conveniences  of  life with  those to  whose 
friendship  they  have  devoted  themselves:  if  anything  calamitous  happen 
with  them  either  they  endure  the  same  destiny  together  with  them,  or 
commit suicide: nor hitherto, in the memory of men, has there been found 
any  one  who,  upon  his  being  slain  to  whose  friendship  he  had  devoted 
himself, refused to die.’
58 
 
The above account of the Soldurii depicts the willingness of soldiers to die for their cause and 
for one another in a tacit understanding of the bonds of fellowship and honour that bind them 
and for the isolated military culture previously discussed. In the ancient world, this fight to the 
death mentality was well documented, ‘The Spaniards too, held it a disgrace to survive in 
battle,…’
59.  Often, as with the Soldurii, the fate of these warriors was bound to those who 
they had sworn to protect or serve, they had formed a pact to die together in battle, and if their 
opposite was slain, they too must fight and place themselves in a position in which the enemy 
would slay them also. The followers of the Germanic Chieftain Chronodamaric, ‘…judged it a 
disgrace  to  live  after  the  death  of  their  King  or  not  to  die  for  him  if  the  opportunity 
occurred.’
60 
 
In  some  instances,  such  as  contemporary  suicide  bombers,  those  that  could  be  deemed 
combatants accept and show a willingness, and determination to die in battle. This state of 
affairs does not translate to all soldiers but many, like the soldurii, would rather die than 
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survive their comrades’ death, whilst in many instances they have killed themselves rather 
than  be  subject  to  the  enemy  treatment,  when  the  odds  are  against  them.  When  fighting 
against imperial Rome for example, the Zealots, besieged in Masada, committed mass suicide 
to a man rather than be captured by the overwhelming force that faced them.
61 Other soldiers 
have been prepared to spend their life, especially when wounded, with the intention of taking 
an enemy with them, such as the Japanese soldiers during their retreat through New Guinea. 
 
‘A man who had the strength left to pull the pin could always blow himself 
up, so everyone tried to keep one grenade until the last moment. Even those 
who tossed away their rifles never threw away their last grenade.’
62 
 
In war suicide can often therefore be seen as a mercy, a release from the tortures of war. When 
death surrounds the soldier, the means by which it is achieved can blur into irrelevance. 
 
‘In New Guinea, we didn't know what was killing us.  Who killed that one?  
Was it death from insanity?  A suicide?  A mercy killing?  Maybe he just 
couldn't endure the pain of living.  I remember the war as mainly one of 
suicides and mercy killings.’
63 
 
In  many  military  organisations,  contemporarily  and  traditionally,  cultural  and  religious 
influence leads to an expectation that the soldier will carry out his duty to fight the enemy 
                                                           
61  N Ben-Yehuda Masada Myth: Collective Memory and Myth Making (University of Wisconsin Press Madison 
1995)  
62 Ernest Herr  The  Army  that  Disappeared    http://www.angelfire.com/planet/solomon0/NewGuinea.html  last 
accessed 25/03/2012 
63 ibid.   
161 
 
unto  death,
64 as is seen in the jihadist battlefield behaviour under the law of the military 
jihad.
65  
 
The most famous example of this is the actions of Japanese Kamikaze pilots during the 
Second World War  who  were not ordered to d ie, but rather  volunteered  for the  suicidal 
mission. 
66 Of  course  there  was  psychological  pressure  in  the  form  of  state  and  peer 
expectation,
67 but it was their choice to voluntarily embark on a mission from which they had 
no intention of returning. It thus seems paradoxical  that knowing that some soldiers are so 
intent on dying for their cause, often influenced through differing cultural factors than 
western society is exposed to, to then punish the soldier who shoots the victim who has barely 
failed to achieve his aim and is suffering in a mortal condition.   
 
Such a culture may seem alien from a western viewpoint, in which the martial tradition has 
slowly  eroded,  and  where  the  concept  of  warriors,  martyrs  and  heroes  is  no  long er 
prevalent.
68 Today western militaries are more individualised and the soldier will be more 
likely to act o n decisions which are best for him   and not the entirety of the group.
69 
Conversely, eastern military establishments with a martial history, for insta nce, members of 
the Turkish Armed Forces, have a heightened willingness and acceptance of dying for their 
cause, and to serve the country by sacrificing their lives.
70 
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Thus soldiers exist, who show a fanatic devotion to their cause and display an intention to die 
whether they achieve their objective or not. In the modern day evidence of this can be seen in 
Islamic fundamentalists who undertake suicide attacks and ‘martyrdom operations’.
71 These 
may be identified by their dress,
72 or it may be evident from the ferocity of their attack and 
actions in battle. However, if a soldier were to commit a mercy killing on one of these suicidal 
fighters, the victim’s previous intentions and desire to die would tend to be ignored and the 
soldier would still be charged with murder.  In situations where the victim falls into such a 
bracket, the law surrounding suicide may serve a better justice to that particular mercy killer, 
but may not be practically applicable. Nevertheless if it were to occur, three practices are of 
relevance, suicide pacts, assisted suicide and a practice known colloquially as ‘death by cop’ 
or victim precipitated homicide 
 
5.4 Victim Precipitated Homicide 
 
Victim precipitated homicide, or suicide by cop was first widely recorded in the United States. 
It is estimated that such types of suicide account for up to thirteen per cent of all shootings 
resulting in death which are carried out by U.S. law enforcement officers.
73 Since first being 
recorded, it has been evidenced throughout the world, including in the UK.
74 Essentially, the 
victim provokes another to kill them to achieve their goal of suicide. It has been postulated 
here that some fighters, for instance those seeking martyrdom, have a clearly settled intention 
to die and the attributes and actions of the participants in victim precipitated homicide are key 
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factors which point to whether victim had suicidal intentions. Many of those involved in 
victim precipitated suicide are unable to suffer the loss of self-esteem associated with arrest 
by the police and failure in their objective.
75 On the battlefield these attributes and actions 
may manifest themselves in the image of the proud warrior who continually attacks the 
enemy heedlessly and against the odds, to achieve his goal without losing any self -esteem as 
to the bravery of their conduct.
76 Furthermore, in cases where the victim’s death will be seen 
as glorious sacrifice, and he places himself in reckless positions, acting without regard to his 
life and refuses to surrender or lay down his arms, these actions can be interpreted as clearly 
suicidal. 
 
However, in such cases involving policemen, the initial attack usually kills the victim. The 
police can use lethal force to neutralise the victim, but if the force, for some reason does not 
kill  the  victim  outright,  the  victim’s  previous  suicidal  actions  do  not  justify  the  police 
shooting him. In the same way, the defendant solider in a battlefield mercy killing cannot 
easily claim the defendant’s previous suicidal actions as a justification for his actions. Whilst 
there is no general duty to prevent suicide, when a person comes under the custody and 
protection of a valid authority a duty does exist to take reasonable steps to prevent such 
actions.
77 The victim of the battlefield mercy killing is certainly under  the protection of the 
soldier, and thus some type of duty is owed to prevent harm coming to him by his own 
actions. He should also no longer pose the type of threat that would justify a shooting. Whilst 
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police  have  a  duty  to  ensure  that  operational  measures  are  put  in  place  to  stop  those  under  their  custody 
committing suicide and must ake reasonable steps to ensure this. Reeves v Commissioners for the Metropolis 
[2000] 1 AC 360.  
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his intentions during battle were suicidal the soldiers delivering a coup de grace to the victim 
cannot easily be viewed in the same light as victim precipitated suicide. 
 
To view the killing as a victim precipitated suicide may have delivered a more apt justice to 
the victim because it places some responsibility for the actions on the victim. This is not to 
say that all victims of war who might experience a coup de grace to end their suffering are 
responsible  for  this  state  of  affairs.  Only  that,  in  some  circumstances,  where  the  soldier 
clearly displays suicidal intent, such as fanatics and would be martyrs, holding the mercy 
killer solely responsible may be too harsh. In the alternative it may be possible to see the 
actions of the victim in light of a suicide pact, such as those entered into by the soldurii and 
Zealots in the ancient Roman wars. Rather than seeking martyrdom, in some cases soldiers 
are bounded by such strong bonds forged in the isolated culture of the military and tempered 
in the extreme conditions of war, that they are loathe to outlive their comrades. 
 
5.5 Suicide Pacts 
 
The behaviour of the Zealots and the soldurii, can be understood as a suicide pact because 
each party had sworn to kill themselves. In the case of the Zealots, to escape capture, in the 
case of the soldurii they would kill themselves by fighting to the death. In both examples there 
was a common agreement to die together and the parties entered into the action with the 
‘settled intention’ of dying. Suicide pacts are defined in both the Homicide Act 1957 and the 
Suicide Act 1961. 
 
‘For  the  purposes  of  this  section  “suicide  pact”  means  a  common 
agreement between two or more persons having for its object the death  
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of all of them, whether or not each is to take his own life, but nothing 
done by a person who enters into a suicide pact shall be treated as done 
by him in pursuance of the pact unless it is done while he has the settled 
intention of dying in pursuance of the pact.’
78 
 
Under the law of England and Wales, the survivor of such a pact commits an offence. Before 
the 1957 Homicide Act, the survivor of such a pact was often held to be guilty of murder.
79 
Today, 
 
‘It shall be manslaughter and shall not be murder, for a person acting 
in pursuance of a suicide pact between himself and another to kill the 
other or be a party to the other killing himself or being killed by a third 
person.’
80 
 
As with victim precipitated homicide, placing liability on the survivor of the suicide pact 
seems to suggest that it is right that he takes some responsibility for his suicidal actions. If 
these previous actions where considered as constituting an explanation for why the battlefield 
mercy killer feels obliged to kill the wounded victim, then this questions whether holding the 
defendant wholly responsible by charging them with murder provides appropriate justice. The 
victim’s actions and obligations to his comrades, which he entered into himself, brought on 
his wounds, and there is a certain moral value in an argument which reasons that those who 
bring about their condition from their own choices ought not to escape any responsibility for 
their actions. The common law states that such actions should be deterred regardless of the 
motive of the parties. 
                                                           
78 Homicide Act 1957 s.4(3) 
79 R v Croft [1944] KB 295 
80 n.78 above  at s.4  
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‘…sensible people will understand of course what brings people in the 
luckless position of these two to so desperate a state of mind. However, 
even people like them must be dettered from going to the extreme of 
terminating life. This is the policy of the law, guided by the public 
interest.  It  must  therefore  be  plainly  understood  that  those  who 
contemplate suicide and do not successfully achieve it in a suicide pact 
will be punished if the other party to the pact dies.’
81 
 
Of course, many such warriors who wish to die with their comrades, are not operating under 
normal conditions and might have been coerced, indoctrinated or pressured into choosing to 
die with their comrades against their foe. This could be the case when they serve within a 
military system which equates death with dishonour, such as the Imperial Japanese military 
during World War Two, where soldiers were advised: 
 
"Meet  the  expectations  of  your  family  and  home  community  by 
making effort upon effort, always mindful of the honor of your name.  
If alive, do not suffer the disgrace of becoming a prisoner; in death, do 
not leave behind a name soiled by misdeeds."
82 
 
However, those who do enter into such a pact, spoken or unspoken, and who have the settled 
intention  to  die,  would  domestically  be  guilty  of  manslaughter  if  they  survived  and 
illustrating that there is an acceptance that such actions are wrong. In a battlefield mercy 
killing however, this intention and liability is  likely to be forgotten and all responsibility is 
                                                           
81 R v Martin (1986) 8 Cr App R (s) 419 Per Watkins J at 421 
82 Japanese Army Field Service Code 1941   
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placed on the defendant because the defendant delivers the final act of death, outside the 
legitimately confined arena of the combat itself. However, it may alternatively be possible to 
view the defendant’s action in light of an attempt to assist the soldier with a settled intention 
to die as assisting or encouraging suicide 
 
5.6 Assisting or encouraging suicide 
 
Russian Soldier: What do you want? 
Injured Chechen Rebel: To go to the paradise. 
Russian Soldier: Where? 
Injured Chechen Rebel: To the paradise.
83 
 
In 1995, the Russian army occupied the village of Kosmo Volsky during the First Chechen 
War. In film from the assault, a Russian soldier is seen pointing a gun at an injured Chechen, 
and the above exchange took place.  A request to be killed in this way may fit within the 
nature of an offence known as a ssisting or encouraging suicide under s ection 59 of th e 
Coroners and Justice Act which creates the offence of assisting or encouraging suicide: 
 
(1)A person (“D”) commits an offence if—. 
 
(a)D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted 
suicide of another person, and. 
 
(b)D's act was intended to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide. 
                                                           
83 Viewable on http://www.youtube,com/watch?v=741ucintEy8M last accessed 26/03/2012  
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A conviction on such a charge does not carry with it a mandatory life sentence, rather it has a 
maximum tariff of fourteen  years and in  some cases  the convicted person will escape  a 
custodial sentence. 
 
The suicidal intent of certain warriors has been discussed and the potential attribution of 
some personal responsibility  for their  condition  has  also  been considered. Potentially, in 
some circumstances, where the victim has expressed a clear and explicit request for aid in 
dying,  the  charge  of  assisted  suicide  may  fit  the  situation  however,  as  always  the 
circumstances will affect the  whether such a charge is appropriate. Whilst assistance can 
involve active participation, for example, if a person drinks a lethal cocktail through a straw 
they commit suicide but the person who mixes the cocktail and hands  them the cup has 
merely assisted by active participation. In the battlefield mercy killing the final action is 
performed not by the victim but by defendant who fires the shot or uses the knife. This 
distinguishes the conduct from suicide, which would occur if the defendant merely handed 
the weapon to the victim who then administered the final action to himself. Accordingly, the 
battlefield  mercy  killing  exhibits  more  features  of  murder,  which  it  is  already  argued  is 
wrongly applied, than assisted suicide. The mere possibility of an assisted suicide charge 
itself  ideally  evidences  the  level  of  the  use  of  inappropriate  legal  doctrines  surrounding 
mercy  killings,  which  when  used  correctly  are  suitable  offences,  but  when  applied  to 
situations where unique considerations are involved cause confusion and injustice. 
 
However, there are cases  which throw doubt  on this  interpretation.  In  Gilderdale,
84  the 
mother of the victim was convicted of assisted suicide, after she helped her daughter to kill 
                                                           
84 n.9 above.    
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herself. Her daughter had expressed her desire to kill herself, and her mother thus prepared 
drugs by which this could be achieved. When her daughter became too weak to continue to 
administer  them  through  an  intravenous  drip,  her  mother  took  over  and  continued  to 
administer the drugs until her daughter died. The preparation of the drugs was a positive act 
which fits within the idea of assisted suicide, but the final action of administering the drugs 
ought  properly  to  be  seen  as  more  than  mere  assistance.  Nevertheless,  Gilderdale  was 
convicted of assisted suicide and sentenced to a suspended custodial sentence. 
 
Of course, not all soldiers will be in the position of the injured Chechen rebel mentioned 
above or the victim in Semrau, many will not have the capacity to make their desires heard. 
They might make their intention to commit suicide clear through their actions, but that is 
through forcing someone to kill them rather than requesting aid in dying. In Semrau, the 
victim  was  completely  unconscious,  and  was  unable  to  make  such  a  request  verbally. 
However, such a request need not necessarily be in words. In R v Robey,
85 the defendant 
delivered the final act in the victim’s death, it was merely signified to the defendant, here the 
defendant’s  wife  had  recently  returned  home  from  an  extended  hospitalisation  after  the 
defendant had accidentally spilled a boiling kettle down her neck. She had become nervous 
and  anxious,  and  jealous  of  her  husband’s  attachment  to  his  young  daughter.  After  an 
argument she returned to the bedroom with a knife, placed the point to her chest and threw 
herself onto the bed. Fatally wounded, the emergency services took over an hour to attend, in 
which time Robey forced the knife home with lethal effect because, ‘…he didn’t want her to 
suffer further.’
86 The court accepted that he had delivered the final action. 
 
                                                           
85 R v Robey (1976) 1Cr App R 127 
86 ibid. at  129  
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‘The verdict involved that you pushed that knife further in while she 
was  still  alive  and  that  is  something  which  I  cannot  possibly 
overlook.’
87 
 
Yet the court apparently accepted the defendant’s argument that he had done so because she 
looked at him as if to say, ‘please do it’, and thus requested aid in dying and convicted him of 
assisted suicide. 
 
The courts have been willing to stretch the application of assisted suicide in cases where the 
defendant delivered the final act, but much rests on the victim’s clear intention and request. In 
Gilderdale, this expression can be seen in the actions of the victim; she had discussed dying 
on the internet, from which it was deduced that the she possessed an intention to commit 
suicide and had instigated the administration of the lethal drugs by her own hand. Likewise in 
Robey, it can be said that the victim initiated the killing herself and it was deduced that she 
asked for help through communication with her husband. He interpreted ‘a look on her face as 
if to say ‘help me finish it off’’.
88 Whilst the victim in the battlefield mercy killing who has 
suicidal intent may express this through his reckless battlefield behaviour, this is some way 
away from a clear request for aid in dying. 
 
Whilst  a  conviction  for  assisting  or  encouraging  suicide  may  bring  better  justice  to  the 
defendant in terms of potential punishment, the stigma attached to the conviction may still be 
inappropriate. In some cases it is clearly associated with crimes of a passionate motive, which 
it is asserted a battlefield coup de grace often is. In A v United Kingdom
89 the killers of elderly 
persons were leniently sentenced.  Their motive was to ‘…comfort and console the old and the 
                                                           
87 ibid. per Browne LJ at 129 
88 ibid. at  129 
89 A v United Kingdom (1984) 6 EHRR CD 140  
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sick and the bedridden or suffering from incurable illness.’
90 However, such cases are rare, 
and often assisted suicide is used to prosecute those who coerce and cajole the victim to 
commit  the  act.  In  R  v  MacGranaghan,
91 acting from an aggravated motive,  namely  the 
offender’s hatred of the victims crime of child neglect, he influenced his mentally ‘pathetic’
92 
victim to commit suicide, and received an eight year jail sentence. Likewise, in Mcshane,
93 the 
defendant  received  a  two  year  custodial  sentence,  for  attempting  to  assist  her  mother  to 
commit suicide, in a ‘…truly terrible crime…motivated by the desire for money.’
94Conversely, 
acting from a motive of compassion may lead to no charge being brought,
95 and thus is should 
be considered that such an offence has negative and positive connotations which may or may 
not justly serve the battlefield mercy killer. 
 
In conclusion, whilst imposing such a charge allows greater leniency in sen tencing, there are 
some practical problems which  affect its successful application. Furthermore, just because 
assisted suicide delivers a more desirable justice in terms of sentencing does not make it the 
correct  way  to  do  deal  with  the action.  It  still  ha s  a  stigma attached  to  it  which  has 
connotations of deceit and manipulation which are not components of the action which the 
battlefield mercy killer is committing. It is not bad law, but using it would again represent bad 
application of the law. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
90 ibid. at  141 
91 R v MacGranaghan (1987) 9 Cr App R 447 
92 ibid. per Lord Croom-Johnson at 448 
93 R v Mcshane (1978) 66 Cr App R 97 
94 ibid. at  104 
95 The Director of Public Prosecutions Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging and Assisting 
Suicide 2011 p.7 para45(2)  
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5.7 Conclusion 
 
In very specific circumstances, the battlefield mercy killer may be considered as someone 
who  has  assisted  another  to  commit  suicide.  To  do  so,  the  victim  might  have  all  of  the 
attributes of fanatics and would be martyrs in that they have a clear intention to die, or he may 
simply express a wish to die following the infliction of mortal wounds. Either way, there must 
be some kind of request from the victim if a claim of assisted suicide is to be satisfied or the 
nature of the defendant’s actions should be limited to compliance with that request. If such a 
case were successful the sentence imposed upon the defendant would obviate the harshness of 
a murder conviction and potentially provide a more just outcome. There are however practical 
difficulties in applying the assisted suicide in these circumstances and it also has a stigma 
which  may  not  be  suitable.  However,  within  the  context  of  soldiers  who  have  suicidal 
intentions and the treatment administered to them it should be considered. 
 
The circumstances of a battlefield mercy killing are very different from mercy killing cases 
which the law of homicide has developed to address. Of the three most likely charges, none 
perfectly  correspond  to  the  circumstances  of  the  crime.  In  almost  all  circumstances,  the 
mercy killing soldier will face murder charges and might, possibly, succeed in reducing their 
conviction to manslaughter if a defence of diminished responsibility is accepted. Potentially, 
in limited circumstances, it may be that a charge of assisted suicide may be brought. 
 
However, neither seem to fit with the nature of the crime of mercy killing. Of course, this is a 
moral  judgement,  which  shall  be  discussed.  As  such,  whilst  they  are  perfectly  adequate 
doctrines to deal with traditional cases where a killing has taken place in a peaceful, civilian 
situation, it is wrong to apply them to the battlefield mercy killer. In cases where there is no  
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point in treating the victim on the battlefield, but it is clear they are suffering, and where their 
pain and inevitable death outweighs the practical benefit any aid can provide them, there is 
another comparable area of law, that relates to physicians making life or death decisions. The 
next chapter will consider whether, on some level, this may be comparable to the actions of 
the mercy killing soldier.  
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Chapter Six 
Conceptual M.A.S.H
1 up: 
Mercy Killing, medical ethics and military murder 
 
Putting  the  service  man  on  trial,  in  a  civil  criminal  court,  charged  with  murder  for 
administering a battle field coup de grace to his mortally wounded and suffering adversary, is 
not ideal; especially if he is tried according to the rules and precedents of peacetime civilian 
mercy killings rather than those in battle between soldiers. It might instead be preferable to 
apply precedents used in cases involving medical practitioners since they are able to rely on a 
unique set of rules and interpretation of rules when making end of life decisions. Both the 
physician  and  the  soldier  are  subject  to  certain  professional  duties  when  confronted  with 
offering treatment or aid to those in need. In conflict, it is stipulated that the wounded, 
   
‘…shall be treated humanely and cared for by the Party to the conflict in 
whose power they may be, without any adverse distinction founded on sex, 
race, nationality, religion, political opinions, or any other similar criteria… 
they shall not wilfully be left without medical assistance and care, nor shall 
conditions exposing them to contagion or infection be created.
2 
 
Whilst physicians must swear to, 
 
‘… prescribe regimens for the good of my patients according to my ability 
and my judgment and never do harm to anyone’
3 
                                                           
1 M.A.S.H. - Mobile Army Surgical Hospital  
2 Geneva Convention 1949 Convention for the Amelioration of the Sick and Wounded Art.12 
3 Hippocratic Oath – to note that many doctors do not swear the Hippocratic oath anymore but is a pervasive 
influence in the medical ethics which inform their professional duty.  
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Often, physicians must make difficult decisions over the administration of treatment which 
could lead to the patient’s demise.  They do not become liable for causing death because they 
operate within specific conceptual and legal boundaries, which are often influenced by moral 
imperatives. It may thus be beneficial to judge the soldier in light of end of life practices 
undertaken by other professionals who deal with death and are also subject to acceptable 
standards of conduct, rather than against the standards of lay civilians whose actions are not so 
governed  and  who  do  not  deal  with  life  and  death  decision  making  in  their  professional 
capacity. 
 
Medical ethics, principally the concept of autonomy, might perhaps offer an alternative view 
of the wrongfulness of the soldier’s  action. In medical practice the patient’s autonomy is 
safeguarded by the need to gain their consent, which can 
 
‘…legitimate many practices that would otherwise be regarded as crimes. It 
is also central to the exercise of autonomy, choice and the maintenance of 
control over medical decisions at the end of life, which  are widely regarded 
as essential for achieving dignity in dying.’
4 
 
The lack of request or consent in the cases of Semrau, Maynulet and Cardenas, exasberated it 
criminal nature and also called into question it’s moral value. However, in medical practice 
when consent cannot be gained, the practitioner must act in the patient’s best interests. It 
would be informative to consider whether Capt. Semrau might be regarded as having acted in 
the best interests of his so called victim and if so what impact that might have on his liability. 
Separately, the theory of double effect, concerning administering pain relief which causes 
                                                           
4 Hazel Biggs Euthanasia, Death with Dignity and the Law (Hart Publishing Oxford 2001) 69  
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unintended death is in some ways comparable to the actions of the battlefield mercy killer. 
Such a comparison may offer a better means by which to judge the battle field mercy killer’s 
actions than using the aforementioned civilian examples since the soldier’s actions are also 
aimed at relieving the pain of the suffering victim. 
 
However, whilst the both physicians and soldiers deal with life or death consequences and are 
both held to professional standards of behaviour, it is important to note throughout that whilst 
the soldier acts from compassion to provide a better, or more just end for the wounded victim 
in contravention to his professional duties, the physician’s duty is to be dispassionate because 
they are acting within the confines of their profession when involved in end of life actions. 
The discussion must begin with a consideration of how far ‘consent’ can legitimise any action, 
and what effect it has on the moral perception of the behaviour. 
 
6.1 The nature of consent 
 
‘If an act is unlawful in the sense of being in itself a criminal act, it is plain 
that it cannot be rendered lawful because the person to whose detriment it is 
done consents to it. No person can license another to commit a crime. So far 
as the criminal law is concerned, therefore, where the act charged is in itself 
unlawful, it can never be necessary to prove the absence of consent on the 
part  of  the  person  wronged  in  order  to  obtain  the  conviction  of  the 
wrongdoer.  There  are,  however,  many  acts  in  themselves  harmless  and  
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lawful which become unlawful only if they are done without the consent of 
the person affected…’
5 
 
From this it is clear that consent to an action between two persons has the power to change the 
moral and legal character certain actions. If x takes something from y with the consent of y, 
then it is said that x is borrowing something. If x takes something from y, without consent, 
then it might be said that x has stolen something.
6 Similarly, 
 
‘Consent turns rape into love making, a kidnapping into a Sunday drive, a 
battery into a football tackle, a theft into a gift and a trespass into a dinner 
party.’
7 
 
In some situations the courts have decided that consent is irrelevant because allowing such 
actions on the basis of the consent of the parties would be against the public interest. Often, 
‘…the rules excluding the victim’s consent as a defence to charges of murder and assault may 
perfectly  be  explained  as  a  piece  of  paternalism  designed  to  protect  individuals  against 
themselves.’
8 Essentially, some actions are considered neutral, only becoming wrong when 
consent is not gained, for instance sexual intercourse, whilst others  are considered wrong 
regardless. 
 
                                                           
5 R v Donovan (1934) 25 Cr App R 1 per Swift J at 507. These acts which are ‘...themselves harmless and lawful 
which become unlawful only if they are done without the consent of the person affected.’ Are those such as 
discussed. Sex without consent can become rape, taking property without consent can become theft, etc. 
6 Subject to other requirements, - the intention to permanently deprive and dishonesty on the part of x. 
7 Heidi M Hurd ‘Blaming the Victim: A Response to the Proposal that Criminal Law Recognise a General 
Defence of Contributory Responsibility’ [2005] 8 Buffalo Law Review 503 504 
8 HLA Hart Law, Liberty and Morality  (Oxford University Publishing London 1963) 31  
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Despite  ‘involv[ing]  intentional  violence  resulting  in  actual  or  sometimes  serious  bodily 
harm…surgery is a lawful activity.’
9 Medical treatment is an action that can be generally 
legitimised by consent because of a ‘presumption that any physical contact occurring in the 
course of medical treatment will be for the benefit of the recipient and is therefore, ultimately 
in the public interest’
10 In the medical context, the physician must gain the consent of the 
patient before they administer treatment.
11 Any unauthorised touching of another, even of a 
patient by their physician, can constitute battery and the administration of treatment without 
consent could constitute a more serious assault. Gaining consent in this context represents the 
practical application of the doctrine of self-determination and, 
 
‘…every  human  being  of  adult  years  and  sound  mind  has  the  right  to 
determine what shall be done with his own body.’
12 
 
All persons have the right to have their autonomy respected, and therefore before any act is 
undertaken which directly affects their person they should have a choice to decide whether 
they want the action to take place. Self-determination in medical procedures is considered a 
basic right and is enforced through the threat of criminal charges where consent is not first 
given.
13  Physicians cannot override the competent patient’s will, adults of sound mind have 
the  right  to  decide  whether  they  undergo  or  refuse  treatment,  and  treating  them  without 
consent may lead to actions in negligence as well as constitute a crime.
14  
 
                                                           
9 R v Brown [1993] Cr App 44 per Lord Templeman at 47 
10 n.4 above  at 72 
11 Acting in the patients ‘Best Interests’ is considered in due course. 
12 Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital(1914) 105 NE 92 (nY) Per Cardozo J at 93 
13 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 per Ward J at 98 
14 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 per Lord Mustill at 891‘…any invasion of the body of one person 
by another is potentially both a crime and a tort…’.  
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The  requirement  of  consent  converts  the  theory  of  self-determination  into  practice  and 
safeguards the patient from medical paternalism, prioritising patient autonomy over clinical 
discretion.
15  However,  lack  of  consent  does  not  preclude  criminal  liability  in  every 
circumstance and an individual’s autonomy can be overridden for a number of reasons. In a 
medical context if a patient is deemed to lack capacity to give appropriate consent it may be 
the physician can act in their best interests.
16 
 
In Semrau, Cardenas and Maynulet, the victims did not give consent to the coup de grace 
which was administered to them. Although the defendants each acted from compassionate 
motives this lack of consent can be said to have altered the nature of the act. Indeed, in cases 
of assisted suicide, whether the victim requested or consented to the action is an important 
factor as to whether a prosecution is even brought against the defendant,
17 whilst the absence 
of consent has the contrary effect. If the victim did not reach a voluntary, clear and settled 
decision to commit suicide which they communicated clearly and unequivocally to the suspect 
then this is considered evidence that they did no t consent to the assistance and increases the 
likelihood that a prosecution will be brought in the public interest.
 18 
 
Situations arise in medical practice in which it is crucial to gain the consent of the individual, 
or the permission of the court to act in their best interests. Such situations include the refusal 
of life saving treatments by the patient or the withdrawal or withholding of treatment from the 
patient.
19 It will be informative to consider whether the actions of battlefield mercy killers 
                                                           
15 n.4 above at 113 
16 There is an issue here about whether a person who lacks capacity actually has autonomy or at least whether 
they can exercise it, so the issue is not necessarily whether that persons autonomy s overridden but rather it 
likely it does not exist. 
17 Director of Public Prosecutions  Policy  for  Prosecutors  in  Respect  of  Cases  of  Encouraging or  Assisting 
Suicide February 2010 
18 ibid. at  para. 43(3)(4)&(5) 
19 n.14 above.    
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such as Capt. Semrau can be feasibly compared to the physician who acts without consent and 
perhaps whether battlefield mercy killings would be interpreted differently and more justly by 
comparison to the practice of medical professionals. First, it should be noted that for the 
consent to be valid a number of requirements must be met on behalf of both the patient and 
the physician. 
 
6.2 Valid and Informed Consent 
 
‘Every  person  is  presumed  to  have  the  capacity  to  consent  to  or  refuse 
medical treatment unless and until that presumption is rebutted.’
20 
 
A patient’s consent is valid only if it is ‘informed’ and they have the ‘capacity’ to consent or 
to  refuse  the  proposed  treatment.  Informed  consent  is  only  achievable  if  the  medical 
practitioner  conveys  all  of  the  relevant  information  regarding  the  treatment,  including  its 
purpose  and  the  positive  and  negative  consequences.  All  relevant  information  should  be 
disclosed, if it is withheld from external motivations this affects the validity of the consent, 
‘[o]f course, if information is withheld in bad faith, the consent would be vitiated by fraud.’
21 
Finally, the patient’s autonomy must not be infringed, and if evidence of coercion exists, 
which forces the patient to consent or refuse treatment this is grounds upon which to question 
the validity of the consent.
 22 
                                                           
20 Re MB (Medical Treatment)(Court of Appeal) [1997] 2 FLR 426 per Butler Sloss LJ at 436 
21 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432 Bristow J 
22 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 T was involved in a road traffic accident whilst at the thirty 
fourth week of her pregnancy. After conversing with her mother she refused a blood transfusion and signed a 
refusal of consent form the contents of which were not explained to her. Her refusal was believed to have been 
formed on the basis that she held some sentiments of a Jehovah’s witness, a faith she did not practice but her 
mother did. It was reported that after her mother attended the hospital the daughter appeared to be led in all 
decision making by her mother. Her baby was delivered, via caesarean but was unfortunately still born, after this 
her condition deteriorated further and again she was refused a blood transfusion. The court viewed it as an 
emergency situation and deemed that it had been proper for the physician’s to treat her in the way they felt best, 
noting the possibility of coercion of her ability to fully consent.  
181 
 
 
‘…doctors have to consider whether the decision is really that of the patient. 
It is wholly acceptable that the patient should have been persuaded by others 
of the merits of such a decision and have decided accordingly. It matters not 
how  strong  the  persuasion  was,  so  long  as  it  did  not  overbear  the 
independence of the patient’s decision.’
23 
 
The information need not be expressed in minute detail, rather broad terms can be used the 
degree of disclosure in each case is to be judged primarily on the basis of medical evidence; 
what a body of medical opinion considers to be appropriate.
 However, lively debate exists as 
to whether this ‘Bolam direction’, that physician are not negligent as long as they acted ‘in 
accordance with the practice accepted at the time as proper by a body of medical men skilled 
in  that  particular  art’
24 is  still  correct,  or  whether  such  a  direction  amounts  to  medical 
paternalism, as it effectively leaves it to the practitioner’s discretion to disclose what they 
think is necessary to the patient.  
 
The use of the direction was upheld in both Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem 
Royal Hospital
25 and Blyth v Bloomsbury Area Helath Authority,
26 despite being questioned 
on good grounds in the former. Ms Sidaway was not informed of the one per cent chance of 
paralysis involved in the procedure, which consequently occurred. She argued she should 
have been made fully aware of this information but the House of Lords ruled this was not the 
case because a reasonable body of medical opinion concurred that the clinical team had acted 
                                                           
23 Re T [Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment] [1992] 4 All ER 649 per Lord Donaldson 
24 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 per McNair J at 122 
25 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871 
26 Blyth v Bloomsbury Area Health Authority [1993] 4 Med LR 151  
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in accordance with the practice of body of medical men.
27 However, it seems that in particular 
instances more knowledge should be given concerning the specific consequences of treatment. 
In Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority
28 a young married man was not informed of the 
risk of erectile dysfunction and impotence that the procedure to be undertaken carried. When 
this subsequently happened, the court found that in such circumstances, the specificity of 
certain information has relevance. In some situations the required level of disclosure is now 
broadly defined in statute,
29 particularly with regard to treatment refusal. 
 
Whilst the doctor must fulfill his obligation to provide relevant treatment information, the 
patient must also have the capacity to consent.  Capacity is presumed,
30 and relates to the 
patient’s  ability  to  weigh  the  information,  retain  it  and  come  to  a  conclusion  on  the 
information concerning their proposed treatment. Where possible, certain adjustments should 
be made for the patient, for instance, if they are hard of hearing or elderly= opportunity must 
also be given to the patient to assert their capacity.
 Assumptions about their capacity should 
not be made solely based in reference to a particular condition or aspects of the patient’s 
behavior.
31 
 
When a patient cannot understand, retain or use the relevant information to form their 
decision,
32 and cannot communicate their decision by any appropriate means,
33 then they lack 
capacity.
34 Assessing the patient’s lack of capacity is supposedly judged by the courts,
35 but in 
                                                           
27 n.25 above per Lord Scarman at 872 
28 Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority [1994] 5 Med LR 334 
29 Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 s.4 the information relevant to a decision also includes information about 
the foreseeable consequences of deciding one way or another about treatment or refusal s.4(a) and failing to 
make the decision s(4)(b). For further discussion see, n.4 above at 74-79  
30 Mental Capacity Act 2005 s.1(2) A person is assumed to have capacity unless shown he lacks it. 
31 ibid. at  s.2(3)(b) 
32 ibid. at  s.3(1)(a) & (b) 
33 ibid. at  s.3(1)(c)&(d) 
34 There are more statutory qualifications on this than detailed here. Mental Capacity Act 2005 s.3(2) A person is 
not to be regarded as understanding information relevant to a decision if they are unable to understand an  
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practice the assessment to give or withhold treatment in these circumstances is often a matter 
of clinical judgment.
36 Sometimes, a lack of capacity to consent is the result of the patient’s 
inability to  communicate their preference through unconsciousness  due to  their condition, 
rather than due to inhibited mental comprehension. In these cases, consent to or refusal of 
treatment may have already been provided in a patient’s advance directive. 
 
The patient may make an advance directive to refuse treatment at a later time when they no 
longer have the capacity to consent or to refuse  treatment.
37 These can be in writing and 
expressed in informal terms.
 38 To apply, the advance directive must relate expressly to the 
ailment which is the cause of the inability to consent,
39 if circumstances are in existence which 
were not foreseen when the patient made the advance directive then this can negate its 
validity.
40 At the time the advance directive was made, the patient must have had the capacity 
to make such a decision.
41 In keeping with the patient’s right to self-determination, they may 
withdraw from the decision at any time,
42 and as a safeguard the directive must be made in 
front of witnesses.
43 Importantly, with regard life sustaining treatment, unless the treatment is 
specifically verified as unwanted even when life is at risk then the decision will not be valid.
44 
Still, there will be times when the patient lacks the capacity to consent and no advance 
directive exists, such as when the patient is placed in their predicament through an emergency 
situation, as would be the case in relation to a battlefield mercy killing.
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
explanation of it given to him in a way appropriate to them. Likewise they may be considered as having capacity 
to make the decision even if they can only retain the relevant information for a short time- Mental Capacity Act 
2005 s.3(3) 
35 Richmond v Richmond (1914) 111 LT 273 and Re MB(An Adult: Medical Treatment) [1997] 8 Med LR 217 
36 The British Medical association and the Law Society  Assessment of Mental Capacity: Guidance for Doctors 
and Lawyers (Third edition The Law Society London 2010) 124 para.13.3 
37 n.30 above at s.24 
38 ibid. at  s.24 (2)  
39 ibid. at  s.24(1)(a) & (b) and s.25(4)(a) 
40 ibid. at  s.24 (4)(b) 
41 For a wider discussion on Advance Directives see, n.4 above. 
42 n.30 above at s.24(3),(4) &(5) Such a decision need not be in writing. 
43 ibid. at  s.25(6)(a)(b)(c)&(d) 
44 ibid. at  s.25(5)(a)  
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In Semrau, all of the relevant information pertaining to the consequences of Capt. Semrau’s 
subsequent actions were not disclosed to the victim. There can be no possibility therefore that 
in such situations the consent of the mortally wounded soldier can help to legitimise the 
action, because it cannot be given. However, it may be said that shooting a victim suffering 
from battle wounds displays a wrongful disregard to his autonomy. But this raises the issue 
over  whether  a  person  who  lacks  capacity  actually  has  autonomy,  especially  when  they 
cannot experience it because of their mental and physical condition. As such it is not that their 
autonomy is disregarded but rather that it does not exist. In such circumstances the physician 
can  act  in  a  patient’s  best  interests  and  it  will  be  informative  to  consider  whether  the 
behaviour of the mercy killing soldier is commensurate. 
 
6.3 The best interests of the patient 
 
If the patient cannot consent to treatment and no valid advance directives exist, the physician 
must proceed in their best interests. The decision should be made with regard to the previous 
wishes  of  the  patient,
45  such  as  their  past  feelings,  beliefs,  values  and  any  other 
circumstantially relevant factors.
46 There will often be other interested parties, family for 
instance, who whilst not being able to decide for the patient can give insight as to the 
defendant’s wishes,
47 likewise, consultation with the wider clinical team is expected.
48 This is 
particularly important where any decision made will result in the patient’s death. 
 
                                                           
45 ibid. at  s.4(6) 
46 ibid. at  s.4(6)(a) b) & (c) 
47 ibid. at  s.4(7)(a)(b)(c) & (d) 
48 General Medical Council  Withholding and Withdrawing – guidance for doctors 2010 para. 33 available on 
http://www.gmc-uk.org/withholding_and_withdrawing_guidance_for_doctors.pdf_33377901.pdf  last  accessed 
04/03/2012   
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Instances exist in which treatment is withdrawn without the consent of the patient who lacks 
capacity where treatment is no longer of benefit and can no longer be justified against the 
unconsented infringement of their autonomy and person. Previously, 
 
‘Primacy [had been] given to the principle that the law should provide no 
means of enabling treatment to be withheld where the patient was in no 
condition to indicate whether they did or did not consent to it.’
49 
 
For instance, patients with severe brain injury may now sometimes survive indefinitely, some 
have only primitive postural and reflex movements and may never again speak, although their 
eyes may move. PVS patients, for instance, have an absence of functioning in the cerebral 
cortex, which is responsible for thinking, feeling and responding to stimuli; the patient will 
never regain consciousness. It is unlike a coma, as cognitive behaviour cannot be regained, 
and it is different to those with ‘brain death’ whose heart always stops beating within a week 
or  two,  or  those  suffering  from  ‘locked  in’  syndrome  who  retain  consciousness  but  no 
movement.
50 However, there is conflictin g medical opinion as to the exact diagnosis of 
PVS.
51 
 
Airedale  NHS  Trust  v  Bland,
52 clarified  the  law  on  whether  or  not  treatment  shuld  be 
continued for patients in PVS.. The patient, Anthony Bland was in a permanent vegetative 
state (PVS) after being the victim of a crushing incident in which his brain was deprived of 
oxygen for several minutes. After resuscitation he could still breathe independently, but there 
                                                           
49 R Goff  ‘A matter of Life and Death’ [1995] Medical Law Review 3 14 
50 Bryan Jennett ‘Persistnet Vegatative State After Brain Damage: A syndrome in search of a name’ [1972] 
299(7753) The Lancet 734 
51 See Suzanne Ost ‘Blinking Subjects; Blinking Justice? – Law, Medicine and the PVS Patient’ [2001] 23(1) 
Liverpool Law Review 1 
52 n.14 above.  
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was no hope for improvement; he was kept alive by the provision of artificial nutrition and 
hydration. His family asserted that if had capacity he would have wished to have the treatment 
withdrawn. 
 
‘He certainly wouldn’t want to be left like he is. I feel that he should be 
removed and the family feel the same. I was angry when the advice from the 
coroner  was  received.  I  can  see  no  point  whatsoever  in  continuing 
treatment.’
53 
 
In Bland, the court was asked whether it would be lawful for the physicians to withdraw 
nutrition and hydration from the victim, which would lead to his death. This brought the 
integral ethical principles of the sanctity of life and the right to self-determination into conflict; 
‘…the ultimate respect that might be paid to a patient’s autonomy – respect for their choice to 
die – potentially conflicts with the ‘autonomy’ of the medical profession in respecting its 
primary guiding principle: First do no harm.’
54  However in Bland, the patient was unable to 
exercise his right to self–determination and the court found that the physicians should act in 
his best interests. 
 
‘…Anthony Bland is an individual human being and the principle of self-
determination says he should be allowed to choose for himself and that, if 
he is unable to express his choice, we should try our honest best to do what 
we think he would have chosen.’
55 
 
                                                           
53 n.14 above at 797 (quote from Stephen Bland the patient’s father) 
54Graeme Laurie ‘The Autonomy of Others: Reflections on the Rise and Rise of Patient Choice in Contemporary 
Medical Law’ in Sheila MacLean First do no Harm: Law Ethics and Healthcare ( Ashgate Publishing Company 
Hampshire 2006) 145  
55 n.14 above per Lord Hoffman at 829 -830  
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The reasoning held, that whilst it is never lawful to take active steps to cause or accelerate 
death, in specific circumstances it is lawful to withhold life sustaining treatment, including 
feeding if it provides no benefit to the patient. The physicians responsible for Bland therefore 
had neither a duty nor were entitled to continue the treatment. The necessity, created by the 
patient’s inability to choose, and which caused the physicians to act in the patient’s best 
interests and thus administer treatment had passed as had the justification for the treatment. 
Subsequently, the physician’s omission to perform what had previously been a duty was no 
longer unlawful and the physicians could not be liable for failing to provide medical care. In 
such situations, the sanctity of life principle does not apply absolutely,
56 and is not violated by 
ceasing to give medical treatment, especially where treatment is administered without consent 
and involves invasive care. 
 
The withdrawal of treatment was further justified  on the basis that there is a prohibition 
against  violating  the  person.  Those  who  have  not  expressed  their  wish  to  discontinue 
treatment do not lose their right to have treatment discontinued if it is in their best interests to 
do so and it is supported by evidence that this was their desire before losing capacity. Indeed, 
if they have capacity, or   have  made a specific advanced decision at a time when they 
possessed capacity, a person may decline treatment even if it is contrary to their best interests. 
The unconsented treatment of a patient in a PVS represents an invasion of their privacy.
57 
 
The patient’s incapacity in Bland allowed the physicians to act initially due to the emergency 
situation which created the necessity for the physicians to act without consent. The patient 
was unable to communicate with medical staff and in such emergency situations patients may 
be treated without consent, but only where ‘…it would be unreasonable, as opposed to merely 
                                                           
56 ibid. at  789 
57 ibid. at  828  
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inconvenient,  to  postpone  until  consent  can  be  sought.’
58 This  emergency  situation  is 
reiterated here because of the comparisons that shall be shortly made between these situations 
and those battlefield mercy killings evidenced by Semrau, Maynulet and Cardenas.
59 
 
Treatment prolonging life will normally be in t he patients best interests provided that the 
treatment is not considered to be excessively burdensome or disproportionate compared to the 
proposed benefits. When no benefit is given to the patient then life prolonging treatment is no 
longer in the patient’s best interest.
60 Some of the characteristics of these circumstances can 
be transposed to the battlefield mercy killing scenario. In Semrau, Cardenas and Maynulet the 
victims were also unable to communicate and actions were taken which led to the end of their 
lives without their consent. However, in these cases those who took the life limiting decisions 
were not doctors whose duty was to act in the best interests of a patient but soldiers, who 
acted according to their own understanding of what was best for the victim. 
 
6.4 The soldier and the victim’s best interests 
  
The victims in Semrau, Maynulet and Cardenas could not consent as their wounds were so 
grave  as  to  have  rendered  them  unconscious.  However,  comparing  the  actions  of  the 
defendant in these cases with those of physicians involved in end of life decision making, may 
inform  the  degree  to  which  this  disregard  to  the  victims  wishes  has  an  impact  upon  the 
perception of these actions. 
 
                                                           
58 PDG Skegg ‘Justifications for Medical Procedure Performed Without Consent’ [!974] 90 LQR 512 
59 Other reiterations of this precedent can be found in various sources e.g.. ‘…it gives rise to a necessity to act in 
the interests of the assisted person without first obtaining his consent.’ Re F (A Mental Patient: Sterilisation) 
[1990] 2 AC 1 Per Lord Goff. 
60 General Medical Council  Withholding and Withdrawing – guidance for doctors 2010 para. 11 available on 
http://www.gmc-uk.org/withholding_and_withdrawing_guidance_for_doctors.pdf_33377901.pdf  last  accessed 
04/03/2012   
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The victims suffered from an impairment which rendered them both unconscious
61 and unable 
to consent. None of them could understand, retain or use and weigh the information regarding 
the nature of their condition even if it had been forwarded to them.
62   In Semrau the victim’s 
condition was so rare that this unresponsiveness was initially to be due to the fact that the 
victim had already succumbed to his wounds.
63 The situation created an emergency which can 
generate an exception to the requirement to gain consent in the medical context,  ‘where the 
patient is unconscious and unable to express his wishes.’
64 In such situations physicians are 
justified in acting in the patient’s best interests such that the initial treatment in Bland was 
justified  because  of  the  necessity  of  the  patients  circumstance.
65 The patient is suddenl y 
placed in a critical condition and no knowledge as to their wishes is available.  
 
‘Where, for example, a surgeon performs an operation without his consent 
on a patient temporarily rendered unconscious in an accident, he should do 
no  more  than  is  reasonably  required,  in  the  best  interests  of  the 
patient…..where the state of affairs is permanent or semi-permanent, as may 
be  so  in  the  case  of  a  mentally  disordered  person,  there  is  no  point  in 
waiting to obtain the patient’s consent. The need to care for him is obvious; 
and the doctor must then act in the best interests of his patient, just as if he 
had received his patient’s consent so to do.’
66 
 
In such a case the doctor treating the patient should do no more than is required to stabilise 
the patient. This is different to the soldier because doctors are permitted to act in order to 
                                                           
61 n.30 above at s.2(1) 
62 ibid. at  s.3 
63 See chapter 1 for details of Capt. Semrau’s case. 
64 ibid. per Ward J at 99 
65 n.14 above. 
66 n.23 above per Lord Goff at 73  
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‘help’ the patient, whereas the mercy killing soldier’s actions would likely not be regarded as 
‘helping’ the victim. 
 
The actions of the battlefield mercy killer using his weapon to administer a coup de grace are 
not  those  legally  comparable  to  the  physician  acting  in  the  patients  best  interests.  The 
physician who withdraws treatment without consent does so because it is of no longer of 
benefit to the patient, their actions are justified as an omission because there is no duty to act. 
The soldier who shoots the victim regardless of consent is not withdrawing treatment which 
no longer has benefit, but rather is engaged in a positive act to end life, and it cannot be 
argued  that  the  battle  field  mercy  killer  has  acted  in  accordance  with  a  body  of  medical 
opinion.
67 This is compounded by the fact that  the soldier has a legal duty to protect all 
wounded and the fact they can be said to be engaged in something which has no other 
intention or use than causing death.
68 
 
‘…no one is entitled to introduce an external agency of death. It was this 
prohibition which Dr Cox violated by injecting Mrs Boyes with Potassium 
Chloride.’
69 
 
The victim’s condition in the battlefield mercy killing situation may be so grave that no form 
of medical treatment would be of benefit or in their best interests. It may be argued that the 
soldier should be free from liability if they omit to tend the wounded in situations, in which 
they will inevitably die. This however negates the argument that such acts are committed from 
mercy, there is little mercy in allowing a wounded solider to experience a lingering, painful, 
death in order to avoid liability. Second, the soldier is under a positive duty to aid all wounded 
                                                           
67 n.24 above. 
68 Geneva Convention 1949 For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and Wounded in the Field Art. 12 
69 n.14 above per Lord Hoffman at 832.  
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and protected persons in their custody regardless of whether or not it is in their best interests.
70 
They are bound to take steps as far as appropriate to aid the victim,
 71 very much like the 
physician, the intentional killing of a patient is not an action which can easily be construed as 
providing this aid.  
 
The motivations of the soldier, the victim’s condition and the extremity of the situation all 
temper the view that should be taken of the action. Whilst, consent or the absence of consent 
with good reason does not make the soldier’s actions legal, they may mitigate the view that 
the strictest penalty and charge possible ought to be brought against the mercy killer. The 
justifications allowing a physician to act without consent during end of life decisions and the 
nature of their actions differs from those of the soldier delivering a battlefield coup de grace. 
They are conceptually distinct. One is an omission and one is a positive action. The physician 
acts in accordance with accepted professional custom whilst the soldier acts contrary to the 
professional duties imposed upon them.   
 
Although the soldier’s actions are not justifiable unlike the physician’s actions, the victim’s 
condition and circumstances are similar to those which may be present when a doctor acts in 
the patient’s best interests. The comparison with the medical practice in these circumstances 
has been useful, because although there was no consent on the part of the victim in Semrau 
that  does  not  mean  that  the  actions  should  be  seen  as  entirely  wrong.  Indeed,  when  the 
understanding  of  the  medical  practice  is  coupled  with  the  battlefield  mercy  killer’s 
compassionate motive, it makes a forceful argument that true justice to the soldier is to not 
impose harsh punishments or convictions. 
 
                                                           
70 ibid. 
71 n.68 above  Art. 15  
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Much of the issue for the soldier who delivers a battlefield coup de grace is that his intention 
cannot be masked. He intends to kill the victim, all be it from a compassionate motive, in 
order to relieve their pain and suffering. There is an accepted practice within the medical 
profession  in  which  easing  the  patients  pain  may  consequently  cause  their  death. 
Understanding such a practice will give a better understanding of the mercy killer’s intention 
and help in any evaluation of the appropriate justice they should receive. 
 
6.5 Double effect 
 
In medical practice it is not unusual to administer a heavy dosage of pain relief drugs to a 
dying patient, which may have the side effect of killing them. The battlefield mercy killer also 
aims to alleviate suffering through his actions. When Capt. Semrau delivered the coup de 
grace  to  the  wounded  insurgent,  it  was  to  ‘alleviate  the  battlefield  suffering’  of  a  fellow 
warrior.
72 The shots he fired were designed to alleviate the victim’s pain but this also had the 
adverse  effect  of  killing  him.    At  first  glance  the  two  examples  may  seem  comparable, 
however, on closer inspection there are conceptual difficulties in matching the two practices. 
The ethical doctrine of double effect allows health care professionals to administer potentially 
fatal  medication,  provided  their  intentions  are  to  control  the  symptoms  of  the  patient’s 
condition. 
 
‘The established rule [is] that a doctor may, when caring for a patient who is, 
for example, dying of cancer, lawfully administer painkilling drugs despite 
the fact that he knows that an incidental effect of that application will be to 
abbreviate the patient’s life. Such a decision may properly be made as part 
                                                           
72 Steven Chase ‘Semrau court-martial puts ‘soldier’s’ pact to the test’ Globe and Mail March 24
th 2010  
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of the care of the living patient, in his best interests; and, on this basis, the 
treatment will be lawful.’
73 
 
A patient who is terminally ill and suffering in great agony may require a dosage of analgesics 
or opioids to relieve their pain which could foreseeably cause their death. The doctor has a 
duty to alleviate suffering but it is not legal to intentionally kill the patient. It would seem that 
there is a distinction between impermissible intended consequences and permissible, merely 
foreseen, consequences. The main point of contention in such acts is that the drugs that the 
doctor administers must have had therapeutic value to the patient; they must not have been 
administered solely to kill the patient. Accordingly a physician who commits an act with the 
sole intention of ending a person’s  life is  liable for murder. However, through a type of 
indirect causation physicians can be legitimately involved in actions which lead to the death of 
the patient because death is not the primary intention. Such instances rely on the causal link 
between the intentions, the actions and the patient’s death.  
 
6.6 Case studies: Intention by any other name? A matter of perceivable intent 
 
R v Adams was the first case to establish the doctrine of double effect in law.
74 Here the 
doctor had been accused of ‘easing the passing’ of elderly patients but was able to rely on the 
doctrine of double effect. He did administer analgesic medications, such as morphine, at doses 
which  would  have  been  lethal,  but  it  was  successfully  argued  that  although  death  was  a 
foreseeable side effect the primary intention was to relieve pain. The doctrine of double effect 
covered Dr Bodkin Adams’ actions, because the use of analgesics supported the assertion that 
                                                           
73 n.14 above per Lord Goff at 868 
74 R v Adams [1956] Crim LR  
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his intention was to alleviate pain and not solely to shorten the life of the victim, even though 
it might be argued that in this instance it amounted to the same thing. 
 
In an interesting aside, debate occurred over whether Dr Adams’ actions could fall within the 
ethical boundaries of the doctrine because of the circumstances of his relationship with a 
particular patient. He stood to inherit a Rolls Royce from one of the deceased, which could 
have put his actions outside the ambit of the concept as any action involving double effect 
should not come from a questionable motive, as then it may give rise to questions as to the 
true reason the doctor administered the pain relief, was it too alleviate pain, or where more 
sinister sentiments involved? As it stood his argument based on the concept of double effect 
succeeded and he was acquitted.  
 
Adams can be contrasted with R v Cox,
75where the defendant physician was convicted of 
attempted murder. Dr Cox was found to have administered medication for the sole reason of 
bringing about the victim’s death and, by definition, anything with a sole purpose cannot have 
a double effect. Dr Cox was a consultant rheumatologist who had treated the victim, seventy 
year old Lilian Boyes, for severe rheumatoid arthritis over thirteen years. Upon her admittance 
to hospital, Dr Cox administered two ampoules of strong potassium chloride to Mrs Boyes, 
more than twice the amount necessary to cause death. This drug has no analgesic effect. Cox 
was found to have deliberately brought about the death because the drug he gave had no 
therapeutic benefit for the patient so it could not be argued that the intention was to relieve the 
agonising pain  Mrs Boyes  was  experiencing. Dr Cox was  charged with and convicted of 
attempted murder rather than murder only because it could not be proven that it was the 
potassium chloride that had caused the victim’s death rather than her own illness. By his own 
                                                           
75R v Cox (1992)12 BMLR 38  
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admission he believed he had shortened her life by perhaps one hour.
76 If double effect is to be 
relied upon there must be a medically therapeutic benefit to the patient, and even the pleas of 
the victim to administer the drug and end their life, as in  Cox, cannot validly legitimise the 
action. 
 
‘. . . if he injected her with potassium chloride with the primary purpose 
of  killing  her,  or  hastening  her  death,  he  is  guilty  .  .  .  If  a  doctor 
genuinely believes that a certain course is beneficial to his patient, either 
therapeutically or analgesically, then even though he recognises…a risk 
to life, he is fully entitled… to pursue it. If …the patient dies, nobody 
could  possibly  suggest  that  in  that  situation  the  doctor  was  guilty  of 
murder or attempted murder.’
77 
 
In applying the doctrine of double effect, the courts seemingly bypass an important premise 
concerning causation and reinterpret it in this particular instance for this particular class of 
individuals. The ‘but for test’ for factual causation in normal circumstances seemingly makes 
it irrelevant as to how much the defendant’s actions shortened the victim’s life. When dealing 
with cases involving medical practitioners and pain relief within the ambit of the double effect 
doctrine the courts apparently take a more practical approach. 
 
‘If, for example, because a doctor had done something or has omitted to do 
something, death occurs at eleven o’clock instead of twelve o’ clock, or 
even Monday instead of Tuesday, no people of common sense would say, 
‘Oh, the doctor caused her death’. They would say that the cause of death 
                                                           
76 Julia Stuart ‘This doctor answered the prayer of a patient desperate to die.’ The Independent 4
th October 2005 
77 n.75 above per Ognall J at 39  
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was the illness or the injury, or whatever it was, which brought her to the 
hospital, and the proper medical treatment that is administered and that has 
had an incidental effect of determining the exact moment of death is not the 
cause of death.’
78 
 
There is however a legal dilemma as to the true validity of double effect in cases concerning 
pain relief at the end of life. Actions similar to those of Dr Adams portray a form of intention 
known in criminal law theory as oblique intention. Intention is integral to every crime other 
than those of strict liability, fundamentally, intention as to a consequence of what is done 
requires  the  desire  of  the  consequence.
79 However, it is possible to attribute undesirable 
consequences as intentional in respect of ‘known certainties.’
80  
 
‘Where  the  defendant  desires  result  x,  and  anyone  can  see  by  merely 
considering x, that another result, y (forbidden by law), will also be involved, 
as  the  direct  consequence  of  x  and  almost  as  part  and  parcel  of  it,  the 
defendant will be taken to intend both x and y.’
81 
 
The  law  attributes  all  foreseeable  consequences  which  are  a  ‘virtual  certainty’  as  being 
intended,
82 and with this intention normally comes criminal responsibility. A physician who 
administers palliative drugs for therapeutic reasons whilst ‘foreseeing’ the strong possibility 
                                                           
78 n.74 above per Devlin J 
79  Anthony Duff ‘Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report’ [1980] Criminal Law Review 147 149  
80 Glanville Willaims ‘Oblique Intention’ [1987] 46 The Cambridge Law Journal 417 418 
81 ibid. at  419 
82 See R v Woollin  [1999] AC 82 Per Lord Steyn ‘…where the direction is not enough, the jury should be 
directed that they are not entitled to find the necessary intention, unless they feel sure that death or serious 
bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s actions 
and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case.’  
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of the doses lethal effects would at first instance sight be regarded as possessing criminal 
intention.  
 
‘… where the defendant is aware that a consequence in the future is the 
certain (though undesired) result of what he does. He is liable for a crime of 
intention if the foreseen though undesired consequence is inseparably bound 
up with the desired consequence.’
83 
 
In  conventional  ‘actions’, which require intention to  be present  in  order to  prove that an 
offence has been committed, this is understandable. Much of this depends on potential public 
outrage at being unable to attribute crimes to criminals who primarily intended to commit 
another offence, or no offence at all but also committed others in its pursuit. Imagine Lord 
Halisham’s example of the criminal who, in order to collect the insurance money, places a 
time bomb on a plane which explodes in mid-air. He intended to collect the monies, not kill 
the passengers, but he knew his plot would involve the death of the passengers. ‘….if any 
passengers are killed he is guilty of murder, as their death will be a moral certainty if he 
carries out his intention.’
84 Public outrage would ensue if such an individual was charged with 
only the intended insurance fraud. 
 
Because death is a clearly foreseeable consequence of administering lethal doses of pain relief 
medication,
85 critics have argued that this constitutes a form of physician assisted s uicide or 
‘slow euthanasia’,
86 which is unlawful in the UK. physician assisted suicide, is an activity in 
                                                           
83 n.80 above at 420 
84 R v Hyam [1975] AC 55 Per Lord Halisham at 74 C 
85 Richard Huxtable ‘Get out of Jail free?’ The doctrine of double effect in English Law’ [2004] 18 Palliative 
Medicine 62  
86 J A Billings S D Block ‘Slow Euthanasia’ [1996] 12(4) Journal of Palliative Care 21 24  
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which the physician actively takes part in a request to aid the death of a patient,
87 and it is 
often  said  that  deaths  brought  about  through  ‘double  effect’  are  morally  equivalent.
88 
However,  unlike  actions  of  double  effect,  which  provides  some  protection  to  physicians, 
physician assisted suicide is illegal and professional bodies remain ambivalent towards any 
such behaviour.  
 
‘A change from our current position of opposing a change in the law to one 
of neutrality will be seen as removing objections. It would be seen as a 
green light.
89  
 
The argument comparing the two practices rests on the basis that t he foreseeability of the 
patient’s death can be little differentiated from intentionally administering the drugs with a 
view to killing the patient.
90 However, there are very different ethical judgements between 
allowing a patient to die and actively killin g them.
91It has been suggested that perhaps the 
only evidence that gives this view credence is the practice of recording the patient’s death as 
due to the ailment the patient was suffering from rather than respiratory depression brought on 
through the administration of a lethal dose of palliative drugs.
92 To record the death as brought 
about through the legal administration of analgesics may be a step too far and would provoke 
criminal action. Such arguments are countered by studies reporting  that very little evidence 
                                                           
87 See R F Weir Physician Assisted Suicide (Indiana University Press Indiana 1997) 
88 Howard Brody ‘Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Courts: Moral Equivalence, Double Effect and Clinical 
Practice’ [1998] 82 Minnesota Law Review 939 
89 Ethics Committee Chairman Tony Calland Speaking at the BMA annual conference 27
th June 2012 ‘BMA 
continues  to  oppose  legalising  assisted  dying’  available  on  http://bma.org.uk/news-views-
analysis/news/2012/june/bma-sticks-with-opposition-to-legalising-assisted-dying accessed 28/6/2012  
90 n.88 above. 
91 James Rachels ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia’ [1975] 78 New England Journal of Medicine 292 
92 Susan Anderson Fohr ‘The Double Effect of Pain Medication: Seprating Myth from Reality’ [1998] 1(4) 
Journal of Palliative Medicine 315  
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exists to suggest that deaths resulting from respiratory depression brought about from the 
administration of high doses of opioids are regular occurrences.
93  
 
However, the argument that the doctrine effectively legalises actions which would other wise 
constitute murder does have some validity. The practice clearly does not fit with the accepted 
rules, by which, ‘… intention [includes] the means as well as the end and the inseparable 
consequences of the end as well as the means.’
94 In accordance with this the courts have 
displayed  a  willingness  to  accept  the  protective  value  of  the  doctrine  in  cases  where  the 
administration of therapeutic drugs has cut the patient’s life short by only a short period, 
regardless of the ‘but for’ test.
95 If they did not, the strict view would be employed and, ‘If the 
life was cut short by weeks or months it is just as much murder as if it was cut short by 
years.’
96 For policy reasons, it is undesirable that medical professionals acting from laudable 
motives should potentially be subject to legal sanctions.
97 
 
Despite calls to abandon the doctrine of double effect because it exhibits clear jurisprudential 
distortion,
98 it remains accepted. The UK government accepts that the practice is legal and 
ethically and practically distinct from any form of active euthanasia.
99 
 
‘In some cases patients may in consequence die sooner than they would 
otherwise have done but this is not in our view a reason for withholding 
treatment that would give relief, so long as the doctor acts in accordance 
                                                           
93 ibid. at  316 
94 n.84 above. 
95 n.74 above per Devlin J 
96 ibid. 
97 n.4 above at 86 
98 David Price ‘ Euthanasia, pain relief and double effect’ [1997] 17(2) Legal Studies 323 324 
99 Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics HL Paper 21-I HMSO, 1994 4 at para. 76  
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with responsible medical practice with the objective of relieving pain or 
distress with no intention to kill.’
100 
 
The action is tolerated because sometimes actions involving moral intent have to be judged 
on their moral quality,
101 and administering pain relief to seriously ill patients on the verge of 
death is neither morally wrong nor should it incur criminal liability in the eyes of law makers.  
Even though the outcome, the death of the patient, may be seen as a bad consequence, it is 
acceptable because of the physician’s duty to alleviate suffering.
102 
 
‘In the case of “double effect” we excuse the act or, to put it more accurately, 
we find the act acceptable, not because the doctors sugar coat the facts in 
order  to  permit  society  to  say  that  they  couldn’t  really  know  the 
consequences of their action, but because the act is medically and ethically 
appropriate even though the result - the patient’s death - is both foreseeable 
and intended.’
103 
 
In many ways, as has been argued for the events surrounding the battlefield mercy killing, 
only  after  all  of  the  circumstances  have  been  evaluated  can  a  judgement  be  made  as  to 
whether  killing  and  letting  die  are  equivalent  in  any  given  case.
104 In  this  light  ‘…legal 
concepts such as intention merely serve to mask retrospective rationalisations of substantive 
value judgements which occur or commentators want to make.’
105 This is important because 
                                                           
100 ibid. at  1994 4 at para. 245 
101 A Norrie Crime, Reason and History (2
nd Edition Butterworths 2002)  50 
102 n.88 above at 946 
103 Plaintiffs-Appellees v State of Washington 79 F 3d 790 at 823 (Re -hearing en bunc 1996) The Court of 
Appeal in the Ninth Circuit (USA) 
104 P T Menzel ‘Are killing and letting die morally different in the medical context? [1979] 4 Journal of Medical 
Philosophy 269 
105 Nicola Lacey ‘A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?’ [1993] 56 (5) Modern Law Review 621 622  
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the allocation of intention is the means by which the criminal system allocates the moral 
blame that is required for justifying punishment. However, in cases of mercy killing, intention 
does not indicate the true moral value of the behaviour and is inept as being indicative of 
moral responsibility, it is only useful to indicate where legal guilt lays. In cases of double 
effect ‘intention’ is with dealt with through legal sophistry in order to ensure that the moral 
value of alleviating terminal suffering does not lead to criminal sanctions and ignoring the 
moral ‘goodness’ of the action would be to serve injustice regarding the social appreciation of 
the action.
106 
 
Regardless of its justifications, the doctrine of double effect has become a recognised practice 
in end of life treatment. Whether or not the actions of the battlefield mercy killer are 
commensurate with the actions of the physician can now be explored. 
 
6.7 The ‘criteria’ of double effect 
 
Ethicists postulate that for an act to fall within the boundaries of double effect there are four 
criteria that ought to be met.
107 First, the act must be ‘morally’ good and not of questionable 
motive, for instance, not motivated because the actor stands to inherit some windfall from the 
victim’s death.
108 Second, any good consequence from the action should not be brought about 
through a ‘bad’ act. Third, the actor must not intend to bring about the bad consequence, in 
this  case  death,  yet  they  may  foresee  the  likelihood  of  this  occurring.  Finally,  the  good 
                                                           
106 See chapter 8 for discussion on normative values. 
107 J M Boyle ‘Towards Understanding the Doctrine of Double Effect’ [1980] 90(4) Ethics 527, W S Quinn 
‘Actions, Intentions and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect’ [1989] 18(4) Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 334, T E Quill, R Dresser & D W Brook ‘The Rule of Double Effect – A Critique of its Role in End of 
Life Decision Making [1997] 1768 New England Journal of Medicine 337  
108 n.74 above.  
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consequence  of  the  action,  and  the  bad  consequence  of  the  action  must  be  roughly 
commensurate.
109 
 
Clearly, such criteria are morally loaded, and as such represent a set of subjective tests,
110 but 
they are useful to assess the conduct of the battlefield mercy killer. What one person judges to 
be ‘bad’ may not be seen as such by another, similarly, decisions as to how commensurate the 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ consequences of the action are, will be regarded differently.
111  These are 
considerations taken into account elsewhere, but clearly in the medical setting, the alleviation 
of pain is seen as a good outcome and a good motive, the administration of the pain relief is a 
good  act,  and  in  specific  situations  the  alleviation  of  pain  and  suffering  can  be  seen  as 
commensurable to the bad consequence, which is death.
112 
 
Equating the treatment of physicians performing actions within the doctrine of double effect 
to the mercy killing soldier is likely to be impractical and perhaps impossible. Of course, the 
two use the tools of their trade to enact the killing, the soldier uses his weapon whilst the 
physician  uses  medicine.  However,  guns  and  medicine  are  unlikely  to  be  compatibly 
interchanged. If the soldier administered morphine or pain relief to a wounded comrade, as  in 
                                                           
109 A  B  Rich  ‘Causation  and  Intent:  Persistent  conundrums  in  end  of  life  care.’  [2007]16(1)  Cambridge 
Quarterly Review of Healthcare and Ethics 63 69 
110 Another way of describing these criteria may be simply to say ‘One may permit the evil effect of his act only 
if  this  is  not  intended  in  itself  but  is  indirect  and  justified  by  a  commensurate  reason.’  P  Knauer  ‘The 
Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect’ [1962] 12 Natural Law Forum 132 136 
111 For instance, the stance of the British Humanist Society can serve as example of  the view that using such a 
doctrine can be morally damaging.  ‘The doctrine of double effect seems to us a sophistry which is morally 
particularly damaging. Where there are two outcomes of a given action, one good and one bad, the action is 
justified only if the good outweighs the bad in moral significance; and the moral weights of the two outcomes 
depend  on  the  outcomes  and  the  overall  context,  and  are  quite  independent  of  the  doctor’s  self-described 
intentions. If a doctor knows, or should know, that a certain result will follow a certain action, and if his causing 
that result will be morally wrong, then that action is morally wrong. It is morally legitimate to give doses of 
pain-killers which are lethal (immediate or long-term) only if it is morally legitimate to kill that patient (with 
immediate or delayed effect) in those circumstances.’ Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics HL 
Paper 21-I HMSO, 1994 4 at para. 76 
112 For the purposes of this paper, such situations are those in which the victim is very near to death and clearly 
in agony.  
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the sombre scene in Saving Private Ryan,
113 in which after an attack on a machine gun outpost 
the US soldiers administer a large quantity of morphine to a mortally wounded comrade, it 
would make a more suitable comparison. There are many such accounts of  this occurring 
through history,
114 a British officer in the Great War was noted to ‘administer a heavy dose of 
morphia in the hope it will ease the victims out of their agony.’
115 However, whilst feasibly 
more commensurable these are not the actions of focus in this work.
116 
 
With reference to the criteria, first, in the same way as the physician, Capt. Semrau intended 
to alleviate the battlefield suffering of a grievously wounded and suffering combatant. Capt. 
Semrau stood to gain nothing from the death of the v ictim and so in line with the criteria he 
did not act from a questionable motive. Whether the good consequence, the alleviation of the 
victim’s pain, came about from a bad act, requires further considerations of what constitutes a 
bad act. For instance, whilst the doctor administering therapeutic drugs is not committing an 
offence, because such an action lays within his role as a physician who is required to do ‘good’ 
for the patient, the soldier acts illegally in shooting a protected person, going beyond his duty 
and acting in contradiction to the laws of war.
117 So it would seem the good consequence 
comes about from a bad action contrary to the established criteria for double effect.  
 
Although Semrau was acting according to his duty when he intended to kill er the insurgents 
during the fire fight, his duty and his intention was different when he discovered the injured 
victim. He intended to relieve his suffering, but the way in which he sought to achieve this 
                                                           
113 Steven Spielberg, Director Saving Private Ryan 1998  
114 For example the story of an American veteran who recalled the recalled how they used morphia to ease the 
passing of the mortally wounded who were dying in pain. ‘Hill had his platoon-sergeant beside him, screaming 
with a stomach wound, begging for morphia; he done for, so Hill gave him five pellets. We always carried 
morphia for emergencies like that.’ Robert Graves Goodbye to all that (Cassell & Co Ltd. 1961) 141 
115 Holmes Acts of War: The Behaviour of Men in Battle (New York Free Press 1986) 188 
116 The doctrine of double effect would more feasibly and comfortably fit such  occurrences because the drugs 
administered have some pain relief effect; of course the motive behind their administration is questionable. 
117See n.88 above for the types of duties he is bound to.  
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end was by killing the victim. This is different to the physician who seeks to relieve pain by 
administering therapeutic drugs even though death is a foreseeable consequence as the drugs 
relieve the unwanted symptoms. Whereas, in Semrau like Cox, it was the administration of a 
deathly intervention which was used to relieve the pain of the victim.
118 
 
The  final  criterion  of  double  effect,  whether  the  good  consequence  of  the  action  is 
commensurate with the bad consequence of the action is also specifically morally subjective. 
For instance, whether a quick death and release from pain is considered a better consequence 
than a lingering, painful but certain death depends on individual beliefs and preferences. Here, 
focus is on the known consequences. In Semrau, the victim was released from pain, which it is 
asserted is a good consequence, the outcome was his death which is a bad consequence. It 
may thus be best to judge this last requirement by the nature of the consequences the death 
brought about. First, the law was broken, generally a bad consequence but the magnitude of 
this infraction is a primary focus of this paper,  secondly, the reputation of the armed forces 
may have been damaged, which as discussed has bad political consequences.  
 
Perhaps, the truly bad consequence is the way in which the act was committed and the effect 
this  has  on  doctrines  which  underpin  end  of  life  decisions  when  they  are  carried  out  by 
medical professionals. Capt. Semrau did not ask the victim, did not consult with anyone as to 
his actions, he just acted, in a manner in which he saw fit and thus his actions cannot benefit 
from the moral legitimacy brought about through gaining consent or acting in the patients 
legitimate best interests as discussed earlier. Neither did he act out of professional experience 
and according to accepted professional standards as a doctor does, quite the opposite.  
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6.8 Conclusion 
 
The law dealing with end of life actions in the medical context is not compatible with the 
actions of the battle field mercy killer. It offers the soldier no protection from the full force of 
the law of murder. However, by comparing the soldier’s actions with those of the physician 
his behaviour may be viewed more sympathetically. 
 
Whilst the soldier’s actions do not fit with concepts such as double effect or withdrawing 
treatment in the patient’s best interests, he like Dr. Cox is not ‘…a murderer as the word is 
commonly  interpreted.’
119 Much  of  the  repugnancy  towards  the  action  stems  from  the 
presumption that the soldier is ‘taking matters into his own hands’ and acting without regard 
for the wishes of the victim. A closer examination of the nature of consent in both normal 
criminal theory and in the medical context allays this presumption. In instances of a battlefield 
coup de  grace, justifications  for punishing  lack of consent  lose much  of their validity if, 
because of military culture and related influences, the soldier can legitimately claim to be 
acting in the victim’s best interests but without legal sanction. 
 
Whilst the actions of the soldier gains greater contextualisation from the comparison with 
medical practitioners the attitudes of soldiers themselves may be better judged through 
processes other than the civil criminal courts. A Court martial, or military tribunal, is 
composed of military men who have shared many of the experiences of the defendant and 
who may understand the subjective element of the act more clearly. However, with this 
increased subjectivism come inherent dangers as to the fairness and impartiality of service law 
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and the perceived bias towards attaining discipline rather than justice. This will be the subject 
of the next chapter. 
207 
 
Chapter Seven 
Marching Up and Down the Square: The Military Justice System and the Mercy Killer 
Introduction 
 
Shakespeare’s Henry V depicts the severity of military justice as it is used to discipline the 
criminal and disorderly elements of the English force. In light of his friends harsh sentence, 
Pistol appeals to the Welsh Captain Fluellen, however, both his immediate superior and the 
King himself support such disciplinary measures.
1 
 
Pistol:   For he hath stolen a pax, and hanged must a' be: 
 A damned death! Let gallows gape for dog; let man go free 
And let not hemp his wind-pipe suffocate: 
But Exeter hath given the doom of death 
For pax of little price…. 
 
  Fluellen:   Certainly, aunchient, it is not a thing to rejoice 
at: for if, look you, he were my brother, I would 
desire the duke to use his good pleasure, and put 
him to execution; for discipline ought to be used……. 
 
The King:  We would have all such offenders so cut off: and we 
give express charge, that in our marches through the 
country, there be nothing compelled from the 
villages, nothing taken but paid for, none of the 
                                                           
1 William Shakespeare Henry V Act III Scene IV  
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French upbraided or abused in disdainful language; 
for when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the 
gentler gamester is the soonest winner. 
 
Pistol appeals against the sentence, Fluellen reviews it and refers it to the King and Henry 
himself confirms the decision as in line with good practice. At the end of this chapter the 
reader may see in this exchange  the beginnings of modern practices designed to protect the 
impartiality of the modern court martial. 
 
Military Law, or Service Law has accompanied effective fighting forces since their inception. 
All members of the military are subject to military law, and whilst it deals with specific 
service offences, designed to maintain the utmost discipline and effectiveness, the Court 
Martial can also hear civil criminal offences committed by service personal. Earlier, an 
analysis was undertaken of the unique nature of the ‘fighting man’ and the isolated culture in 
which his behaviour takes place,
2 and as a result, it has been postulated that the domestic civil 
courts may be unable to properly assess the unique factors applicable to the battlefield mercy 
killer. Service law and the court martial offer an alternative means of trial. 
 
Capt. Semrau faced a court martial, as did the defendants in the US cases of  United States v 
Alban – Cardenas
3 and United States v Maynulet.
4 They were tried by their military peers, 
under systems which closely resemble the basic structure of Service law in the United 
Kingdom and under charges that would closely relate to the battlefield mercy killer. Unl ike 
the civil criminal courts, in which the soldier would be tried by civilian jurors, represented and 
prosecuted by civilian counsels and have his case heard in a court presided over by a civilian 
                                                           
2 See chapter 2 
3 United States v Cardenas 29 (Headquarters, 1
st Cavalry Division Jan 14
th 2004) 
4 United States v  Maynulet No. 04-9847,242-243 (Headquarters 1
st Armoured Division Apr. 1 2004)  
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judge, the court martial predominately consists military men or women,.  These persons will 
have  been  through  many  of  the  same  ‘shared  experiences’  and  influences  which  affect  a 
soldier and make his actions difficult to judge by the standards of the ‘ordinary’ man. None of 
the defendants in the aforementioned cases was convicted of murder, but all were found to 
have committed lesser crimes and service offences. Whether or not a civil criminal court 
would have convicted them of murder cannot be said with certainty, but the court martial does 
offer the military defendant the prospect of a more suitable consideration of their actions.  
 
However,  this  benefit  is  also  mitigated  by  factors  which  throw  the  impartiality  of  the 
procedure and the type of justice which is being administered into question. Military justice 
systems have been consistently labelled unjust and liable to be influenced from command 
influence with a focus on administering discipline rather than justice. Their membership has 
previously been confined to the officer cadre of military personnel who may or may not have 
a prejudiced view of the actions of the private soldier. Consequently, just how far military 
justice is concerned with delivering justice as a fair verdict, or whether it is more concerned 
with maintaining military discipline and the effectiveness of the fighting for force it governs is 
open to debate.  
 
‘An army, to be successful in the field, must from the moment it begins to 
train  at  home  have  absolute  control  of  its  discipline.  The  commanding 
general  is  everything.  He  must  bear  the  three  keys.  He  must  have  final 
control. He must be the judiciary, the legislative and the executive. If he 
were not, he would not have an army.’
5 
 
                                                           
5 Editorial ‘Judging the ICC: The cases for and against US participation in the International Criminal Court’ Los 
Angeles Times  (Los Angeles16
th March 2009) 
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Closely related to this is the issue of class, which has been touched upon in previous chapters. 
Potential  exists  for  differing  treatment  between  defendants  from  the  officer  classes  and 
enlisted men. How far those presiding on the court martial are truly the peers of the soldier 
they try is questionable since they all belong to the officer classes and are trained to maintain 
the discipline in the lower ranks, whom they govern on a daily basis. Conversely, in the civil 
court, the twelve persons selected by lot can be seen as the epitome of the wider community 
which the defendant originates from and able to offer a range of views, whereas a Board of 
officers may be seen as partisans to the armed force’s command structures whose view is to 
sustain the discipline of the armed forces.
6 Historical investigation indicates that there has 
been notable disparity in the treatment between commissioned officers and enlisted men for 
commensurable crimes. 
 
Finally, they have largely co nsisted of legally untrained persons, who again may be more 
concerned with discipline than justice.
7 In this environment, can the court martial with its 
composition of military men, be expected to come to a fair verdict on serious and complicated 
criminal matters based on legal reasoning and jurisprudence which is normally the domain of 
civilian lawyers? 
 
‘It would, indeed, seem as reasonable to expect fifteen military men capable 
of  concluding  satisfactorily  a  purely  judicial  investigation,  dependant  in 
every stage on the application of principles of a jurisprudence with which 
they cannot become acquainted, as to imagine the fifteen judges of your 
majesty’s  superior  and  common  law  courts  at  Westminster  competent  to 
                                                           
6 Lysander Spooner An Essay on Trial by Jury (Library of Alexandria 2000) 6-14 
7 It is noted that civlilian juries are also untrained but the Board in a Court Martial has particular powers in 
relation to sentencing which civilian juries do not possess and it is  in this role that it is argued they require 
training, as discussed in depth later in the chapter.  
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form a correct opinion concerning critical military operations dependant on 
pure military strategy.’
8 
 
This chapter focuses on both the benefits and the detriments the battlefield mercy killer may 
experience under a court martial. The negative effects are not only those which arise from 
courts lack of impartiality and the perceived bias, but also the negative effects of a trial which 
may  diminish  the  gravity  of  the  act  by  trumping  military  discipline  above  administering 
justice to the defendant and for the victim. 
 
Capt. Semrau was tried in a Canadian court martial, Capt. Maynulet and SSG Cardenas in a 
United  States  court  martial.  Both  the  Canadian  and  United  States  procedures  have  their 
foundation in  the   British military justice system  which was  spread to these jurisdictions 
during colonial rule. However, before analysing the traits of the court martial it should be 
understood how and why military law came into being in the United Kingdom and how it 
spread throughout the British Empire and influenced the military law of those former colonies. 
 
7.1 The development of British Military Law 
 
Initially, it should be remembered that the over-arching feature of all military codes is the 
need to ensure that recruits adhere adhere to the command structure in order to create military 
discipline and the requirement to impose consequences if not. 
 
‘If a soldier does not obey his quincurion, but sets himself in opposition, he 
shall be chastised, and likewise for the quincuriuon who is not obedient to 
                                                           
8 Samuel Warren, ‘A Letter to the Queen on a Late Court Martial’ (1850) William Blackwood & Sons 10  
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the Decurion, and the Decurion who does not obey his centurion. If any 
legionary dare resist his superior officer, that is to say a count or a tribune, 
he  shall  suffer  the  supreme  penalty.  For  all  subordination  of  a  soldier 
towards a commanding general or commander-in-chief calls for a capital 
punishment.’
9 
 
Traditionally, military law was developed in a top down manner, the word of the superior was 
law to be obeyed. This was no different in the foundations of British military  law which 
eventually inherited the mantle of the exemplary system of military justice. 
 
‘There was extant, I observed, one system of Articles of War which had 
carried two Empires to the head of mankind, the Roman and the British; for 
the British Articles of War are only a literal translation of the Roman. It 
would be vain for us to seek in our own invention or the records of warlike 
nations  for  a  more  complete  system  of  military  discipline…they  have 
governed our armies with little variation to this day.’
10 
 
In feudal England, all land was granted by the Crown to landowners in return for, amongst 
other things, military service and the promise to furnish their overlord with military force 
from  the  fiefdoms  they  controlled.  No  standing  army  existed,  and  would  not  until  the 
aftermath of the civil war.
11  Instead, men fought as retainers of the crown, not as servants to 
the crown. They fought in return for protection or land from their King or their lord who owed 
fealty to the King. The military force was disbanded at the cessation of hostilities, or when 
they could no longer be reasonably detaine d in the Crowns service, as the majority of such 
                                                           
9 Military Laws from Rufus, Article 11 
10 C Adams The Life and Works of John Adams: Vol III (Little Brown and Company 1856) 74 
11 See chapter 1  
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forces were peasant militias who had to attend to their liege.
12 Service was owed to the crown 
only during war not indefinitely. 
 
Few constant laws existed by which to regulate soldier’s activities. Each time the host was 
summoned, new treatises, known as the Articles of War, were drafted to amalgamate the laws 
governing that particular host during that particular campaign. These were of most importance 
when the armies fought on the continent, or sometimes the holy land, where no local customs 
existed. Importantly, the regent was considered the supreme war leader, the commander-in-
chief, and the Articles of War were drafted in his name. They are an early instance of the law 
being used to  govern and instil discipline and efficiency upon a fighting force. The laws 
incorporated many of the same standards of behaviour upon the troops as they were subject to 
at  home,  for  instance  the  act  of  murder  was  prohibited  whilst  on  campaign.
13 Military 
discipline also required  subordination and the ability to ensure the obedience of those one 
commanded, hence acts with no civilian comparison, such as desertion, were also made 
felonious under the Articles.
14 
 
In this early period, violations of the Articles of War were heard under  the Court of the 
Constable and Marshal. The Marshal was effectively the chief of staff whilst the Constable 
may be seen as the logistical organiser of the force.
15 These early tribunals are generally seen 
as the ‘fountain of marshal [martial] law’.
16 Generally, the court’s jurisdiction covered only 
soldiers serving abroad, but did have some jurisdiction within the realm. 
                                                           
12 Neveux F & Curtis H, A Brief History of the Normans: The Conquests that Changed the Face of Europe 
(Robinson London 2008) Chapter 5 – recounts the most famous instance of such disbandment. In 1066 whilst 
Harold Godwin’s armies had to be disbanded to collect the harvest after spending the summer encamped on the 
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13 An example is seen during Herny VII reign – I Hen VII, c.14 
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15 See  W S Holdsworth ‘Martial Law Historically Considered [1902] 18 Law Quarterly Review 117  
16 Edward Coke Institutes of the Lawes of England Concerning the Jurisdiction of the Courts (Protedfort and R 
Brooke London 1797) 122  
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‘…it pertaineth to have cognizance of contracts touching deeds of arms and 
of war out of the realm and also of things that touch war within the realm, 
which cannot be discussed or determined by the common law, which other 
constables heretofore have duly and reasonably used in their time.’
17 
 
Practically, the court heard and had jurisdiction over all, ‘the offences and miscarriages of 
soldiers contrary to the laws and rules of the army.’
18 It was designed to meet the needs of a 
mobile, non – regular feudal army and was restricted to trying cases of a military nature 
only.
19  
 
Then as now, the common law civil courts held primacy, as fear existed  that marshal courts 
could be used to control the civilian populace by holding civilians to the same high standard 
as the soldiery. Legislation continually restricted the use of the courts within the realm.
20 
These  fears  were  realised  during  the  religious  te nsions  during  the  Tudor  and  Stewart 
monarchies, when the jurisdiction of martial law and the Court of the Constable was widened 
and Martial law began to be administered during both times of war and also during any time 
of ‘apprehended disturbance’.
21  In the aftermath of the civil war the courts became redundant 
for two reasons. First, the introduction of a permanent military force led to the cessation of the 
periodic drafting of the Articles of War. Second, the Court of the Constable and Marshal had 
previously been a law making body unto itself, 
 
                                                           
17 13 Rich II, St I, C.2 (1389) 
18 Hale History of the Common Law Charles Runnington ed. (London 1870) 42 
19 n.17 above. 
20 ibid. 
21 n.15 above.  
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‘Whereby it appeareth that all the four justices agreed that the Constable and 
Marshal had a law by themselves, whereof the common law doth take notice, 
as well it doth of ecclesiastical law, being a law of itself from the common.’ 
 
By the seventeenth century the common law courts had grown in stature and viewed rival 
courts with suspicion, and were disposed to question and challenge the legality of a court 
which encroached upon their primacy.
22 This suspicion of the court martial has lingered into 
the twenty-first century in which the military process is continually being called into question 
amid claims of the need for increased transparency and accountability.
23 
 
Like the contemporary Armed Forces Acts and their predecessors the Army Acts, the Articles 
of War included many common law offences such as the act of murder. Unlike modern 
legislation which implicitly prohibits all criminal offences,
24 prohibited acts were expressly 
defined within the articles, so theft of goods and acts of plunder were often permitted if 
carried out against hostile civilians. Finally, the application of the Articles was restricted to 
particular courts at particular times, much like the jurisdiction of the modern court martial.
25 
Soldiers could only be held accountable in these courts for actions during campaign, because 
of the fear of the harsh justice they handed out being administered to civilians. 
 
The emergence of the Standing Army meant the armed force required governance at all times 
unlike the previous levied forces.
26 The Articles no longer served and gave way to the Mutiny 
Acts in 1689, so named because they were initiated after many soldiers refused to fight for the 
                                                           
22 ibid. at  118 
23 For an overview of the continuing debate listen to, Joshua Rozenburg  File on Four: Military Justice (BBC 
Radio 4 2
nd Nov 2010) available on www.bbc.co.uk/radio/player/b00vkxh9 last accessed 6/6/2012  
24 Armed Forces Act 2006 s.42 
25 See chapter 4. 
26 This force was created  after the  Royal Prerogative fo drafting the Articles of War was rested away from the 
monarch and invested in Parliament after the expulsion of James II and the investiture of William III in 1688.  
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new King.
27 The Mutiny Acts were the first to create purely military  disciplinary offences 
such as mutinous assemblies, permitting prisoners to escape and desertion to the enemy. 
 
7.2 The birth of the early court martial 
 
In this period the Articles of War still existed but now related to court procedure. Trials began 
to be heard before committees of officers who deliberated upon cases. Again the jurisdiction 
of  these  courts  was  restricted,  primarily  dealing  with  military  offences  because  of  the 
lingering fear of the military courts suppressive capabilities. The phrase ‘not in times of peace’ 
was inserted into the Mutiny Acts to limit the court martials jurisdiction,
28 and common law 
offences which could be heard before these courts became increasingly limited. In England 
and  Wales,  and  the  Colonies  of  America,  India  and  Aus tralia,  criminal  discrepancies 
committed by serving personnel were preferably dealt with through the civil system. By 1749, 
military courts were barred from hearing cases of murder and many other serious crimes, such 
was  the  suspicion  cast  upon  the  tainted   justice  that  they  delivered ,  which  primarily 
implemented harsh exemplary military discipline as a deterrent.
29  
 
‘Martial  Law,  which  was  built  upon  settled  principles  but  was  entirely 
arbitrary in its decisions, was as Sir Matthew Hale observes, in truth and 
reality  no  law,  but  something  indulged  rather  than  allowed  as  law.  The 
necessity of order and discipline in an army was the only thing which could 
give it countenance: and therefore it ought not to be permitted in time of 
                                                           
27 However, the enactment of these acts was still periodical much like the Articles of War which were drafted 
only to meets the needs of the gathering host. Because it was illegal to muster and keep an army for longer than 
twelve months without parliamentary consent, the Mutiny Act were re-enacted annually until 1878.The first of 
these Acts was recorded as 1 W & M., C4 1689 and the last during the reign of Queen Victoria as 41 Vict., c.10 
1879 
28 1 Anne c.16 1702 
29 M J Pritchard ‘The Army Act and Murder Abroad’ [1954] Criminal Law Journal 237  
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peace when the King’s Courts are open for all persons to receive justice 
according to the laws of the land’
30 
 
The court martial comprised of commissioned officers sitting in deliberation who decided the 
appropriate sentence who were advised by civilian judge advocate.
31 The Board of officers 
was presided over by a president, who held the most senior rank, whilst the judge did not 
operate in the same manner  he would in a civilian case. He could only offer advice to the 
board at the hearing and often was ignored in the pursuit of administering personal justice and 
discipline.
32 
 
By the late seventeenth century, the judge advocate also became involved in prosecuting as 
well as presiding over the trial,
33 and at this point the modern concern caused by the courts 
composition and its effect on the impartiality of the court arises. The duality of many positions 
within the court plagues court martial procedure to this day, as does the influence of command 
hierarchy within the process. 
 
Since ancient Rome, service law has meant that justice and discipline are intertwined; for the 
military to be effective it must be disciplined, and as such the discipline must be enforced 
upon the inferior by the superior. Just a s the Kings of England had previously drafted the 
Articles, and held sway over the decisions which would govern the troops on campaign, the 
                                                           
30 D P O’Connell ‘The Nature of British Military Law’ Military Law Review 19(1963)147 
31 There were often over a half a dozen judge advocates serving the military at one time and these were presided 
over by the Judge Advocate General, first appointed in 1666 by Charles II (Dr Samuel Bowes). 
32 The ability of the board to dissent from the previously weaker position of the judge advocate had been 
recognised as far back as the mid eighteenth century. Yet still the practice continued, even after attempts were 
made to remind the Board of the judge advocates legal expertise. ‘The opinion of the Deputy judge advocate 
ought to be conclusive upon any point of law or procedure which arises upon a trial at which he officially 
attends, whether he has or has not an opportunity of consulting the JAG before a decision is made.’ J York 
Scarlett  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army  Memorandum  to  the  Presidents  of  all  District  and  General  Court 
Martials, 1865 
33 Jeff Blackett Rant on The Court Martial and Service Law ( 3
rd ed. Oxford University Press Oxford 2009) 6  
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officers in the Standing Army held the right to discipline their troops. It is still argued that 
control over offending soldiers must be held in the hands of their commander.  
 
‘The power to command must remain with the military forces if we expect 
to have an efficient and well disciplined military. The power to command 
depends upon discipline, discipline depends on the power to punish. If we 
take the power to punish away from the military we will destroy discipline, 
and eventually the power to command.’
34 
 
The influence of the doctrine of command control was manifest in various positions, being 
mostly occupied by commissioned officers, their functions conflicted. For instance, the judge 
advocate, the only non-military member, was responsible for both prosecuting and advising 
the defendant, whilst ensuring they did not suffer from an over-zealous prosecution which he 
himself was bringing.  The ‘board’ of officers who deliberated on the verdict and influenced 
the  sentence  had  no  legal  training,  they  had  only  military  training  and  the  knowledge  of 
military discipline.
35  
 
Some official oversight existed, and no serious sentence was complete without approval from 
the crown or a commander with the delegated authority, usually the Judge Advocate General. 
The civil courts maintained their supremacy with a review capability over the courts martial 
and again the power of the military court, especially concerning serious crimes, was slowly 
eroded.  Often soldiers were tried by civil courts rather than the court martial in order to 
ensure that the most serious crimes received fair trial. By 1879 both the Mutiny Acts and the 
                                                           
34 US Senate Committee on Armed Services 81
st Congress 1
st Sess. 228 (1949) Per William J Hughes President 
of the judge advocates association 
35 Luther C west ‘HIsory of Command Influence on the Military Judicial System’ [1970] 18 UCLA Law Review 
1   
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Articles of War were consolidated into a single statute,
36 the forerunner of the various Army 
Acts, which governed military justice throughout the twentieth century. 
 
7.3 The Modern Court Martial: Recent changes in light of perceived lack of impartiality 
 
This is the background of the court in which it is likely a battlefield mercy killer would face 
trial. Inherently the court has delivered harsh punishments and justice and for that reason has 
required constant jurisdictional restriction. Recent reformation of the system has taken place 
which makes it far more procedurally sound, but whether or not command influence would 
affect the trial of a battlefield mercy killer depends on factors which are unquantifiable. Some 
members of the board may possess proclivities which predispose them to regard the stringent 
application  of  military  law  as  paramount  to  good  discipline,  whilst  others  may  be  more 
sympathetic to the plight of the soldier and some may exhibit a mixture of both. This is 
informed speculation, arguments are explored in this chapter which indicate that both are 
plausible. However, as it is impossible to identify what effect the composition of the board 
may have, perhaps a better question to ask is whether the court martial procedure is rigid 
enough  to  ensure  that  justice  is  served  rather  than  merely  discipline,  and  whether  the 
application of justice will trump command ideals? 
The dual roles and command influence seen in the early court martial endured in one form or 
another into the twentieth and early twenty-first century. It was not until challenges could be 
mounted under European law that any meaningful measures were taken to address this matter. 
These challenges were largely based on Article 6 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights.
37  
                                                           
36 Army Discipline and Regulations Act 1879 42 & 43 Vict C.23 
37 European Convention on Human Rights Article 6.1  
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Before the Armed Forces Acts of 1996 and 2006 began to incorporate changes, there existed 
several practices which could make it look to outside observers that command influence was 
able to interfere with the court. Often the manifestation of many roles and procedures in a 
single person caused a perceived conflict of interest, much like the role of the Judge Advocate 
in the early development of the Court Martial. This inhibited the defendant’s right to, 
 
‘…a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law.’
38 
 
The Army Act 1955, assigned the roles of defence, prosecution, jury and those bringing the 
initial charge to military personnel who as such were within the military command structure. 
This  posed  problems  because  it  was  believed  that  the  pursuit  of  discipline  may  oust  the 
application  of  justice  because  of  the  perceived  lack  of  impartiality  created  by  the  courts 
constitution. 
 
‘However, I share the concerns…with the problems of independence and 
impartiality which are inherent in the very nature of military tribunals. In my 
opinion,  the  necessary  association  between  the  military  hierarchy  and 
military tribunals – and the fact that members of the military serve on the 
tribunals – detracts from the absolute independence and impartiality of such 
tribunals…the members of a court martial, who are the triers of fact, and the 
Judge Advocate, who presides over the proceedings much like a judge, are 
chosen from the ranks of the military. The members of the court martial will 
also be at or higher in rank than Captain. Their training is designed to insure 
                                                           
38 ibid.   
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that they are sensitive to the need for discipline, obedience and duty on the 
part  of  the  members  of  the  military,  and  also  for  military  efficiency. 
Inevitably, the court martial represents to an extent the concerns of those 
persons who are responsible for the discipline and morale of the military. In 
my opinion, a reasonable person might well consider that the military status 
of court martial’s members would affect its approach to the matters that 
come before it for decision.’
39 
 
7.4 The Commanding Officer: An example of Command and Judicial Interplay 
 
The chain of command is a central aspect of the military structure, and as such pervades 
military justice. Officers such as the Commanding Officer (CO) may have the dual role of 
delivering both discipline and justice. Summary offences, not heard in the court martial, are 
dealt with by the CO. Though not legally qualified, they are aware of the legal powers their 
role entails.
40 It is a command role, not an administrative post, occupying a senior position in 
the chain of command by which superior officers hold supremacy of command over all junior 
ranks and they are responsible for disciplining the troops they command. Military law bei ng 
heavily concerned with discipline makes it logical for the CO to be the primary source of 
military justice.If an outside authority were the source of this justice it could potentially 
undermine the entire command structure.
41  
 
Previously, the CO held absolute power in summary cases, organising the pre-trial detention 
of the defendant and having powers of detention. The CO could undertake a summary trial 
                                                           
39 R v Généreux [1992] SCR 259 per Lamer CJC at 294 -295 
40 They are usually educated through courses and publications such as the Manual of Service Law, Ministry of 
Defence 2009  
41 David Richards ‘The Armed Forces Act 2006 – Civilianising Military Justice?’ [2008] Criminal Law Review 
198   
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where he combined roles of prosecutor, judge and reviewer of the sentence he had passed, all 
upon a soldier who was under his direct command and influence. Ultimately, it was found that 
the procedure violated the independence, impartiality and consequently the fairness of the trial 
in contravention of Art. 6.1, and that the exclusion of legal representation at the such trials 
was a violation of Art.6.3.
42 
 
Summary cases now have far more official oversight. CO’s can no longer simply decide, but 
must report potential breaches of discipline to the Director of Service Prosecutions and the 
Service Police who effectively take control of any serious charge, and who evaluate the merits 
of the case before a hearing of any sort can be instigated.
 43 Their sentencing powers have also 
been limited,
44 and these restraints reduce the command influence on the impartiality of  the 
trial whilst ensuring that but ensure the command structure is not undermined by an outside 
authority, because the Service Police and DPS are military organisations separated from the 
command structure. 
 
This potential conflict between the military officer’s duty to discipline and serve justice may 
lead the battlefield mercy killer to suffer an injustice. If the deliberating officers are concerned 
primarily with discipline rather than justice many important factors in the case may be ignored. 
The  mercy  killer’s  compassionate  motive,  the  stresses  of  combat  and  the  circumstantial 
evidence in which the incident took place, may be ignored as the case is seen as a matter of 
serious misconduct which must be remedied to maintain military efficiency.
45  Such a trial 
will not take place under a summary hearing, but it serves to highlight the dual role of the 
                                                           
42 Bell v UK [2007] ECHR 41534/98  
43 n.24 above at s.113(1) This is especially so in the case of a Schedule 2 offence – Civil Crimes 
44 n.24 above at s.132 – s.133. They cannot dismiss the soldier from service and can only order a reduction of a 
single rank and detention for a maximum of ninety days.  
45 As was discussed in Chapter 4, these matters are considered in the civil criminal courts, but only in relation to 
the civilian circumstances which have influenced previous cases. As such the influences affecting the soldier 
administering a battlefield coup de grace are not fully recognised in these courts.  
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military officer when functioning in their legal capacity,  which historically has led to the 
command influence permeating the proceedings. 
 
7.5 Command influence and the safeguards of the modern court martial 
 
The most recent reform of the court martial system has focused upon this apparent influence 
of the command structure on the court martial to outside observers.  
 
‘An individual who challenges the independence of a tribunal…need not 
prove actual lack of independence. The question is whether a reasonable 
person, familiar with the constitution and structure of General court martial, 
would perceive that tribunal as independent. The independence of a tribunal 
is to be determined on the basis of the objective status of that tribunal. This 
objective status is revealed by an examination of the legislative provisions 
governing the tribunal’s constitution and proceedings,  irrespective of the 
actual good faith of the adjudicator.’
46 
 
It has never been confirmed that justice has been influenced through the command structure, 
but the concern is that it could. As indicated in the above quote, justice could be seen to be 
influenced and if command influence does affect a trial in this way, it could impact on the 
justice the battlefield mercy killer receives. Recent changes have been aimed at halting this 
perception, which may ensure that the trial procedure for those administering battlefield coup 
de graces limits the potential for injustice to occur. 
                                                           
46 n.39 above at per Lamer CJ  
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Today, the court martial is a standing criminal court which dispenses public justice, but it also 
supports the operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces. As such, whilst it has a right to 
have regard to the public interest it also has a right to have regard to the interests of the 
Armed Forces.
47 For this reason, it should not be seen as a crown court sitting in uniform, but 
it must regard the unique differences relating to the service context which military law serves. 
However, it is still required to provide a standard of justice which is just as high as that which 
is administered by the crown courts. This is illustrated by the Court Martial Rules which state 
that when the judge advocate reaches an impasse where the Armed Forces Act or the Court 
Martial Rules cease to apply, they should follow the procedure in accordance with the Crown 
Court.
48 
 
Previously, two tiers of court martial  were available; the General Court Martial (GCM) and 
the District Court Martial (DCM). The DCM  was the lower court, had a minimum of three 
members on its board, deals with less serious indictable offences and ha d the power two 
imprison for a maximum of two years. The GCM hear d  the most serious crimes, ha d  a 
minimum of five members on the board, and can sentence in accordance with the maximum 
limits that the specific offence provides. Concerning the battlefield mercy killer, the GCM had 
authority to hear all cases, including murder. Various important murder trials  tooh under a 
GCM,
49 but  never  before has  a  case of battlefield mercy killing   been heard in the UK . 
However, under the Armed Forces Act 2006,
50 this demarcation has been swept away, 
although the board still comprises of three to five members, sentencing depends on the nature 
of the offence and not the composition of the board. 
                                                           
47 n.33 above at 25 
48 Armed Forces (court Martial) Rules 2009 r.26 
49 R v  Page [1954] 1 QB 170 
50 n.24 above at s.155.  
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As with the role of the CO in a summary case, many of the procedures in the court martial had 
been governed by a single person regardless of a possible conflict of interest, until a series of 
cases  led to  legislative  change during the late  nineties and end of the last  decade.
51  For 
instance, the role of the convening officer and the confirming officer were manifested in a 
single person.
52 As the convening officer they were responsible for both establishing the court, 
appointing the personnel who would try the defendant, and also for bringing the prosecution. 
As confirming officer they decided whether the sentence passed could stand. Effect ively, 
under this system, a soldier brought to trial for committing a battlefield mercy killing would 
face a trial where the prosecution chose the jury, brought the case against the defendant and 
then acted as a judicial review body.  
 
‘The Commission therefore considers that, whether or not the Convening 
officer is as a matter of fact the prosecuting authority, he is seen to be 
central to the prosecution of the case by court martial.’
53 
 
Such a conflict could easily make the court martial seem to lack impartiality. Of course, this 
could have been to the mercy killer’s benefit if the army adopted an in house paternalistic 
attitude towards the defendant, and wanted to limit the damage caused by a possible murder 
conviction. That is to say they sympathised with his plight and feared the adverse publicity the 
case could potentially bring.  However, this in itself presents a flawed justice in which the 
treatment of the crime itself comes second to political motivations. 
 
Findlay v United Kingdom,
54  led to the dismantling of the role of the CO into separate entities. 
The court found that s.107 of the Army Act 1955 was incompatible with Article 6, because 
                                                           
51 The most sweeping legislative change has come in the form of the Armed Forces Act 2006 
52 Army Act 1955 s.86 and s.111 
53 Report of the Commission on Human Rights, Application No. 22107193 Alexander Findlay Para 99  
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allowing a non-judicial individual to uphold a conviction was contrary to the principle that 
judicial  determination  cannot  be  overturned  by  a  non-judicial  authority.
55 The European 
Commission on Human Rights,
56 addressed many problems which made the court martial 
appear to lack impartiality it was thus seen as objectively unfair,  although it could not  be 
proven to be subjectively unfair, only that the procedure they followed enabled insinuations of 
partiality. It was the procedure that was flawed and not the human operatives within the 
procedure. 
 
‘In  addition,  an  objective  test  must  also  be  applied,  that  is  ascertaining 
whether sufficient guarantees exist to exclude any legitimate doubt … [I]t 
must be determined whether there were ascertainable facts, particularly of 
internal organisation, which might raise doubts as to impartiality. In this 
respect  even  appearances  may  be  important:  what  is  at  stake  is  the 
confidence  which  the  court  must  inspire  in  the  accused  in  criminal 
proceedings and what is decisive is whether the applicant’s fear as to a lack 
of impartiality can be regarded as objectively justifiable’ 
57 
 
The convening authority was abolished under the Armed Forces Act 1996, and new roles were 
created separating the roles from the perceived pressures of command influence as far as 
possible.  The role of the Director of Service Prosecution was created, who whilst being a 
member of the services, was outside the chain of command and thus ‘independent’ in their 
responsibility  for  prosecutions.  The  court  administration  officer  took  over  the  role  of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
54 Findlay v United Kingdom  [1997] 24 EHRR 
55 See Andenas Mads ‘European Perspective on Accountability and Judicial Interdependence’ [2007] 41(1) The 
International Lawyer 1 
56  Abolished since 1998, when the need to apply to the commission was no longer required as the European 
Court of Human Rights had its jurisdiction widened and individuals could take their cases directly to the court. 
57 n.53 above at para 90  
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convening the trial and appointing the president of the board and the lay members, who were 
civil servants with guarantees as to their independence. The judge advocate role was enhanced, 
no longer are they ‘quasi clerks’, they now have powers more in line with a judge in a civil 
criminal trial. 
 
However, despite these changes, further queries remained over the composition of the board, 
who were all serving officers, and their potential to be influenced by the command structure 
through both the permanent president and the inherent ideal of command, an ideal they had 
been trained to imbibe in their subordinates.
58 This was first raised in Morris v UK,
59  and led 
to the ‘Morris direction’ which is now read to board members before each trial, reminding 
them of their duty to be impartial.
60 Further doubts were then raised as to the board’s lack of 
legal training with regard to their sentencing role and, despite being initially dismissed, this 
doubt still remains.
61 
 
‘Indeed, in performing the role only occasionally, the members of a court – 
martial  resemble  jurors  and  should  bring  to  the  task  the  freshness  of 
approach which is one of the benefits of the jury system.’
62 
 
The Board in a GCM consists of up to seven members,
63 and in response to these cases and 
concerns it,  has undergone substantial changes.  First, no one who is involved with the 
                                                           
58 R v Boyd, Hastie and Spear; Sanby and Others [2002] UKHL 31 
59 Morris v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 1253 
60 However, the precise formulation of the guidelines are a matter for the trial judge, but it is designed to cover 
in sufficient detail those matters which are necessary to reinforce the independence and impartiality of the court. 
Normally the judge will ensure that the lay members have read and received the relevant guidance regarding the 
trial procedure, and explains that no reports of members’ performance during the trial will be made. Guidance is 
given  in    Practice  in  Courts  Martial:  Collected  Memoranda  2009  s.4  available  on 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/courts/judge-advocate-general/PracticeInTheCourtMartial-
CollectedMemoranda-V3-October2009.pdf last accessed 09/06/2012 
61 See Cooper v UK [2003] ECHR 48843/99 
62 n.58 above per Lord Rodger at para. 67  
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prosecution, or has any links can serve on the board.
64 Nor can anyone who has served less 
than three years as an officer.
65 Most importantly, they can have no affiliation with the  units 
the defendant has served in,
66 unlike the regimental court martial in which the defendant was 
essentially being judged by his own personal officers. The Permanent President, holding the 
minimum rank of Lieutenant Colonel, heads the board and the position will be his last posting 
before retirement in order to minimise the possibility of his role being influenced by career 
prospects in higher command. The Permanent President is more than a foreman of the jury, 
being charged with upholding the integrity  of the deliberative process.
67  In an attempt to 
curtail any potential interference, whether it is subliminal in nature or not, junior members of 
the board are required to offer their opinions on the case before the more senior officers.
68 
This  should  help  t o  minimise  the  board  members  themselves  being  influenced  by  the 
command structure, which is present even in this small group makeup.  
 
When sentencing deliberations actually take place, the lay members move from the member’s 
box and sit on the bench, either side of the judge advocate to hear the pleas of mitigation. 
They are then advised on general sentencing principles and the tariffs particular to the specific 
offence. They may provide the judge with service considerations as to sentencing and the 
career implications of particular sentences. They all have an equal vote, but when the decision 
is split, then the judge advocate holds the deciding vote on sentencing.
69 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
63 This is always so when it is a schedule 2 offence. Armed Forces (Court Martial) Rules 2009 r.29 
64 n.24 above at s.156(2)(1)(2) & (3) 
65 ibid. at  s.156(2) 
66 Armed Forces (Court Martial) Rules 2009 r.32 
67 Their duties are found within The Court Martial Guide and the Summary Appeal Court Guidance Volume 2 : 
Guide  for  Court  Members  Table  3.8,  and  include,  collating  the  votes  on  the  verdict  in  order  of  seniority, 
announcing the findings in court, signing a record of the findings, chairing any discussion during deliberations 
on the findings, ensuring all members have an equal vote and voice and to protect the boards integrity by 
ensuring that members of the board have no external contact with interested parties. 
68 Armed Forces (Court Martial) Rules 1997 
69 Concerning their sentencing powers and role the training of the lay members of the board, junior officers are 
encouraged to attend trials as ‘persons under instruction’ in order to understand their capacity in this role. They  
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Finally, the modern judge advocate is still a civilian. Such persons must be legally qualified 
advocates of at least five years’ experience. They act much like the judge in the civil process, 
although  the  advice  they  give  to  court  is  now  legally  binding.
70 They also deliver their 
findings on the case in open court before the Court Martial retires to consider the verdict, on 
which they have no say, but they do join the board in deliberations on sentencing .  Although 
the judge advocate is not a ‘member’ of the court martial, he is appointed by the Secretary of 
State for Defence, who is the political leader of the military force. Therefore it has been 
argued  that  he  can  be  dictated  to  by  a  higher  military  authority  which  jeopardises  his 
independence.
71 Despite  the  changes,  there  still  exists  a  view  that  the  judge  advocate’s 
strengthened involvement in the court martial ‘is not sufficient to dispel any doubt as to the 
court martial’s independence.’
72 
 
7.6 Semrau and the Court Martial 
 
These challenges and criticisms of the court martial’s potential lack of impartiality have been 
mirrored in other jurisdictions which have their roots in the colonial British system. Most 
importantly, in Canada, where Capt. Semrau faced trial under a court martial, the challenges 
have to some degree mirrored those experienced by the British system of military justice.  The 
previous view of their system of military justice was similar to the traditional British view, 
which  feared  a  system  of  justice  being  totally  severed  from  the  command  structure  and 
justified the procedural  flaws. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
take an oath and may remain with the members of the board during deliberations when the court is considering 
sentence but not when the board is deliberating on the finding, nor can they offer any advice or opinion. 
70 n.24 above at s.84(c) 
71 n.33 above at 185 
72 n.53 above at para. 103  
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‘In a military organisation such as the Canadian Forces, there cannot ever be 
a truly independent military judiciary; the reason is that the military officer 
must be involved in the administration of discipline at all levels. A Major 
strength of the present military judicial systems rests in the use of trained 
military officers who are also legal officers to sit on courts martial in judicial 
roles. If this connection were to be severed, (and true independence could 
only be achieved by such severance.), the advantage of independence of the 
judge  that  might  thereby  be  achieved  would  be  more  than  offset  by  the 
disadvantage of the eventual loss by the judge of the military knowledge and 
experience which today helps him to meet his responsibilities effectively. 
Neither the Forces nor the accused would benefit from such a separation.’
73 
 
Initially, the lower court of the standing court martial was challenged on the grounds that it 
was not impartial. A single military judge sitting alone and deliberating upom a case could not 
be seen as impartial.
74 The second notable challenge was upheld in R v Ingebrigston,
75 where 
it was argued that the court was not sufficiently independent from the chain of command 
structure.  Furthermore,  the  role  of  the  military  judge  in  a  standing  court  could  never  be 
impartial because their pay, promotion prospects and appointment were subject to the military 
executive and thus they could not be guaranteed to be sufficiently independent under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights.
76 
                                                           
73 J B Fay ‘Canadian Military Criminal Law: An Examination of Military Justice’ [1975]  23  Chitty’s Law 
Journal 228 248 
74 Mackay v R [1980] 2 SCR 
75 R v Ingebrigston (1990) 5 CMAR 87 
76 Presumably under The Constitution Act Part 1 1982 Article 9  - Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained or imprisoned.  
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The major changes to the Canadian court martial system came about after R v Genereux
77 and 
R v Foster.
78 These challenges led to many changes especially concerning those officers who 
carried out conflicting functions and focused upon areas of concern which closely resembled 
those in the UK, which took place several years later in the UK. They focused upon the lack 
of independence the judge advocate enjoyed,  
 
‘…The  National  Defence  Act  and  regulations  fail  to  protect  a  judge 
advocate against the discretionary or arbitrary interference of executive... As 
a result, there was no objective guarantee that his career as military judge 
would not be affected by decisions tending to favour an accused rather than 
the  prosecution.  A  reasonable  person  might  well  have  entertained  an 
apprehension that the person chosen as judge advocate had been selected 
because he had satisfied the interests of the executive…’
79 
 
Also  of  concern  was  the  influence  of  the  command  structure  on  the  Board  members 
themselves, who were assessed on the basis of their performance at the court martial, 
 
‘A military officer’s salary is determined in part according to a performance 
evaluation. There was no formal prohibition at the time against evaluating 
an officer on the basis of his performance at a General Court Martial.’
80 
 
Finally, it was deemed that whilst justice may be being served in the Canadian court martial, 
it was reasonable to assume, very much like its UK counterpart, that it could seem to outside 
                                                           
77 n.39 above. 
78 R v Foster [1992] 88 DLR (4
th) 169 
79n.39 above. 
80 ibid.  
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observers that the system was not as impartial as it should be. This particular case concerned 
the role of the convening officer. 
 
‘…certain characteristics of the General Court Martial system were likely to 
cast doubt on the institutional independence of the tribunal in the mind of a 
reasonable and informed person... military officers, who are responsible to 
their superiors in the Department of Defence, are intimately involved in the 
proceedings of the tribunal. In particular, it is unacceptable that the authority 
that convenes the court martial, i.e. the executive, which is responsible for 
appointing  the  prosecutor,  should  also  have  the  authority  to  appoint 
members of the court martial, who serves as the triers of fact.‘ 
81  
 
Since then steps have been taken to improve the perceived justice the court martial delivers 
both at home and in the relevant jurisdictions considered here. What this means for the mercy 
killing soldier is unquantifiable, especially since no soldier has been brought to trial for such 
an act in the UK. Nevertheless, there are two clear effects such a trial could have for mercy 
killer, the board could sympathise with the defendant, as comparable military men with the 
same experience, in a manner that a civil try jury composed of civilians cannot. Elsewise, they 
may take a more draconian outlook upon the charge and view the court martial as a means to 
ensure  discipline  is  the  paramount  consideration  of  the  trial.  It  is  most  probable  that  the 
members of the board will not evidence such polemicized attitudes, and one would hope and 
expect a level of dispassionate professionalism. 
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Despite the safeguards and oversight which have been introduced to the improve the system, 
potential for the possibility of bias still exists. Judging whether the mind-set of the individual 
board members can be improved via these changes cannot be evaluated. Nor can the military 
culture in which the individual board member finds themselves operating or any influence on 
their deliberations. This subjective mind-set and military culture may adversely affect the 
private solider charged with a mercy killing, and may have something to do with what shall be 
termed here, class bias. 
 
Capt. Semrau, facing trial in a Canadian court martial, which like its British counterpart had 
faced major procedural overhaul to improve the appearance of impartiality, was not convicted 
of  second  degree  murder.  He  was  convicted  only  of  the  military  offence  of  negligently 
performing a military duty, and punished with demotion to junior officer and discharged from 
the Canadian Forces. Capt. Semrau was an officer, and was tried not only by a board of 
military men like himself but also by his peers. Whether or not it is possible to postulate that a 
private  soldier  might  be  treated  differently  by  a  board  of  individuals  who  are  usually 
responsible  for  commanding  his  ilk  and  disciplining  his  smaller  service  misdemeanours 
requires further investigation. 
 
7.7  The  arbitrary  nature  of  the  court  martial  and  the  early  disparity  in  treatment 
between the private soldier and the commissioned officer 
 
The  potential  for  this  type  of  bias  to  occur  to  occur  is  compounded  when  officers  sit  in 
deliberation over private soldiers, as shall be assessed. Whether the court martial delivers 
discipline veiled as harsh justice, and the potential influence of ‘class bias’ are closely related.  
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To investigate these claims it is best to begin with the foundations of the system and focus 
upon the practices and sentences which may have informed this view. 
 
In the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries officers in the infantry, guards and 
cavalry bought their commissions and they were not required to undergo formal training or 
selection.
82 Lord Wellington himself bought his first commission in 1787 as an ensign and 
bought a further seven until he reached the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and commanded  a 
regiment of his own.
83 This ‘purchase system’ did not end until 1871.
84 To become an officer 
one had to be a gentleman, and to be considered a gentleman required, breeding, education, 
money  and  social  status.  Furthermore  the  regimental  commander  himself,  the  lieutenant 
colonel, was expected, with a small government subsidy, to fund their regiment from their 
private wealth, including, recruitment, wages, uniform, equipment and welfare payments to 
widows.
85 
 
This class divide certainly shaped the views officers had of the enlisted men serving under 
them, and Lord Wellington himself made one such famous remark evidencing the disdain in 
which the common soldier was often held. 
 
                                                           
82 Douglas W Allen ‘Compatible incentives and the purchase of military commissions’ [1998] 27 Journal of 
Legal Studies 45. See also C B Otley ‘The social origins of britsh army officers’ [1970] 18(2) The Sociological 
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‘The  French  system  of  conscription  brings  together  a  fair  sample  of  all 
classes; ours is composed of the scum of the earth – the mere scum of the 
earth.’
86 
 
This prejudice was greatly influenced by the sociological approach of Benthamite thinkers, 
who believed that there existed a criminal ‘class’ within the Victorian working classes, many 
of who enlisted in the army.
87 
 
‘Men of loose and unstable principles must constitute a very large element 
of our army. Poverty forces these characters to enlist, and exposed to the 
low temperature of our garrison towns, they naturally revert to their former 
habits.’
88 
 
This clear social division and the prevailing attitude towards the private soldier, could provide 
the basis by which an enlisted soldier accused of a battlefield mercy killing may be treated 
differently from a commissioned soldier who is being tried by a jury of his peers. There exists 
a plausible argument to suggest that disparity in treatment for the same crime has previously 
occurred between officers and private soldiers in previous manifestations of the court martial 
and that a class divide still segregates the ranks. 
 
In the past offences of a lesser nature and purely military misdemeanours were dealt with by a 
tribunal  consisting  of  officers  of  the  same  regiment.  These  were  the  Regimental  Court 
Martials, whilst the General Court Martial, was a far more formal affair which was reserved 
                                                           
86 Earl Phillip Stanhope Notes of Conversation with the Duke of Wellington (London 1888) 14 
87 Peter  Burroughs  ‘Crime  and  Punishment  in  the  British  Army  1815-1870’  [1985]  100(396)  The  English 
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for serious  crimes, including desertion  and murder. The RCM  was  an informal affair, its 
boundaries were left deliberately undefined, and it was procedurally less strict than the formal 
GCM, and incomparable to the civil law courts.
89 Conducted by five officers, and initially 
reserved for crimes of less gravity, the officer class consistently overstepped these boundaries 
and prosecuted men for crimes reserved for the GCM under different offences. 
 
‘Officers have tried men for Desertion under pretence of neglect of duty, 
whereby  they  have  evaded  the  bringing  of  offenders  to  Tryal  before  a 
General Court Martial’
90 
 
However,  disregard  for  procedure  was  the  least  of  the  RCM  procedural  indulgences. 
Overzealous punishments occurred regularly and help to explain the inherent belief in the 
harshness of the court martial. It is also perhaps the best evidence of the detrimental effects 
the chain of command influence could potentially have on the court martial, as discipline 
through exemplary and overtly punitive methods was prioritised over fairness and the true 
administration of justice. 
 
‘…looking out on the Parade I saw a soldier tied to halberd and a body of 
Guards in the Round, the Solider was stript, and the Drums with switches 
whipped him two hundred lashes; and as I am informed a few days after two 
hundred more, and a few days later two hundred more, in all six hundred 
executed by ten Drums.’
91 
 
                                                           
89 A N Gilbert ‘The Regimental Court Martial in the Eighteenth Century British Army’ [1976] 8  Albion: A 
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90 Judge Advocate Hughes to Secretary of War 3
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The  above  is  a  recollection  of  a  punishment  given  for  an  alleged  case  of  defrauding  the 
Colonel of the Regiment of several men, (collecting pay for men no longer serving in the 
regiment); a claim which was never safely nor wholly substantiated. Under a thin veneer of 
legality the RCM allowed officers to punish their soldiers without regard to legal procedure 
which might have been upheld in a GCM presided over by a judge advocate. RCM procedure 
was lax, written accounts of trials were not maintained and there existed no system of review. 
However, ‘[N]o military person is therefore of absolute right entitled to demand the assembly 
of a GCM...’ the colonel would review such requests and ‘…either grant or refuse it as he 
shall think proper.’
92 
 
Nor were the GCMs a paradigm of transparency and just decision making, although they 
represented  a  more  comprehensive  system  of  legal  transparency,  abiding  within  defined 
powers and boundaries. The disparity in treatment by the military justice system between the 
common  soldier  and  the  commissioned  officer  can  be  most  acutely  seen  in  the  GCM,  it 
regularly  passed  severe  punishments  such  as  the  death  penalty.  Contrasting  the  treatment 
between commissioned and enlisted men for similar offences evidences the disparity.  
 
Art LVIII   At every muster the commanding officer of each regiment, troop, or 
company,  then  present,  shall  give  to  the  commissary  of  musters 
certificates signed by himself, signifying how long such officers, non-
commissioned officer, and soldier, who shall not appear at the said 
muster,  have  been  absent,  and  the  reason  of  their  absence;  which 
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reasons, and the time of absence, shall be inserted in the muster – rolls, 
opposite to the respective names of such absentees.
93 
 
This offence was designed to minimise desertion and frau d because being absent from the 
regimental mustering without certification could be constitute either. It was not unknown for  
both unscrupulous non-commissioned and commissioned officers to claim that non -existent 
soldiers were absent in order to claim th eir  pay and privileges in absentia.   Private John 
Ellingham,  for  missing  muster  was  charged  with  desertion,  the  GCM  decreed  that  his 
punishment should also set an example to his comrad es so Lieutenant Colonel Sir Charles 
O’Hara  sentenced  him  to  be  hanged  ‘in  sight  of  as  many  of  his  companions  of  that 
regiment.’
94 Comparably, a Captain Cassill, who missed and presented several false names at 
muster with the intention of collecting their pay was punished with suspension and disabled 
from holding future military office.
95 
 
Captain Cassill’s punishment can be considered harsh compared to  that  of his  peers. For 
example, Captain Eyton, was presented with solid evidence against him including the sworn 
testimony of a serving solider regarding his constant false mustering, yet the court was, 
 
‘…of the opinion that the Captain Louis [Eyton] has given full satisfaction 
to the court, as to the articles brought against him by the Corporal Todd and 
                                                           
93  Various different forms of false muster existed see William and Mary, 1692: An Act for punishing Officers 
and Soldiers who shall mutiny or desert  Therr Majesties Service and for punishing False Musters and for the 
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398. 
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th and 11
th  21 
95 ibid. In a General Court Martial held in Portsmouth. 1694 Oct 4
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therefore the Court does  clear him of the False Musters and those other 
offences connected…’
96 
 
The witness against him was a non-commissioned officer. This ‘soft’ treatment of those the 
members of the court may have considered peers and gentlemen was not displayed when 
passing sentence upon enlisted soldiers. In one particular sitting, twenty-three private soldiers 
were  sentenced  to  death  for  mainly  crimes  concerning  failure  to  attend  muster.
97 For the 
enlisted soldier at least, ‘A court martial is tried, not by a jury of the defendant’s peers which 
must decide unanimously, but by a panel of officers,’
98 who represented a class divide and 
thus a skewed perspective of their role. 
 
The  modern  changes  to  the  court  martial  procedure  concerning  the  demarcation  of  roles 
within a single officer have made the procedure aesthetically pleasing to observers of justice. 
However, the class differentiation of the court martial procedure may still be evident when 
dealing with a private soldier. Only officers are allowed to serve on the board and until the 
late twentieth century, the officer classes still mainly consisted of the social elite. 
99 In the 
early 1980’s eighty-two per cent of Army officers originated from  ‘independent’ schools, 
excluding grammar schools, with over one third originating from just fourteen high profile 
public schools.
100 Even with the social change occurring in Britain, the preference remained 
for officers to be recruited from the traditional backgrounds,
101 however, at the end of the 
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century it was said that the ‘elite’ makeup of the officer cadre was not as sharp as it once 
was.
102 Currently, the Ministry of Defence,  
 
‘…does  not  monitor  recruitment  and  promotion  by  socio-economic 
groupings  or by  educational  background…it takes  account  of a potential 
recruits  educational  achievements  and  qualifications  but  not  the  type  of 
school they attended.’
103  
 
However,  in  2005,  53  per  cent  of  recruits  at  Royal  Military  Academy  Sandhurst  still 
originated  from  independent  Schools,
104 and encouragement for joining the Army as an 
officer  is  still  aimed  at  these  social  backgrounds.
  105    More  importantly,  non-officer 
recruitment  draws  on  mostly  young  people  from  disadvantaged  backgrounds,  with  many 
recruits joining as a last resort when they cannot gain other employment.
106 These have below 
national  average  educational  achievements,  have  h igh  rates  of  unemployment  prior  to 
enlistment, and a significant proportion come from ‘broken homes’ in economically deprived 
areas.
107 The military, 
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‘…acknowledge that, for many  youngsters, particularly from deprived or 
disadvantaged backgrounds the Armed Forces provide an opportunity that 
may have been denied them in civilian life.’
108 
 
This glosses over the reality that many enlisted soldiers are forced by circumstance to join the 
military from a position of socio-economic weakness, it could be said that, ‘…the defence of 
the  realm  depends  on  a  socio  economic  underclass.’
109 There  is  still  a  clear  class  divide 
between the ranks which may have been evident in Semrau, Maynulet and Cardenas. 
 
Capt. Semrau was a commissioned officer and charged only with negligently performing a 
military duty. The second degree murder charge against him was dropped and he served no 
time  in  confinement.  His  punishment  was  demotion  to  junior  officer  and  dismissal.  The 
Canadian court martial, similar in design to the British, was staffed by commissioned officers 
of    commensurate  rank  to  Capt.  Semrau.  They  would  have  understood  the  pressures  of 
leadership that faced Semrau on that day when the Afghan Army personnel were mistreating 
the soldier. They may also have felt sympathy towards him for making the wrong procedural 
decision whilst in charge, which they may have experienced themselves. It should be asked 
whether they would be more empathetic to a man they could directly relate to because of his 
position? He had after all shared in their role as an officer who was expected to maintain 
discipline amongst the lower ranks. Whilst this cannot be answered a common sense approach 
would suggest it is possible, and if so, the nature of the justice that Capt. Semrau received 
may be different to that received by an enlisted man with whom the Board could not directly 
empathise. 
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This  empathy  can  also  be  seen  in  United  States  v  Maynulet,  where  the  defendant  was  a 
Captain  commanding  a  US  force  during  the  occupation  of  Iraq  who  shoot  a  mortally 
‘wounded getaway’ driver. He was found not guilty of a murder charges against him, but was 
convicted  of  assault  with  the  intent  to  commit  manslaughter.
110 He was discharged from 
service but was not sentenced to a period of confinement. 
111 But when the defendants were 
not commissioned officers in a similar exchange the court was not so lenient. 
 
In United States v Cardenas the defendant was a non-commissioned officer, he and his co-
defendant, Sgt Horne, (who was sentenced at another trial) had delivered the coup de grace to 
an insurgent who had been shoot in a previous skirmish and was lying mortally wounded 
before them during an increasingly hostile situation. They were convicted of unpremeditated 
murder  and  conspiracy  to  commit  murder,
112 and were sentenced to o ne and three years 
confinement, a bad conduct discharge and a dishonourable discharge respectively and were 
demoted several ranks to that of Private. 
 
Care must be taken when comparing sentences passed in different jurisdictions by courts 
conducted  under  differing  procedures  and  policy  influences,  it  is  also  tricky  to  compare 
individual cases rather than looking at general trends. Each case was circumstantially different 
and evoked different responses, yet still, the two officer defendants tried before a Board of 
officers for a battlefield mercy killing have been spared incarceration and perhaps received 
lesser  convictions,  whilst  the  enlisted  defendant’s  received  more  serious  convictions  and 
prison sentences. In the USA considerations of class tend to be less prevalent and less obvious 
than in other jurisdictions however, to attain the rank of Captain in the US Army, you must be 
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in receipt of a university degree,
113 which must be paid for, and thus the educational level of 
the officer is far higher than that of the average enlisted man. 
 
It may be best to redefine the ‘class bias’ based on broad social status, as one which also 
includes the attainment of rank within the Armed forces. Inclusion within the commissioned 
officer  group,  comes  with  the  attainment  of  superiority  and  authority,  in  the  command 
structure at least, over those below you. The existence of a natural bias towards those who are 
traditionally disciplined compared to their officer compatriots was the subject of enquiry in 
Boyd, where it was asked whether it was reasonable to assume that the Board may hold the 
evidence given by a fellow officer in higher regard than that of a private soldier. However the 
Lords dismissed the assertion as unfounded. 
 
‘Of course, this submission is really just a matter of assertion. There was, 
and  could  be,  no  evidence  to  back  it  up…  Viewed  in  this  light,  the 
specialised knowledge and experience of the members of the court-martial 
could be seen as a positive advantage rather than a disadvantage. However, 
this maybe, I see no reason to think that, when duly directed by the judge 
advocate, officers in a court-martial cannot properly assess the evidence and 
return a true verdict based on it. I therefore reject the appellant’s argument 
on this point.’
114 
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7.8 The positives and negatives of trial by court martial for the mercy killer and 
the administration of justice. 
 
Focusing on the potential social bias and lack of impartiality of the court martial can be 
misleading. Good reasons are evident to consider the court the ideal place for the battlefield 
mercy killer to be tried. Foremost, is the fact that he will be tried in a military setting, by 
military men who will have an understanding of the culture in which the soldier operates 
compared to the jury in a civil trial. They may have participated on active operations, been 
placed in morally compromising situations which brought them into conflict with accepted 
practice, perhaps they even saw friends die or were wounded and can sympathise with the 
mental toll brought on by that prolonged exposure to conflict. They could understand the 
soldier’s plight in context in a way civilian juries could not. 
 
Furthermore, the ideals of military duty that officers are expected to abide by such as, honour, 
loyalty and integrity, have been used to argue why the officer is the ideal candidate to serve 
on the Board. 
 
‘The oath taken by the members of the court required them to well and truly 
try the accused ‘according to the evidence’ and to do justice according to the 
relevant  1955 Act  ‘without  partiality, favour or affection.’ ...There is  no 
reason to suppose that the members of the court-martial would be any less 
faithful to their oath or any less diligent in applying the directions given by 
the judge advocate than would the members of a jury. Indeed it is at the very 
least arguable that the officers on a court-martial, as members of the armed 
forces for whom trust and obedience to commands are particularly important,  
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would be even more likely than civilian jurors to be true if their oath and to 
follow the directions given to them.’
115 
 
Nor should military discipline be interpreted as a bad thing, in itself it is very useful and the 
courts offer the ideal avenue by which to fairly administer this discipline, which is integral to 
the effective fighting force. The trial judge in Semrau evidenced such a sentiment and Capt. 
Semrau’s conviction cannot be said to have been tainted by the imposition of harsh military 
justice.  ‘We  need  discipline  and  we  need  to  keep  our  professionalism,  that’s  what 
distinguishes us from every other guy with a gun in this country.’
116 
 
A further reason to support the credibility of the court martial as the place to give the mercy 
killing  soldier  a  fair  and  impartial  trial  lays  in  the  fact  that  the  UK  does  not  practice 
conscription.  The  strength  of  volunteer  forces,  like  Canada  and  the  UK,  can  be  quickly 
affected by dissatisfaction among the ranks.  A system of Kangaroo courts which imposes 
unfathomably harsh punishments would create low morale and affect the forces professional 
reputation to potential volunteers. True ‘discipline’ in these forces is actually achieved by 
positive self-discipline through patriotism, morale and camaraderie and military justice is only 
used  when  a  lack  of  discipline  attracts  sanctions.  The  courts  are  not  used  to  enforce  a 
discipline on the troops, they are a means of last resort.
117 It is in the military’s best interest to 
ensure the trials are fair and impartial, and that in cases like Semrau, the process is as fair as 
possible. 
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Conversely,  protecting  the  reputation  of  the  armed  forces  may  also  affect  the  fair 
administration of justice, not to the mercy killer, who may receive a lesser sentence but to the 
victim and the act itself. The killing may be marginalised in order to protect the military’s 
upstanding reputation, as discussed earlier concerning the Army’s response in R v Payne.
118 
The military authorities spoke of the victim’s death at the hands of  the British soldier in 
‘worryingly euphemistic terms’ calling the facts of the case ‘uncomfortable’,
 119 which could 
potentially undermine the operational effectiveness of the Army.
120 Their concerns were not 
directed at outrage at the killing but on the potential damage to the institution. They called the 
circumstance of the killing par t of an unlawful ‘conditioning process’,
121 a euphemism for 
torture.  Likewise, in a case of battlefield mercy killing, it is possible that the misconduct 
would be focused upon rather than the murderous act itself, and could be detrimental to the 
armed forces professional standing. 
 
This may have occurred to some degree in  Semrau  where  the  court  accepted  that  Capt. 
Semrau had shot an injured enemy, a protected person, but found him guilty of only a single 
breach of military discipline. The judge emphasised that he had failed in his duty as an officer 
to set an example to his subordinates, whilst the fact he had shot a wounded enemy went 
largely unreported. The crime was marginalised but the discipline was magnified, ssubverting 
justice  in  order  to  serve  the  military’s  purpose  of  ensuring  disciplined  efficiency  and 
protecting its professional reputation. 
                                                           
118 R v Payne and Others [2007] 
119 Peter Bradley ‘Gerry Simpson ‘The Death of Baha Mousa’ [2007] Melbourne Journal of International Law 
340 344 
120 ‘General  Dannatt  Speaks  after  Close  of  Cpl  Page  Court  Martial’,  Defence  News  (UK)  30
th  April  2007 
available from http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/Archive last accessed April 2nd 2011 
121 Ibid.  
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‘How can we expect our soldiers to follow the laws of war if their officers 
don’t? How can we expect the ANA to follow the laws of war if the officers 
mentoring them do not?’
122 
 
Whilst this may mean that the soldier who has delivered a battle field coup de grace receives a 
lesser conviction and sentence this in turn affects the ‘justice’ delivered to both the defendant, 
the victim and  in relation to the action itself. Such treatment of the behaviour curtails any 
moral response to the action and provides an uncertain indication as to society’s appreciation 
of the defendant’s behaviour. It ignores any evaluation of what justice the victim deserves as 
by convicting the soldier of only military crimes it gives the perception that the armed forces 
are the true victim.   
 
7.9 Conclusion 
 
A balancing process is required between the argument that any system of military justice will 
never be fair and the argument that modern arguments pertaining to human rights should be 
excluded from  military  consideration because it is  impossible to run an effective military 
machine under such constraints.  Despite the changes to the court martial to make it appear 
more procedurally sound, critics will continually  uncover faults.  For instance, despite the 
increased oversight of the composition of the Board, ‘…whilst one of the members was a 
Permanent President, the remaining Members [return] back to their ordinary military duties at 
the  end  of  the  applicants  court  martial,’
123 and  thus  are  still  influenced  by  the  military 
command structure. 
                                                           
122 n.116 above. 
123 n.53 above at para 105  
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The statement is true, but whether or not the fact the members of the board return to military 
duties  affects  their  judgements  in  the  manner  discussed  can  never  be  tested,  it  is  purely 
subjective.  Perhaps,  such  hostility  towards  the  court  martial  prevails  because  of  the 
authoritarian sentiments which can be traditionally placed upon the command of military. 
 
‘I am convinced that in justice to other men, soldiers who go to sleep on 
post, who go absent for an unreasonable time during combat, who shirk in 
battle,  should  be  executed;  and  that  Army  Commanders  or  Corps 
Commanders should have the authority to approve the death sentence. It is 
utterly  stupid  to  say  that  General  Officers,  as  a  result  of  whose  orders 
thousands of gallant and brave young men have been killed, are not capable 
of knowing how to remove the life of one miserable poltroon.’
124 
 
Yet  the  purpose  of  military  justice  is  not  to  ensure  that  the  troops  are  bound  by  the 
‘unmitigated  will  of  the  commanding  officer’,
125   as  the  constant  limitations  on  military 
tribunals through history have shown, but rather to keep discipline and ensure that the soldiery 
also abides by the laws of the land, despite their isolated and sometimes privileged position. 
The plight of the battlefield mercy killer should be better understood by courts manned by 
military men with a similar mind set to the defendant. In the US cases of  Cardenas and 
Maynulet and the Canadian case of Semrau it is apparent that this has led to the imposition of 
lesser  convictions  and  shorter  sentences.  However,  these  cases  also  possibly  display  a 
worrying bias that is present in the court martial system as an inherent and ineradicable aspect 
of military life. The imposition of authoritarian or class bias could prejudice proceedings 
leading to uncertainty as to how the officer or enlisted person may be treated. 
                                                           
124 House Committee on Armed Services, 80
th Congrees, 1
st Sess 2153 (1947) Per Lieutenant General J Lawton 
Collins. 
125 S T Ansell ‘Military Justice’ [1919]  5 The Cornell Law Quarterly 1 17  
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However, compared to the civil system, where the soldier faces trial and is considered in 
relation to his civilian counterparts and is deliberated upon by a jury whose members have 
little or no understanding of military life, warfare and the effects both of these have on an 
individual’s choices and conduct, the court martial trial is not an unattractive option for the 
battlefield  mercy  killer.  Despite  the  reservations  it  is  likely  that  he  will  receive  an 
‘understanding’ justice, from men who can in some way relate to the defendant. That the 
Board also contemplates the consequences of the defendant’s actions for military discipline is 
a larger obstacle to the defendant in theory than in practice. In 2002 the acquittal rates for all 
cases in the courts martial system were 59% for non –commissioned officers, whereas the 
acquittal rate in the civil courts varied between 37.4% and 44.2% during the years 1998-
2002.
126 For the soldier, the court martial seems to be the best place for trial if they protest 
their innocence or wish for ‘success’. 
 
Of course, such a stance ignores the bigger question of justice. Success for the mercy killer, 
an acquittal or lenient sentence, is different to true justice, for himself, the victim and the act. 
Such a success ignores the act’s gravity and the moral considerations that should be given to it. 
Whilst  the  varying  methods  of  how  the  battlefield  mercy  killer  can  be  tried  have  been 
investigated  and  the  unique  experiences  which  should  be  taken  into  account  have  been 
considered, the final questions remain. What is justice for the battlefield mercy killer and how 
should the act be viewed? 
                                                           
126 A Lyon ‘Two Swords and Two Standards’ [2005] Criminal Law Review 852  
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
Justice to the mercy killer 
 
‘Justice is to give each his own’
1 
‘‘Well then, ought we give our enemies whatever is due to them?’, 
‘Certainly’ he said, ‘what is due to them; and that is, I assume, what is 
appropriate between enemies, an injury of some sort.’’
2 
 
Speaking at a press conference, in the wake of a trial for the murder of a child by his mother, 
Detective Inspector Maxine Martin’s statement read, ‘I take no satisfaction from the sentence 
delivered to Kimberly Hainey today, although I am satisfied that justice has been served.’
3 
This is the archetypal rhetoric when it is held, both subjectively and objectively, that someone 
is rightfully punished for a crime. When someone is punished for an offence they are found to 
have committed it is often said that ‘justice has been served.’  
 
However, Bernard Martin, speaking after the judge passed a fourteen year sentence upon a 
man who murdered his son with a baseball bat, said, ‘I don’t think justice has been served, the 
fact  that  this  idiot  got  the  minimum  possible  sentence  he  could  get  is  disgusting.’
4 This 
opposing view is often heard when sentences are deemed disproportionate to the offence 
committed in the eyes of an individual or wider group, as such justice has not been served. 
 
                                                           
1 Plato The Republic (Translated by Sir Desmond Lee Penguin Classics 2003) 
2 ibid. at8-9 line 332(b) 
3 Chris Clements ‘Declan murder cop says justice has been served’ Daily Express 13
th  Jan 2012 8 
4 Andrea O’Neill ‘Father of Murdered East Kilbride teen furious over sentence’ East Kilbride News 4
th June 
2012   
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It  is  important  for the victims,  their wider families  and the community to  know that the 
wrongdoer  has  been  held  accountable  for  their  criminal  actions  committed  against  those 
individuals. In the words of Detective Inspector Caroline Corfield, speaking after the trial of a 
man who murdered his partner, ‘Hopefully they can come to terms with what happened with 
the knowledge that justice has been served and Karl Burman will serve a long sentence for 
this dreadful crime.’
5 Individuals like to feel that someone has been held accountable for the 
wrongs committed against them, ‘It does help that justice has been served…. now it is just a 
matter of trying to move on…’
6 said Diana Atkinson, whose son was knifed to death. 
 
It follows then, that when justice is served, the convicted has ‘got what they deserved’,
7 or at 
least this is what some people believe. Others often feel that the offender may have deserved 
to have been punished more severely, as this is what is due to the convicted. ‘The sentence is 
a positive one, though  I’m a policeman so  I always  want  longer, but  it sends  a positive 
message.’
8 Others may feel that a jail sentence may be too much and the offender does not 
deserve such a harsh sentence.
9 This is a matter of proportionately, whereby the punishment 
should be seen to fit the crime and that the wrongdoing against the victim and wider society’s 
morality is reflected in the sanctions against the offender.
10  
 
This just deserts theory of punishment is properly known as retributivism, where retributivist 
conceptions of punishment seek to allocate moral blame for the crime, claiming there is a 
moral link between punishment and guilt. Punishment goes hand in hand with accountability 
                                                           
5 Kyle Andrews ‘Shauna Lee Murderer sentenced to life’ Coventry Post 22
nd March 2012 
6 Jennifer Bell ‘Mother of murdered victim Mark Webb speaks out about her on going grief’ The York Press 6
th 
March 2012 
7 Adam Uren ‘Hero says rapist got ‘what he deserved’’ Peterborough Telegraph  Tuesday 5
th June 2012  
8 ibid. per Detective Superintendent Rich Seston  speaking after Ryan Forde was convicted for a ‘stranger rape’ 
and sentenced to six years imprisonment.  
9 Mel Evans ‘Rutgers suicide spy case sentence due’ The Telegraph 21
st May 2012. Many people felt that the 
defendant did not deserve to receive a gaol sentence. 
10 Stephen Simone ‘A Rant on YouTube Does Not Deserve a Prison sentence’ The Telegraph Tuesday 5
th June 
2012   
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or responsibility.
11 Under this theory the mercy killer would deserve punishment, and justice 
would be served when he is convicted of the crime he has been proven to have committed, 
namely murder or manslaughter. If  he is convicted of murder, according to a retributivist 
theory, the imposition of a mandatory life sentence is proportionate to the crime. This thesis 
has argued that this is not the case  however and that this is not justice for battlefield mercy 
killer. The killer who acts from compassion to ease the suffering has acted in a far more 
legitimate way and these factors deserve to be accounted for whe n considering how to treat 
them  punish  him  because,  like   other  mercy  killers  such  harsh  sentencing  may  not  be 
appropriate for the battlefield mercy killer. If the level of punishment is intrinsically related to 
the notion of justice the reasons behind the commission of the crime and the imputus behind 
the punishment must be understood and acknowledged. 
 
8.1 The rationale for punishment 
 
Offenders are punished for a number of reasons, because they deserve to be punished, to 
prevent them from committing further crimes, to discourage others, to  protect society, to 
make  them  pay  penitence  for  harms  caused,  to  convey  the  societal  disapproval  of  their 
behaviour,  and  to  maintain  the  authority  of  the  rule  of  law  by  ensuring  people  clearly 
understand the consequences of disobedience.
12 Punishment enforces criminal prohibition and 
without it laws could be freely flouted at will without fear of consequences. Thus to doubt the 
legitimacy of punishment casts dou bt upon the enterprise of the criminal law.
13 In the 
criminal law, justice and punishment are inextricably linked; the sanctions that are imposed 
upon the battlefield mercy killer will be used to measure the justice both he and his victim 
                                                           
11 P Bean Punishment: A Philosophical and Criminological Inquiry (Oxford Martin Robertson 1981) 14-15 
12 C Banks Criminal Justice Ethics (Sage Publications 2008) 104 
13 Christopher L Russell ‘Detterring Retributivism: The Injustice of Just Punishment’ [2002] 96 North Western 
University Law Review 843 852  
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receive.  Too  harsh  a  punishment  may  be  perceived  as  unjust  to  the  soldier,  too  soft  a 
punishment may be perceived as unjust for the victim, whilst the wrong type of punishment 
may be perceived as  casting the level  of  condemnation  of the behaviour into doubt.  For 
instance, when Capt. Semrau was punished with demotion and dismissal, it has been argued 
that  these  punishments  did  not  recognise  the  moral  gravity  of  his  behaviour  and  only 
addressed his perceived indiscipline. 
 
In  opposition  to  the  retributivist  theory  introduced  earlier,  stand  consequentialist  based 
theories, which justify punishment according to the good consequences which are promoted 
by the sanctions against the individual. These theories are founded upon the principle that it is 
wrong to harm another in any circumstance save for self-protection, for either the individual 
or the wider community. The system should not exercise punishments on anybody unless 
there is some good benefit to be derived from it. 
 
‘... That the one purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over 
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others…His  own  good,  either  physical  or  moral,  is  not  sufficient 
warrant…The only part of the conduct for anyone, for which he is amenable 
for society, is that which concerns others’
14 
 
Under this approach, punishment itself is not a good action, all punishments are intrinsically 
bad, as they require the infliction of harm upon another person against their will. However, 
they are justified because the consequences of punishments can provide ‘good’ results which 
                                                           
14 John Stuart Mill On Liberty (1859) (Oxford University Publishers Oxford 1975) 21-22  
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outweigh the harm done to the offender.
15 For instance, through incarceration the offender is 
incapacitated and prevented from committing further harm to others, if they are successfully 
rehabilitated whilst in prison they will not harm society with their criminal behaviour again. 
Punishment also upholds the rule of law which maintains an orderly society and when 
publicised, punishments deter others from participating in similar behaviour. Such concepts 
underlying  the  administration  of  punishments  were  traditionally  thought  to  be  morally 
sensitive,  merciful  and  humane,
16 and  most  infamous  amongst  the  consequentialist 
justifications for punishment is that of deterrence which implies that the punishment will 
prevent others behaving similarly. 
 
‘…if delinquents were constantly punished for their offences, and nobody 
else knew of it, it is evident that…there would be a great deal of mischief 
done, and not the least particle of good…The punishment would befall every 
offender as an unforeseen evil. It would never have been present in his mind 
to deter him form the commission of the crime. It would serve an example to 
no-one.’
17 
 
However, consequentialist justifications for punishment have been replaced by a resurgence 
in  the  retributivist  doctrine.  Doubts  over  the  worthiness  of  the  deterrence  aspect,  the 
cornerstone of the theory, have abounded for years in the wake of sociological surveys which 
question its credibility.
18 It can now be said that, ‘[R]etributivism can be fairly regarded as the 
                                                           
15 Jeremy Bentham The Theory of Legislation (1871)(Triibner London 1976 2
nd edition) 171 -170 
16 n.13 above at 848 
17 Jeremy Bentham ‘Principles of Penal Law’ in John Bowring (ed.) The works of Jeremy Bentham (Russell and 
Russell London 1962) 399 
18 See Johannes Andenaes ‘Does Punishment Deter Crime’ [1968] 11 Criminal Law Quarterly 76, J P Gibbs M 
L Erikson & G F Jensen ‘The deterrence doctrine and the perceived certainty of legal punishments [1977] 42 
The American Sociological Review 355, and Daniel S Nagin ‘Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the 
Twenty-First Century’ [1998] 23 Crime and Justice 1   
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leading philosophical justification for the institution of criminal punishment.’
19 It seems that 
mercy killers are punished in line with this retributivist theory because the consequentialist 
justifications for punishment ill fit the battlefield mercy killer. Therefore, the most credible 
argument that can be provided to tie the punishment of the battlefield mercy killer to the 
consequentialist theory, is that such punishment sets an example. For instance, speaking at 
Capt. Semrau’s trial judge advocate Lt. Col. Perron said, 
 
‘How can we expect our soldiers to follow the laws of war if their officers 
don’t? How can we expect the ANA to follow the laws of war if the officers 
mentoring them do not?’
20 
 
However, Capt. Semrau was not punished particularly harshly, as he was merely demoted two 
ranks and discharged from the Canadian Forces but served no custodial sentence. The purpose 
of ‘making an example’ of an individual when they have committed a particular action, is to 
deter others through publicising the punishment. Whilst in Capt. Semrau’s case the knowledge 
that committing such an act could result in a discharge from the service of a military violently 
engaged in supressing a costly insurgency may not deter individuals, who may see such a 
punishment as desirable, there are other reasons to suggest that even if harsher sentences were 
passed this would not effectively stop the soldier committing the crime. First, this concerns 
the nature of the crime and the impact the concept of deterrence has on different activities, if 
the criminal act is performed from mercy and compassion, as in a battlefield mercy killing, 
then the threat of a criminal sanction is likely to be less of a deterrent.
21  
                                                           
19 David Dolinko ‘Three Mistakes of Retributivism’ [1992] 39 UCLA Law Review 1623 1623 
20 Lt. Col. Perron the Judge in the Semrau case as cited in Christie Blatchford ‘For the jury ion Semrau case the 
penalty did not fit the crime’ Globe and Mail 19
th July 2010 
21 A Pepitone ‘Social psychological perspectives on crime and punishment’ 31(4) Journal of Social Issues 197  
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Second, the action has been carried out for thousands of years on various battlefields, and 
continues to this day.
22 Thirdly, and partly explaining the second reason, a battlefield mercy 
killing is usually a split second decision occurring during intense unforeseen circumstances 
rather than a premeditated killin g planned before the event. As such, punishment is not 
deterring those who are ‘considering’ such behaviour, rather it is the circumstances which 
create the need to act. Add to this the situational stress which is likely to negatively impact 
upon a person’s ability to make appropriate decisions,
23 and it is not reasonable to believe that 
the soldier will be deterred by recalling the punishments inflicted upon others for similar 
actions At the very least it is appropriate to claim that the consequences of punishment in this 
circumstance may not be fully weighed. 
 
Whilst it is desirable to deter  unlawful actions, morally bad actions, or socially condemned 
actions mercy killing is a very particular crime which attracts an atypical social response 
illegal. There is, for example, much evidence to suggest that mercy killings do not necessarily 
suffer  social  condemnation,
24 especially  when  associated  with  ‘indignities  of  protracted 
dying.’
25 Furthermore, in this context the punishment does not protect the public at large, they 
need no protection from the administration of a battlefield coup de grace, as circumstantially it 
is  a  very  unlikely  set  of  events  to  befall  the  normal  person  in  everyday  life.  Applying 
punishment  in  line  with  consequentialist  theory  is  also  redundant  if  it  is  said  that  the 
                                                           
22 As is evidenced by the examples in chapter two, from the accounts of such killings taking place in antiquity, 
to the accounts of medieval knights participating in such behaviour, the Crimean war and up until the modern 
day cases of Cardenas and Maynulet. 
23 See K R Hammond Judgements under Stress (Oxford University publishing New York 2000) and also how 
the perception of the situation negatively affects decision making Kathleen M Kowalski-Trakofler & Charles 
Vaught  ‘Judgement  and  decision  making  under  stress:  an  overview  for  emergency  managers’  [2003] 
International Journal of Emergency 278 281 
24 See The Law Commission Report 290  Partial Defences to Murder, Appendix C: Brief Empirical Survey of 
Public  Opinion  Relating  to  Partial  Defences  to  Murder,  August  2004  HMSO  London  ,  and  The  Law 
Commission Consultation Paper 177 A New Homicide Act for England and Wales, Appendix A: Report on 
Public Survey of Murder and Mandatory Sentencing in Criminal Homicides, November 2005 HMSO 
25 Hazel Biggs ‘The Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2004: Will English Law Soon Allow Patients the 
Choice to Die?’ 12(1) European Journal of Health Law 43 44-45  
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punishment is inflicted in order to rehabilitate the soldier. There is no evidence to suggest that 
battlefield mercy killing is a common place phenomenon or that mercy killing soldiers go on 
to become serial killers. Nor is it likely that they will pose a lingering threat to individuals. 
That said, it is clear that by punishing the soldier the rule of law is upheld and its authority is 
not seen to be damaged. There are of course exceptions in which the offender can escape 
punishment without the rule of law being affected, which are discussed later, but punishing 
the soldier on the basis that he broke the law and thus deserves punishment has a distinctly 
retributivist flavour, thus, it appears more probable that the mercy killer is punished because 
they  deserve  to  be  punished  rather  than  because  of  the  justifications  offered  by  a 
consequentialist argument.  Before this is analysed, a little more depth should be given to the 
theory of retribution especially concerning the grounds upon which it might justify why the 
offender should be punished.  
 
Under a retributivist theory punishment is justified by no more than a just deserts argument. 
 
‘What we may call the retributive view is that punishment is justified on the 
grounds  that  wrongdoing  merits  punishment.  It  is  morally  fitting  that  a 
person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing. That 
a criminal should be punished follows from his guilt, and the severity of the 
appropriate punishment depends on the depravity of his act. The state of 
affairs where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally better than the state 
of  affairs  where  he  does  not  and  it  is  better  irrespective  of  any  of  the 
consequences of punishing him.’
26 
                                                           
26 John Rawls The Two Concepts of Rules [1965] 64(1) Philosophical Review 3 5  
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That  is  not  to  say  that  the  punishment  has  no  other  useful  outcomes,  only  that  such 
consequences are not needed in order to justify the initial sentence. All that is required is for 
the offender to  have been found deserving of punishment,
27 and the punishment must be 
proportionate to the wrong caused. The severity of the punishment that a person  deserves is 
directly commensurate with the amount of harm they have inflicted upon another, literally an 
‘eye for an eye’.
28 
 
 ‘[Whatever] undeserved evil you inflict upon another within the people, that 
you inflict upon yourself. If you insult him, you insult yourself; if you steal 
from him, you steal from yourself; if you strike him, you strike yourself; if 
you  kill  him,  you  kill  yourself.  But  only  the  law  of  retribution  (jus 
tallies)…can specify definitely the quality and quantity of punishment; all 
other principles are fluctuating and unsuited for a sentence of pure and strict 
justice because extraneous considerations are mixed into them.’
29 
 
However,  this  theory  is  not  without  its  critics.  The  justification  it  offers  for  instigating 
sanctions, that ‘… the guilty ought to be punished because they deserve it, is not an argument 
but an assertion.’
30 It offers no concrete grounds other than this assertion,
31 merely claiming it 
is ‘right’ that the guilty suffer. It may be stretched as far as to say that ‘moral order’ requires 
the institution of punishment, but why this is so is unclear.
32  
                                                           
27 Immanuel Kant Metaphysics of Morals (1797) (May Gregor trans. Cambridge Cambridge University Press 
1991) 22 
28 Deuteronomy 19:21 
29 n.27above at 141 
30 Richard  Wasserstrom  ‘Why  punish  the  guilty?’  in  Gertrude  Ezorsky  (ed.)  Philosophical  Perspectives  on 
Punishment (New York State University of New York Press 1972) 337 
31 n.11 above at 30 
32 ibid. at  31  
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This is not a satisfactory answer as to why the soldier is punished for the battlefield mercy 
killing, or a basis on which to discuss how best they ought to be treated. Indeed, in the case of 
the soldier, the doctrine may seem somewhat flawed because when compassionate acts do not 
normally  invoke  moral  condemnation,  which  is  fundamental  in  a  just  deserts  argument. 
Understandably, when murder is committed the punishment should be commensurate, and in 
most jurisdictions, murder convictions are represented by a lengthy period of imprisonment. 
However, the battlefield mercy killer cuts short the life by only a matter of minutes, whilst a 
conviction for murder tends to deprive the soldier of his liberty for a minimum of fourteen 
years.
33 This is a disproportionate punishment, the sentence should be lenient bec ause he 
acted out of compassion in a situation far removed from  the civilian ideals which the law 
generally deals with. The true determination of how to treat the soldier who administers a 
battlefield coup de grace is first to gage the degree of wrongness represented by his behaviour. 
 
8.2 Wrongness as opposed to illegality 
 
The wrongness of certain behaviours can be determined only with reference to the system 
within in which they take place. Any system, in this case the criminal justice system, will be 
founded upon principles which inform it’s rules. In turn these systems also take into account 
social  norms, the widely  held  social  perceptions  of right  and  wrong as legitimising their 
decisions. 
 
The sanctity of life principle supports the imposition of a murder or manslaughter charge 
when a person has been unlawfully killed and supporters of the principle claim it has ethical 
                                                           
33 The temporal element is an important difference between the domestic mercy killer and the battlefield mercy 
killer. In the cases of Pretty and Bland, the life was being to be cut short or was cut short by a considerable 
length of time. This is because the immediacy of the situation is different. (See Chapter 3) In the battlefield 
mercy killing situation, the victim is close to death after suffering severe wounds, as in Semrau, in which the 
victim was so grievously wounded that the patrol at first thought he was dead.  
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primacy because, for among other reasons, ‘life is a gift from god and should not be taken.’
34 
In  the  case  of  a  battlefield  mercy  killing,  this  principle  competes  with  another,  that  of 
individual  respect  for  the  suffering  dying  person,  which  is  manifest  in  the  act  of 
compassionate  killing.  Delivering  the  appropriate  punishment  or  justice  to  the  battlefield 
mercy killer requires a value judgement between these principles.
35 In cases of a battlefield 
mercy killing the principle of greater importance is that which recognises the suffering of the 
victim because this tallies with public values. If the sanctity of life principle were followed it 
would cause undignified, futile suffering in all cases for no other reason than to respect the 
rule it upholds, the prohibition of killing. 
 
However this is not the case, the sanctity of life principle is not  unilaterally accepted as an 
absolute value,
36 reflected in the legal treatment of those who take life or are involved in end 
of life decisions, especially in the medical profession. Some actions are not deemed as 
contravening the principle and in other situations  the court is willing to take into account 
mitigating circumstances to ensure that the punishment is not too harsh. For instance, in the 
medical context legal sophistry is used to avoid conflicting with the principle,
37 if the 
principle were upheld absolutely, it would question the feasibility of physicians administering 
palliative care which they foresaw as having a high likelihood of causing death. As such, if 
the principle held primacy the standard which  the physician would be obliged to uphold 
would run in line with preserving life above all other considerations. This is not the case, the 
axiom  in  professional  ethics  is  to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  patient  and  their 
                                                           
34 T Chappell ‘Chappell’s reply to Jung’ [2003] 40 Philosophy Now 15-16 
35 Hans  Kelsen  ‘What  is  Justice?  Justice,  Law  and  Politics  in  the  Mirror  of  Science’  in  W  I  Jennings  ed. 
Collected Essays By Hans Kelsen (Berkley and Los Angeles Press 1957) 
36 Contrary to arguments to the opposite such as Norman L Gessler  Christian Ethics: Contemporary Issues and 
Opinions (2
nd ed. Baker Academic Michigan 2010) 16 where it is stated that the duty not to kill is an absolute 
requirement. 
37 See chapter 6.  
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wishes.
38Furthermore, in cases of domestic mercy killings including  Marshall and Webb the 
courts have acknowledged that some killings do not detrimentally affect the ideal. 
 
‘In  the  unusual  and  particular  circumstances  of  this  case  we  do  not 
believe  that  the  principle  of  the  sanctity  of  human  life  would  be 
undermined if the sentence imposed on the appellant were now reduced 
to one of 12 months' imprisonment, suspended, so that this lonely old 
man may receive the help that he will need to come to terms with the 
disaster that has overtaken him’
39 
 
Mercy killings evidence the famous ‘penumbra of doubt’ in legal reasoning,
40 where the rules 
do not fit the nature of the crime. The sanctity of life principle which underlies these rules is 
not as persuasive as in other instances of killing and little guidance is available about how to 
proceed. For this reason mercy killers have been subject to diffuse treatment. Gilderdale, 
Inglis, and Webb were recent mercy killing cases, which passed verdicts of assisted suicide, 
murder and manslaughter by means of diminished responsibility respectively. If the rule were 
absolute then logically all cases of killing should be treated alike. The secondary importance 
the  sanctity  of  life  principle  should  be  allocated  in  relation  to  respecting  the  individuals 
suffering  and  the  compassion  shown  them  when  a  mercy  killing  takes  place,  is  further 
                                                           
38 Paul Jewel ‘Rationality, euthanasia and the sanctity of life’ Paper delivered at the  Australian Association for 
Professional  Applied  Ethics  12
th  Annual  Conference  28
th-30
th  Sept.  2005  p.  2  available  at 
http://w3.unisa.edu.au/hawkeinstitute/gig/aapae05/documents/jewell.pdf last accessed 12/6/2012 
39 R v Webb [2011] EWCA Crim 152 at para 26 
40 H L A Hart ‘Positivism and the Separation of Laws and Morals’ (1958) 71(4) Harvard Law Review 621  
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evidenced by public opinion which does not condemn such actions,
 41 principles only gain 
moral validity when they are supported by the community in general.
42 
 
An  absolutist  view  of  the  sanctity  of  life  principle  supports  the  retributivist  justice 
administered to the mercy killer on no more certain grounds than because any infringement 
upon the principle deserves punishment. But when the behaviour does not match the degree 
of wrongness society ascribes to the action, especially  when a battlefield mercy killer is 
charged with murder,
43 then abiding by this absolute principle creates an injustice for those 
who are tried with regard to it. It is not to say that the offence of murder is bad law or that the 
sanctity of life principle lacks general public support, but they represent an incorrect attitude 
towards the specific circumstances of the mercy killer because the consequences they have 
upon the compassionate defendant are not proportionate to their behaviour. In principle a 
prohibition on killing is agreeable, but it becomes problematic when the law is upheld over 
moral concerns. 
 
‘The most pernicious laws, and therefore those which are most opposed to 
the will of God have been and are continually enforced as laws by judicial 
tribunals. Suppose an act innocuous, or positively beneficial be prohibited 
by the sovereign under the penalty of death; if I commit this act, I shall be 
tried and condemned and if I object to the sentence, that is contrary to the 
law of God…the court of justice will demonstrate the inconclusiveness of 
my reasoning by hanging me up, in pursuance to the law which I impugned 
                                                           
41 See The Law Commission Report 290 Partial Defences to Murder, Appendix C: Brief Empirical Survey of 
Public  Opinion  Relating  to  Partial  Defences  to  Murder,  August  2004  HMSO  London  ,  and  The  Law 
Commission Consultation Paper 177 A New Homicide Act for England and Wales, Appendix A: Report on 
Public Survey of Murder and Mandatory Sentencing in Criminal Homicides, November 2005 HMSO 
42 R. Dworkin Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press Cambridge: MA 1986)  209-214 
43 n.41 above.  
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the validity. An exception, demurer plea, founded on the law of God was 
never  heard  in  a  court  of  justice,  from  the  creation  of  the  world  to  the 
present moment.’
44  
 
Contemporarily,  in  the  above  exert  the  phrase  ‘God’  should  be  transposed  with  ‘public 
opinion’, the decline of religious influence in society is well documented but religious themes 
still resonate in the new morality of an individualised society.
45 Laws and public morals are 
not the same, nor should they be, for to treat the two as interdependent creates the danger of 
existing law becoming the final test of moral behaviour and escaping criticism. If it were so it 
could not be argued that the law treats the battlefield mercy killer unjustly,  especially when 
they are charged with murder. ‘The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is 
another’.
46 Laws are influenced by moral input and murder is an offence, in part, because it is 
widely  held  that  the  general  killing  of  persons  is  not  desirable  both  objectively  and 
subjectively.  It also makes sense to preserve the lives of kith and kin.
47 It is the general 
acceptance of the principle that life is sacred that legitimises the imposition of the rule over 
society,
48 it  has  some  ‘…generally  accepted  ethical  postulates  underlying  [its]…ultimate 
sanction’.
49 
 
Regarding mercy killing these ‘generally accepted ethical postulates’ or social ‘norms’ and 
the legal stance can be said to be unaligned as many widely accepted surveys show that 
public opinion does not support the imposition of murder or manslaughter charges in cases of 
                                                           
44 John Austin The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Library of Ideas 1954) 185 
45 Louis Dumont ‘Religion, Politics and Society in the Individualistic Universe’ in Proceedings of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland (Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and 
Ireland 1970) 31 
46 John Austin The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Library of Ideas 1954) 184 
47 n.38 above at 6 
48 Lon L Fuller ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law’ [1958] 71(4) Harvard Law Review 632 
49 R H Lowie The Origin of the State (Harcourt, Brace and Company New York 1927) 113  
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mercy killing.
50 Norms are a social judgement of what is right and wrong, what is acceptable 
and what is unacceptable in any situation. They are based on a common understanding of 
fairness, efficiency and other justifications which make the practice recognised and valid, and 
have  attained a minimum level of compliance, but that does not mean that individuals 
interpret the understanding of the norm identically.
51 Often, what starts as a collective moral 
ideal,  becomes  an  equitable  principle and  then  becomes a  rule  of  law.
52 Communities 
regularly respond to ‘any infringement upon the law with condemnation, because it is seen 
that the violation is against an accepted norm.’
53 
 
Not all norms are represented by law and the rules which apply to the mercy killer do not 
always identify the community’s shared understanding or normative values.
54 Many norms 
are simply commonly held beliefs of right and wrong and with regards to mercy killing public 
opinion is not against the practice, and as such does not suffer societal condemnat ion. The 
misalignment of the legal and the normative appreciations of the behaviour evidences that for 
an action to be illegal there is no need for it to meet the social expectations of wrongness. 
Specifically regarding the battlefield mercy killer, the no rmative appreciation of his actions 
should also be considered in light of the isolated society in which he operates.
55 The norms 
which exist within the military culture, especially those regarding the camaraderie and duty 
each soldier owes to each other and which are focused on principles of honour and loyalty, 
compound the effect that the wider public opinion has on the perspective of the behaviour. 
There  exists  no  widespread  social  repugnance  towards  the  action   as  evidenced  by  the 
numerous public surveys, but there does exist a polemicized academic debate between the 
                                                           
50 n.41 above. 
51 Neil MacCormick ‘Norms, Institutions and Institutional Facts’ [1998] 17 Law and Philosophy 301 306 
52 Roscoe Pound ‘Jurisprudence and Ethics’ [1945] 23 North Carolina Law Review 183 188 
53 Neil MacCormick ‘Norms, Institutions and Institutional Facts’ [1998] 17 Law and Philosophy 301 303 
54 See Ronald Dworkin Laws Empire (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press) 209-214 for a theory of how 
laws gain legitimacy. 
55 See Chapter 2  
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proponents  for  and  against  legalising  euthanasia,
56 which, are often regarded with more 
validity than the opinion of the average man. 
  
The battlefield mercy killer is punished because such behaviour constitutes an offence which 
on its broad principles is societally supported as prohibiting a wrong. But in the specific 
activity of mercy killing the action the law prohibits, killing another, is not always considered 
wrong but is still illegal.
57 There are many examples of individuals committing actions which 
break the law but not being held liable on account of the fact that the action is not seen as 
unjustifiably wrong. When actions are held criminal despite displaying only a small degree of 
wrongness, this is often because the criminal law primarily focuses upon the actor’s intent 
and the physical end result rather than their motive for acting as shall be considered. 
 
8.3 Considering the morality of the action: motive and intention 
 
‘But is not the just man good?’
58 
 
A main component which informs the way in which a mercy killing is normatively judged, is 
that of compassion. The compassionate motive involved in the killing is often cited as the 
reason why it is morally acceptable.
59 However, the law seemingly ignores motive excluding 
‘a moral element in human conduct in the attribution of fault.’
60  
 
                                                           
56 The most common argument against the legalisation of euthanasia is often based on religious theory, see 
Roland Chia The Right to Die: A Christian Response to Euthanasia (Armour Publishing 2009) 
57n.41 above. 
58 n.1 above at 14 line 335(d) 
59 LIezl van Zyl Death and Compassion: A virtue-based approach to euthanasia (Ashgate 2000) 
60 Alan Norrie Crime, Reason and History {London Butterworths 1993) 171  
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Ignoring motive abstracts the defendant from the context which has given rise to their crimes. 
This removes the battlefield mercy killer from not only the battleground setting, with all the 
emotional connotations that entails, but to also from his experiences as a soldier,
61 as he is 
held to account by the standards of a law developed in response to civilian consi derations.
62 
This false separation decontextualizes the moral issues, no moral sense can be made of the 
action regarding whether it was good, bad, right or wrong.
63 But humans are not nomads; they 
are social creatures and operate between ‘two domains, the social and the personal, and what 
anybody does can only be explained by reference to both’.
64  
 
If the court had to pay attention to the factors that motivate a person to commit a crime, the 
difficult task of considering moral fault would have to be undertaken in every crime, for 
example, when a mother steals food to feed her child.
65 Focusing on intentional agency as 
providing  the  paradigm  of  responsible  agency  is  mor e  convenient,  as  in  doing  so  the 
defendant’s  intention  represents  their  moral  culpability
66 and  justifies  the  imposition  of 
retributivist  punishment.
67  However,  equating  intention  as  wholly  reflective  of  moral 
culpability ignores the normative perception of mercy killing, under which the practice is not 
always condemned. Focusing on intention as the paramount consideration means that the 
compassionate motivation in a battlefield mercy killing is ignored and therefore an act driven 
by a ‘good’ motive is punished because the required intention is comparable to that present in 
actions normally driven by a bad motive and which generally deserve punishment. 
 
                                                           
61 See chapter 2. 
62 See chapter 3. 
63 n.60 above at 4-5 
64 R Hare D Clarke & N DeCarlo Motives and Mechanisms (Methuen London 1985) 21  
65 Anthony Duff Philosophy and Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1998) 171-175 
66 R A Duff Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (Blackwell Oxford 1990) 102 
67 M Moore Placing Blame (Clarendon Oxford 1997) 33-45  
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Good reasons exist to exclude considerations of motive. In principle formal justice should 
deliver certainty and treat people with equality and deliberations on moral matters linked to 
motive would tend to involve highly subjective considerations of right and wrong and thus 
create uncertainty. Concentrating on the cognitive state of intention allows more objective 
standards to be utilised. It is illegal to intentionally kill a person in being regardless of motive. 
This stance causes an injustice to the mercy killer, who is not normatively ‘wrong’ but it does 
provide a general justice by providing certainty, and of course it seems a just outcome to 
those who oppose mercy killings as wrong.
68 Advocates of formal justice might argue that 
even if one aspect of the rule was unjust, in order to maintain justice in conjunction with the 
principle of consistency it might be better to apply unjust laws consistently.
69  
 
However, this does not escape the fact that any moral judgement of a person’s behaviour will 
take into  account their  reasons  for acting. Whilst  the predominant  emphasis on intention 
satisfies the moral requirement to impose punishment when the defendant has acted from 
desire, emotion  or simple inclination,  when the defendant  acts,  like the battlefield mercy 
killer, because they consciously saw their act as good and its consequence a desirable end 
then  punishment  does  not  sit  comfortably  with  the  moral  appreciation  of  the  act.
70 Such 
reasoning is similar to the Kantian principle to, 
 
‘Act  only on that maxim  whereby  you  can at  the same time will that it 
should become a universal law’
71 
 
                                                           
68 n.59 & 56 above. 
69 John Rawls Theory of Justice (revised edition Harvard University Press 1999) 51 
70 EJ Bond Reason and Value (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1983) 16-18 
71 n.27 above at 44.  
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Or more simply, ‘…in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you.’
72 The 
existence of a commonality between the defendant, the victim and the rest of society, tempers 
the view of the behaviour. Both the victim’s condition and the defendant’s dilemma can be 
sympathised with, many people would not only act as the soldier did to end the victim’s 
suffering,  but  if  they  were  the  victim,  would  appreciate  the  administration  of  a  coup  de 
grace.
73 This commonality is evident in the sympathy that is felt towards the mercy killer 
where the ability to put oneself in both the defendant’s and victim’s ‘shoes and feel their pain’ 
is evident
74 
 
8.4 Justice, sympathy, mercy and excusable conduct. 
 
If formal justice demands mercy killings to be punished as murder or manslaughter, it may be 
that an exception in the application of the law should be made in order to give fair treatment 
to the soldier. If justice is dependent on certainty and equal application and intention is the 
maxim by which moral culpability is adduced, perhaps when the moral culpability is unfairly 
reflected  in  the  punishment,  ‘mercy’  should  be  shown  to  the  battlefield  mercy  killer 
themselves. Justice and mercy are different virtues since when justice is delivered and each 
man is given his due, a statement is also delivered according to the wrongness or rightness of 
their actions. Mercy is to make an exception without making this statement, and as such often 
arises from a feeling of commonality with the defendant.
75 Treating someone mercifully is 
not based on judging them against acceptable standards of behaviour but there usually exists a 
                                                           
72 Matthew 7:12 
73 In 2010 80% of participants questioned agreed that it should b allowed to end the terminal suffering of another. 
See, S McAndrew ‘Religious faith and contemporary attitudes’ in Park A, Curtice J, Thomson K, Phillips A, 
Clery E and Buts E (ed.s) British Social Attitudes 2009-2010: The 26
th Report (Sage London 2010) 87-113 
74 C D Baston The Altruism Question (Laurence Erlbaum Associates Publishers New Jersey 1991) 83-84 
75 Emilios A Christodoulidis ‘The Irrationality of Merciful Legal Judgement: Exclusionary Reasoning and the 
Question of the Particular’ [1999] 18 Law and Philosophy 215 221  
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sympathetic feeling towards the defendant, or ‘the heightened awareness of another and the 
urge to alleviate that suffering.’
76 
 
The argument for mercy is to assert that in particular situations the abstract universality of 
formal  justice  should  be  departed  from,  especially  when  the  behaviour  does  not  sit 
comfortably within the reasoning behind the rules.
77 As such, in certain situations a departure 
from the justice that legal certainty provides might be justified,
78 and the existence of 
widespread, genuine sympathy towards the defendant may be such a justification. In doing so 
this may bring certain benefits to judicial reasoning.
79  
 
The sympathy displayed towards mercy killings can be seen often in popular culture, for 
instance the sympathy the reader has towards George when he shots Lenny in Steinbeck’s ‘Of 
mice and men.’
80 Judicial decisions concerning mercy killings have also been seen to display 
sympathy towards the defendant. Ognall J tempered justice with mercy when imposing a 
sentence of twelve months imprisonment suspended for twelve months upon Dr. Cox, and the 
General  Medical  Council  (GMC)  expressed  the  wider  public  sympathy  towards  the 
predicament that faced both physician and patient when they did not remove him from the 
practicing  register.
81 Through  sympathy,  judges  may  better  understand  the  defendant’s 
perspective and appreciate all the legally relevant facts of the case. However, sympathy can 
                                                           
76 Lauren Wispe The Psychology of Sympathy (Plenum Press New York 1991) 158 
77 n.75 above at218 
78 J Murphy ‘Mercy and Legal Judgement’ in J Murphy and J Hampton Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 1988) 124 
79 Lynne  N  Henderson  ‘The  dialogue  of  heart  and  head’  [1988]  10  Cardozo  L  Review  123,  Lynne  N 
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already be seen in the court room, especially in cases of domestic mercy killings, Bean J 
clearly sympathised with the defendant in Gilderdale when he said, 
 
“I do not normally comment on the verdicts of juries but in this case their 
decision  if,  I  may  say  so,  shows  that  common  sense,  decency  and 
humanity which makes Jury trials so important in cases of this kind”
82 
 
Legitimising the acceptance of sympathy in judicial decision making would only encourage 
the subjective perspective taking in which judges are already involved.
83 Regarding justice, 
judging  sympathetically  may  be  regarded  as  a  bad  idea  because  like  other  emotions, 
sympathy is too irrational, subjective and biased to   deliver formal justice.
84 Sympathetic 
decision making by its nature would be more subjective and be inconsistent with processes of 
what is generally regarded as good decision making, and yield unfairly biased decisions.
85 
 
‘Sympathy for suffering and indignation are worthy sentiments, but they are 
not safe visitors in the courtroom, for they blind the eyes of justice. They 
may not enter the jury box, not be heard on the witness stand, nor speak too 
loudly through the voice of counsel. In judicial inquiry the cold clear truth is 
to be sought and dispassionately analysed under the lenses of the law.’
86 
 
                                                           
82 Caroline Gammell, ‘Mother Kay Gilderdale found not guilty of murder attempt on ME sufferer daughter”, 
The Telegraph, (London 25
th January 2010)  per. Bean, J. 
83 Toni  M  Massaro  ‘Empathy,  legal  storytelling,  and  the  rule  of  law:  New  words  old  wounds?’  [1989] 87 
Michigan Law Review 2099 2106 -2110 
84 Martha Nussbaum Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (Beacon Press Boston 1995) 
 53-78 
85 Neal R Feigenson ‘Sympathy and legal judgement’ [1997] 65 Tennessee Law Review 1 6 
86 F W Woolworth Co. v Wilson (1934) 74 2d 439 at 443  
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The  concern  is  what  constitutes  justice  to  the  mercy  killer?  Viewing  their  plight 
sympathetically may be in line with public opinion, but when that means that the decision is 
influenced by a subjective form of mercy, that cannot constitute true formal justice, that which 
is widely held as ‘best’, for the soldier. The reason for this is ‘…plain enough. Justice must be 
rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when right minded people go away thinking, 
‘the judge was biased.’
87 Formal justice requires certainty, and to provide this certainty all the 
agencies involved in the criminal justice system must act within legally defined boundaries, 
whereas  the  administration  of  mercy  seemingly  requires  large  discretion  on  the  part  of  a 
decision maker, which is out of keeping with the modern administrative state.
88 Furthermore, 
mercy must be given freely, if it is asked for it becomes a form of justice because, 
 
‘If one offers some general reason for being given lenient treatment, or one 
points  to  features  of the case that  support such a claim,  an argument  of 
justice  has  been  offered  and  in  asking  for  justice  one  does  not  ask  for 
mercy.’
89 
 
The  battlefield  mercy  killer  offers  exactly  the  sort  of  reasons  which  seek  to  give  some 
justification to his conduct in order to credit it with a certain amount of legitimacy. To make a 
‘merciful’ exception of the soldier delivering a battlefield coup de grace offers neither justice 
to the soldier or his victim. Receiving mercy undermines the moral gravity of the act because 
it is forgiven rather than justified. However, the sympathy shown to the battlefield mercy 
killer’s actions may be shown more legitimately not through the administration of a ‘merciful’ 
pardon, but because such actions are considered excusable.  
                                                           
87 MR Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd. v Lannon [1969] 1 QB 577 per Lord Denning at 599 
88 Rachel E Barkow ‘The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy’ [2008] 121 Harvard 
Law Review 1333 1335 
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In reality, the ‘moral element’ is not consistently excluded and issues of motive continually 
interrupt the law. It is accepted that, 
 
‘…in principle it ought to be recognised that to any criminal charge there 
may be an answer or explanation that would make it morally repugnant to 
convict in the circumstances, even if the elements of the offence are made 
out, and even if there were understandable reasons why prosecution was 
brought in the first place.’
90  
 
In relation to this it must first be acknowledged that the excuse is distinct from the merciful 
pardon. Excusing the act is achieved by shedding favourable light on what the defendant did 
through a focus on why the defendant committed that wrongdoing. This would allow the 
compassionate and sympathetic motive as well as all the distinct cultural influences involved 
to be considered when a soldier delivers a battlefield coup de grace. To excuse an action 
accepts  that  there  are  morally  active  reasons  which  deserve  contemplation  at  play  in  the 
defendant’s conduct.   
 
‘The gist of an excuse…is precisely that the person with the excuse lived up 
to  our  expectations…the  question  is  whether  that  person  lived  up  to 
expectations in a normative sense. Did she manifest as much resilience, or 
loyalty, or thoroughness, or presence of mind as a person in her situation 
should have manifested?’
91 
 
                                                           
90 Jeremy Horder Excusing Crime (Oxford University Publishing Oxford 2004) 7 
91 John Gardner ‘The Gist of Excuses’[1998] 1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 575 
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As such, an excuse is not an outright denial of responsibility. Rather, it is a statement that the 
soldier should be excused because when his behaviour is evaluated against how he ought to 
have behaved, it is seen that in ending the agony and suffering of the terminal victim he does 
not  fall  short  of  an  expected  standard  of  behaviour  that  is  well  below  the  normative 
expectations of what is the right thing to do in such a situation. 
 
However, the standard of behaviour to which the soldier should be held accountable could be 
argued to be the objective standard of the reasonable soldier; if a person is a soldier they 
should behave as a soldier is expected to behave.
92 The soldier is trained to withstand pressure 
and abide by rules and they are bound to certain expectations,  one of which is to protect the 
wounded. Such a stance fails to accept that there are some situations where what is expected 
of the soldier goes beyond what is reasonable, and the circumstances presented to the soldier 
in the battlefield mercy killing scenario is one such instance. To expect the soldier to stand by 
and watch another die a painful death in order to comply with impractical expectations which 
do not take into account the reality of the collective influences that are at play should not 
make the action inexcusable. 
 
After consideration of the law’s failure to reflect the realities of a soldiers experience’s as a 
member of the armed forces and during combat, as well as failing to take into account the 
morality of the act and the public opinion of the behaviour, the final question can be asked, 
what is the best justice that can be delivered to the battlefield mercy killer? 
 
 
 
                                                           
92 ibid. at 557  
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8.5 What to do with the mercy killing soldier? 
 
‘And what about the just man? In what activity or occupation will he best be 
able to help his friends and harm his enemies?’ 
In war; he will fight against his enemies and for his friends.’
93 
 
Perhaps, as the moral appreciation of the action does not marry the legal attitude towards the 
battlefield mercy killing, the best justice  that can be delivered to the soldier acting from 
compassion is to bring no prosecution. This stance is intensified by taking into account the 
previous considerations of the public perception of the action.  One reason not to bring a 
prosecution is that it is not in the public interest.  Such a rule is well established within the 
criminal justice system, as Attorney General Shawcross stated, 
 
‘[i]t has never been a rule in this country – I hope it never will be – that 
suspected  criminal  offences  must  automatically  be  the  subject  of 
prosecution’,  there  should  only  be  a  prosecution  when  ‘…it  appears  the 
offence of the circumstances of its commission…are of such a character that 
a prosecution in respect thereof is required in the public interest.’
94  
 
These decisions are taken by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) and precedent exists displaying that in some types of involvements in end 
of life actions, prosecutions are regarded as not in the public interest.
95 Under the Code for 
Public Prosecutors, decisions on whether to prosecute must be made first at an evidential 
stage, when it is decided if appropriate evidence exists to bring a prosecution, and if so at the 
                                                           
93 Plato The Republic (Translated by Sir Desmond Lee Penguin Classics 2003) 9 line 332(e) 
94 Speech of Attorney-General Sir Hatley Shawcross, House of Commons Debates, Vol 283, 29
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95 Director of Public Prosecutions Policy for Prosecuting Cases of Assisting or Encouraging Suicide 2011  
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public interest stage it is decided whether it is in the public interest to bring the prosecution.
96 
In a limited number of cases, prior to the evidence being collected it will be clear that the 
public interest does not require a prosecution.
97 Prosecutions will always take place unless the 
factors supporting a prosecution are outweighed by tho se not supporting a prosecution 
However it is not simply a matter of adding up the factors on either side,  as one factor may 
outweigh all of its opposites. L ikewise the absence of a factor does not mean it should be 
taken as a factor tending in favour of the opposite direction.
98 
 
Some common public interest factors tending against a prosecution against the  battlefield 
mercy killer are, that if a case is brought the court will likely impose a nominal penalty and 
that the suspect was at the time of the offence suffering from significant mental ill health.
99 
Regarding the soldier, in many cases of domestic mercy killing such as Webb or Gilderdale 
and in Semrau, where suspend sentences or no sentence at all was passed on the suspect, it 
could be very likely that he receives a nominal penalty. Similarly as was discussed previously 
in relation to ill mental health where it was argued that the experiences of combat can have a 
detrimental  effect  on  a  soldier’s  mental  state  leading  to  trauma  and  PTSD,  or  may  just 
manifest itself in the ‘frenzy’ of war which overtakes some combatants.
100 
 
However, there also exist common public interest factors which favour a prosecution, under 
which the soldier’s actions may also fit. First, if the conviction is likely to lead to a significant 
sentence, then a prosecution ought to be brought.
101 In Inglis, the defendant was convicted of 
murder and sentenced to life, although this was later reduced to ten years, and her actions 
                                                           
96 The Code for Crown Prosecutors February 2010 p.7 para.4.1 
97 The Code for Crown Prosecutors February 2010 7 para.4.2 
98 ibid. at.9-10 para.4.12 -4.14 
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100 See the whole discussion in chapter 2. 
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were designed to release her son from what she perceived as his suffering, very much like the 
subjective evaluation the soldier makes of his victim’s condition. Another factor favouring 
prosecution is whether the offence involved the use of a weapon.
102 This speaks for itself, 
however, the soldier carries his weapon legitimately and does not illegally carry a weapon in 
a manner detrimental to the public, and thus the use  of a weapon to enact the killing should 
not be necessarily seen as further criminal behaviour compounding the offence. Also, that the 
soldier committed the offence when the victim was in a vulnerable situation, being wounded, 
and when he, the soldier, was  in a position of authority being bound to protect him, are  
factors which favour prosecution.
103 
 
Despite these factors favouring a prosecution, the act may also have grounds for becoming an 
offence which should only prosecuted with the consent of the DPP or Attorney General. The 
problems entailed in prosecuting battlefield mercy killings fit the reasoning behind the need 
for such special consent. Such c onsent is required in some cases, to ensure consistency in 
prosecution in instances where it is not easy to  define the offence very precisely, to enable 
account to be taken of mitigating factors which are not susceptible to statutory interpretation, 
and to  ensure that any prosecution takes into account important considerations of public 
interest.
104 Currently, there is little consistency in how mercy killings are treated,  depending 
on the circumstances they have been seen as murder, manslaughter and assisted suicide in 
recent years.
105 If consent was required to prosecute a mercy killing it would add a n element 
of consistency in the laws application by taking account of all of the motivations and 
mitigating circumstances prior to trial. Public interest factors could also be considered and 
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105 Inglis, Webb and Gilderdale  
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perhaps then the social attitudes towards the behaviour would not be negated by the obtuse 
legal stance. 
 
In considering whether or not to bring a prosecution, precedent is found in end of life cases in 
the Director of Public Prosecutions Policy for Prosecuting Cases of Assisting or Encouraging 
Suicide.
106 Under these guidelines an important factor in favour of bringing no prosecution is 
whether the act is carried out from compassion to the victim,
107 the same compassion that the 
soldier shows to the victim when he delivers a battlefield coup de grace. This important factor 
is overlooked by the current legal stance, but is fundamental in establishing the moral 
appreciation of the act, but which is vital to justifying the punishment and thus the justice the 
soldier receives. 
 
A particular episode which took place during the Fa lklands war supports the argument that 
perhaps the best justice which can currently be achieved for the battlefield mercy killer is to 
bring no prosecution. After  the battle of Goose Green, the A rgentine hostages were being 
supervised whilst they moved their ammunition to safer storage when an accident led to an 
explosion which immediately engulfed three men and caused another to fall into the flames. 
A British Sergeant, a medic, managed to get close to the burning Prisoner of War, but his 
multiple attempts to save him failed as the fire was too hot. 
 
‘About four to five minutes after the explosion and start of the intense fire, 
the Sergeant, who was in considerable distress because he thought he saw 
the man moving and could not reach him, obtained a self-loading rifle and 
fired  three  or  four  shots,  with  the  intention  of  ending  his  [the  victim’s] 
                                                           
106 Director of Public Prosecutions Policy for Prosecuting Cases of Assisting or Encouraging Suicide  London: 
UK http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.html.  Accessed 25/6/2012 
107 ibid. at 7 para. 45(2)  
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apparently  intense  suffering  because  he  considered  that  he  was  beyond 
further assistance and in agony.’
108 
 
This led to an immediate informal investigation by the British authorities in which Argentine 
officers  accepted  the  medic’s  explanation  and  did  not  pursue  the  matter.
109  A  formal 
investigation soon followed,
110 in which the UK Government, after considering all of the facts 
and after scrutiny by relevant legal authorit ies, concluded that proceedings would not be 
instigated against any individual involved in the  death. The inquiry found that the medic 
believed that the burning   prisoner of war  (POW)  was alive and beyond the point where 
medical assistance could have any benefit , and that he acted out of mercy. In not bringing 
proceedings against him they ‘wish[ed] to spare him further agony and exonerate him for his 
act of mercy.’
111 
 
Deciding not to prosecute in such cases bypasses the other uncertainties which are evident 
when  the  soldier  is  tried  under  civil  domestic  law  in  the  court  martial.  Whilst  the  law 
continues to offer inadequate solutions for dealing with mercy killers in general, the best 
justice which can be offered to the battlefield mercy killer is not to hold them to account under 
a legal system which offers the possibility of ‘justice’ which is too harsh, not specific and 
undeserved. 
 
 
                                                           
108 United Kingdom, British Report in Accordance with Art. 121 of the Third Geneva Convention relative to the 
treatment of prisoners of war of 12
th August 1949, Explosion of Ordinance on 1
st June 1982 in which Four 
Argentine Soldiers Died and Eight Others were Injured While in Custody of British Forces at Goose Green East 
Falkland (1982) 2 
109 ibid. at) 3 
110 In accordance with Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of POWs 1949 Art.121 Every death or 
serious injury of a prisoner of war caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry, another prisoner of war, 
or any other person, shall immediately be followed by an official enquiry by the detaining power. 
111 ibid. 
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8.6 The Creation of a New Offence to Deliver Justice to the Soldier 
This thesis has focused on the inadequacies of the law to justly treat the mercy killing soldier. 
First,  this  can be caused via the mode of trial by which the soldier is  tried; in  the civil 
criminal courts the soldier is judged by persons who may lack the contextual understanding of 
their actions because of the isolated nature of military life. Meanwhile, in the military courts 
the soldier’s trial may be prejudiced by the need to maintain, first, military discipline, and 
second the reputation of the armed forces and the mission upon which they are engaged. 
However, both procedures have certain characteristics which could potentially be desirable 
when trying the soldier who kills from mercy on the battlefield. 
Furthermore, the legal doctrines currently applied to the soldier accused of a battlefield mercy 
killing and under which the courts are bound to try the soldier, deliver only institutional 
justice  to  the  soldier,  which  does  not  correspond  to  the  soldier’s  degree  of  moral 
responsibility.
112 First, the civil criminal law imposes the general offence of murder, which is 
far too wide a concept to appropriately depict the social justice in this situation. In lieu of this, 
in cases where the courts and prosecution perceiv e that the justice delivered under the rules 
will cause a unique injustice, the courts apply bastardised doctrines such as diminished 
responsibility or misapply other offences such as assisted suicide, in order to dilute the 
consequences of a murder convic tion. As a result, the mercy killer who has acted from 
compassion will be wrongly stigmatized via conviction which incorrectly indicates the nature 
of his act. For instance, if convicted with murder, such a label incorrectly signifies attributes 
of violence and aggression and not the battlefield mercy killer’s primary motive, which was 
compassion. 
                                                           
112 See Chapter 3, 3.1 & 3.4  
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Additionally,  legal  doctrines  developed  in  the  context  of  civilian  peacetime,  are  at  best 
unhelpful and at their worst run the risk of trivializing the actions of a soldier who kills from 
compassion during war. When acts during war are labelled similarly to actions during peace 
there is a risk of interpreting such acts comparably to instances when the same conviction is 
passed during peacetime on a civilian.
113 In turn this labelling ignores and fails to convey the 
wider circumstances of battle and war which influence the soldier when they commit the act. 
In an attempt to outline a possible means by which a better justice can be achieved in such 
circumstances, the more suitable aspects of both of the previously mentioned means of trial 
and legal doctrines shall be adopted and added to. Of the two systems discussed, the Court 
Martial offers the most suitable means to hear cases of battlefield mercy killings by soldiers.  
Court  Martial  trial  offers  several  distinguishing  features  for  the  soldier.  First,  most 
importantly, military personnel populate the Board, the equivalent to the Jury in civil criminal 
procedures. This provides the soldier with the opportunity to be tried  by a jury of his peers, 
unlike the civil criminal courts where the jury represents the civilian population of the local 
area.
114 
This allows the soldier to be tried by those who may have a better insight and comprehension 
concerning the circumstances of such a killing. They are better able to consider the soldier’s 
actions in context and can perceive many more of the factors which brought him to that 
eventuality  than  the  lay  person.  These  factors  include  the  militaristic  culture  which  has 
informed the soldier’s actions, the stress of combat and the duality of the soldiers role in both 
being required to protect or to kill the same person dependent upon circumstances which can 
change in an instant, but nonetheless influence the soldier’s decision making abilities.   
                                                           
113 See Chapter 3, 3.2, 3.4 & 3.5 
114 See Chapter 7, 7.8.  
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‘…in criminal cases it is not only the right and duty of juries to judge what 
are the facts, what is the law and what was the moral intent of the accused; 
but that is also their right, and their primary and paramount duty, to judge of 
the injustice of law,...’
115 
This system allows a better evaluation and consideration of the soldier’s moral responsibility, 
which as discussed throughout,
116  can only be properly gauged by first referencing all of the 
factors which are in play upon the individual, includin g his past relevant experiences and 
then, afterwards, considering his intention to kill the mortally wounded person, rather than 
focusing on his immediate intention alone.   This results in a narrow interpretation of the act, 
consequently generalising the condemnation of an actor’s criminal actions as simply right or 
wrong. The argument against widening the mental element of the crime focuses on the fact 
that that the common law does not take into account motive, but this is now a perverse fiction. 
The Director of Public Prosecutors Guidelines on Assisted Suicide clearly state the existence 
of compassion on the accused’s behalf as a factor in deciding whether or not to instigate 
prosecution,
117 whilst the court, especially in unique situations, have accepted t hat, ‘motive 
generally  throws  light  on  intention…’.
118 Applying  such  narrow  methods  to  morally  and 
legally complex and unique cases, such as the battlefield mercy killing, produce judgments 
which are out of sync with concepts of social justice, or poorly fashioned adjustments of 
existing law to allow for the anomaly. 
Clearly, negative attributes can also be attached to the system of Court Martial.
119 But to an 
extent these are features of any system whereby one person or section of society is asked to 
judge another; the effect of prejudice and bias upon decision making is universal to all 
                                                           
115 Spooner L An Essay on Trial by Jury (Library of Alexandria 2000) 
116 See Chapter 8, 8.3 
117  See Chapter 8, 8.4 
118 R v Court [1988] 2 All ER 221 per Lord Grifftihs at 224 
119 See Chapter 7, 7.8  
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people, whether they are members of the military or not. Of course, these prejudices could be 
accentuated in such an ordered social structure such as the military, but they could equally be 
offset  by  the  importance  of  understanding  the  shared  nature  of  soldier’s  collective 
experiences  of  training,  fighting  and  living  within  the  Armed  Forces  when  assessing  the 
moral nature of the soldier’s actions. For these reasons, whilst not perfect, it remains the best 
means by which to evaluate how far the soldier should be held responsible. 
However,  before  the  case  proceeds  to  trial,  a  decision  must  be  made  to  prosecute  the 
defendant. As discussed previously,
120 a battlefield mercy killing as outlined in this thesis 
fulfils many of the public interest grounds favouring no prosecution of the soldier; yet it also 
fulfils many of the grounds for prosecuting the soldier. It has been forwarded that because of 
their complexity and unique nature, such actions should be considered as offences which 
should only be prosecuted with the special consent of the DPP or Attorney General. The 
background and precedent for such considerations have been the focus of prior discussion  in 
this chapter,
121  but such considerations should necessarily be readdressed here, as they would 
form a common sense basis for any future prosecutions. Questions specifically relevant to 
whether or not any prosecution should commence may consider whether a ny complaint has 
been raised about the battlefield killing; who raised that complaint; the proximity to recent 
combat in which the killing took place; the nature of that combat; the rank of the killer; if 
they were of commanding rank what was the nature of  their responsibility to the men under 
their  command?.  Evidence  about  the  nature  of  the  victims  condition  should  also  be 
considered, particularly whether they were showing signs of a particularly high level of 
suffering due to their mortal wounds. Simple questions such as these could help to determine 
whether the action was one of compassion and necessity rather than of callousness which was 
caused by a break down in order and respect for military law. 
                                                           
120 See Chapter 8, 8.5 
121 ibid.  
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Notwithstanding that there is a decision to prosecute, and that the trial should take place 
under Court Marital, it should then be considered which legal doctrine best would apply to 
the  mercy  killing  soldier.  The  greatest  confusion  caused  by  the  legal  approach  to  mercy 
killings has been the patchwork of doctrines that have been applied to the action during times 
of peace.
122 Convictions range from murder to manslaughter via diminished responsibility 
and sometimes even assisted suicide. None fit the battlefield mercy killing adequately, either 
reflecting to much moral condemnation, attributing the wrong mental condition to the soldier 
or simply because the act does not meet all components of the offence respectively.  No 
current offence developed in response to peacetime actions is appropriate to judge an act of 
battlefield mercy killing. This could be remedied by either the development of a distinct 
defence for the act of mercy killing or the creation and adoption of a new law to govern 
battlefield mercy killings. 
Dealing with the concept of a defence first, it sh ould be noted that the primary concern of a 
criminal defence is to stop an injustice which would result under the institutional rules if 
some other factor was not properly taken into account.  Such defences are either a total 
defence, such as self-defence, or have a mitigating effect on the possible conviction, such as 
loss of control. The validity of a defence is normally the subject of consideration at trial. In 
the case of the battlefield mercy killing, this introduces an important safeguard, as the 
soldier’s version of events and their credibility is examined in court, reducing the possibility 
that the defence would be successfully invoked by people not deserving of it. 
The traditional objection to any defence of ‘mercy’ killing has long been that,  
                                                           
122 See Chapter 4  
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‘It will be extremely difficult to distinguish killings where the motive was 
merciful from those were it was not.’
123 
However, basing the defence on the natural and admirable human emotion of compassion,
124  
would not be a unique development for a defence in crimi nal law.  If the mercy killing is a 
reasonable expression of this compassion then it can be comparable to other defences such as 
duress and self-defence. For instance, fear is an equally natural emotion and when the 
accused’s actions are a reasonable expression of it, either in committing a crime from fear of 
violence  against  them  or  others  if  they  resist,  or  committing  an  assault  to  fend  off  that 
violence the court allow the defence of duress or self-defence.
125  
A defence of mercy killing could be defined as follows; 
‘Where a defendant is found to have killed the victim out of compassion 
excited by the circumstances they found themselves, and where their actions 
were a reasonable expression of that emotion.’
126 
Such  a  defence  would  go  some  way  to  safeguarding  against  incorrect  labelling  and 
subsequent stigmatising of the defendant.  Whether or not it should offer a total defence is a 
more interesting concept. Whether there is no blame in the defendant’s conduct or some 
blame in their conduct are matters which could affect the applicability of the defence. It may 
be the case that the circumstances of the battlefield mercy killing give rise reason to punish 
the defendant to some degree, yet their actions do not portray anywhere near the level of 
moral responsibility attributable under a murder conviction.
127 For instance, it may be shown 
                                                           
123 Report of the Royal Commission On Capital Punishment (1953) CMND 8932 para 179. 
124 Jeremy Horder ‘Mercy Killings: Some Reflections on Beecham’s Case’ [1988] 52 Journal of Criminal Law 
309 311 
125 For the courts acceptance of duress see R v Steane [1947] KB 997. For considerations of self-defence see 
Chapter  4.3 
126 Based loosely on J. Horder’s formulation of the defence to assisted suicide, found in Jeremy Horder ‘Mercy 
Killings: Some Reflections on Beecham’s Case’ [1988] 52 Journal of Criminal Law 309 311 
127 KJM Smith ‘Assisting Suicide’ [1983] Criminal Law Review 579  
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they acted against orders, or that their motive was also influenced by other less praiseworthy 
considerations.  If the defence were complete in its application then many soldiers whose 
actions do not warrant a murder conviction would not be able to utilise it successfully. 
A more preferable method to minimise injustice, would be to create a new offence. The 
creation of a new offence would signify a break from the previous confusion caused by using 
the traditional legal approach, compared to the creation of a special defence which is aimed at 
bandaging some of its ill effects. 
 
A new offence would also have the benefit of clearly signifying the soldier’s actions, which 
in turn would allow the correct amount of social condemnation to be attached to them. As 
English law sees no difference between euthanasia and other types of killing,
128 the creation 
of a new category of homicide would be required. The offence of Combatant Induced Non  – 
Combat Homicide is forwarded as such an example.  
Whosoever kills a seriously wounded enemy soldier who is hors du combat, 
from compassion with the reasonable belief that such an action is easing their 
suffering; shall be guilty of the offence of Combatant Induced Non- Combat 
Homicide. 
The meaning of ‘Combat Induced’ can be explained based on the previous discussion which 
forwarded that combatants take risks with their lives when engaging in battle, knowing that 
serious injury or death is a distinct consequence.
129 The phrase ‘Combat Induced’ reflects this 
acceptance on the soldier’s behalf, and is intended to convey that the killing came about in 
response to their injuries which they were aware they could suffer. 
                                                           
128 A Grubb ‘Euthanasia in England – A Law Lacking Compassion’ [2001] 8 European Journal of Health 89, 90 
129 See Chapter 5, 5.5 & 5.6  
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It is designed uniquely for combat, not civilian, scenarios. By removing such an offence from 
the civilian arena; clearly relating it to combat and between combatants the name denotes 
exactly what action the soldier has committed; he has killed an enemy soldier, outside of 
combat in part due to that soldier’s actions. Unlike murder, which insinuates too much moral 
condemnation  or  manslaughter  via  diminished  responsibility  which  presupposes  mental 
deterioration,  this  label  is  clear  and  factual  and  offers  a  far  better  representation  of  the 
soldier’s actions. Further clarification may be needed over certain aspects of such an offence, 
for instance, for an appropriate definition of the meaning of ‘seriously wounded’, but it is 
envisioned that the offence would only cover those who kill combatants from a reasonable 
and genuine belief that the victim was mortally wounded. 
By  making  sentencing  discretionary,  the  soldier’s  punishment  will  depend  on  the 
circumstances or absence of circumstances surrounding the killing. Full consideration of the 
facts should be given by the Board, and Judge Advocate and the entirety of the circumstances, 
both mitigating and aggravating, should help to influence to what extent the soldier and his 
actions should be commendable and to what extent they should be condemnable, even to a 
custodial  sentence  spanning  years.  However,  it  is  not  posited  that  the  maximum  penalty 
should be life imprisonment. In cases where the actions of the soldier likely warrant such a 
sentence, it is difficult to assume that the action was truly or primarily a mercy killing and in 
such instances where the punishment is to be so great it is likely that the intentions and 
motive of the killer best fit a charge of murder. If such actions were charged and convicted 
using the new offence, and a term of life imprisonment was passed, then the offences ability 
to express a far lower level of responsibility and wrong doing would be nullified.  
A conviction for Combatant Induced Non- Combat Homicide is still a criminal conviction, 
and as such it still possesses the criminal stigma. But if such an offence is charged correctly 
then it will only apply to those who act appropriately, and who are influenced by compassion  
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and sympathy. The stigma attached to it is not as heavy as being charged with a war crime or 
serious assault and the discretionary powers of sentence allow an appropriate punishment to 
be passed. Nonetheless, some stigma is necessary for the pragmatic reason that killing non-
combatants  during  war  is  a  difficult  business  to  assess.  Some  such  killings  are  clearly 
reprehensible,
130 others are not so clear cut;
131 the only way to ensure that unacceptable 
killings are not justified on dubious grounds is to apply a blanket ban on all such killings. 
However, to then punish all killings, regardless of circumstance and motive, u sing the same 
offence is where an otherwise understandably pragmatic approach becomes less practical and 
more arbitrary.  
Nor is it ideal that, that a conviction of Combatant Induced Non -Combat Homicide in the 
Court Martial, is likely to be accompanied by some type of military charge for it is likely that, 
in committing the act, the soldier responsible would have breached his orders in some way. 
However, military discipline must be preserved, not only to maintain an effective fighting 
force, but also to ensure that men do not overstep the moral boundaries which are quickly 
blurred during combat, and where a soldier killing from mercy and a soldier killing from a 
less praiseworthy motive are difficult to differentiate.  It is assumed that the level of penalty  
delivered in response to a conviction of Combatant Induced Non-Combat Homicide would be 
reflected in the severity of the military charges against the soldier. 
The creation of a new offence is not a perfect solution but it does offer a fairer, more just and 
more consistent means by which to judge the soldier. When an infinite amount of possibilities 
and circumstances exist surrounding how any action may take place, it is absurd to expect a 
single offence, such as murder, to adequately and ideally reflect th ese circumstances and the 
moral revulsion attached to them. By giving wider scope to how the soldier involved in a 
                                                           
130 See Chapter 3, 3.3 
131United States v Cardenas 29 (Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division Jan 14th 2004) & United States v  Maynulet 
No. 04-9847,242-243 (Headquarters 1st Armoured Division Apr. 1 2004)   
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battlefield mercy killing can be  charged, and dealing  with  that soldier exclusively in  the 
military courts, his actions will be understood in context and can be labelled reflecting the 
actions  which  actually  took  place  rather  than  casting  a  dark  shadow  over  the  soldier’s 
character in the form of a murder conviction. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
Unfortunately,  despite  the  public  acceptance  of  mercy  killing,  the  current  legislature 
continues  to,  ‘take  no  steps  to  translate  the  new  morality  into  the  concepts  of  law.’
132 
Domestically, this  has  led to  uncertainty  as  to  how people involved with  mercy killings, 
originating from both voluntary or involuntary requests, shall be treated, and as such the 
‘current legal status of assisted dying is inadequate and incoherent…’
133 When the domestic 
law is applied to the battlefield mercy killer, the uncertainty and incoherence of the domestic 
approach has the opportunity to serve a great injustice upon the soldier who operates in an 
culture isolated from common law developments. 
 
Conflict and military training are such extreme experiences that the effects of both require 
judicial consideration. Trying the soldier under the common law is not effective, as neither 
the law nor the jury are equipped to judge the battlefield mercy killer. There are, however, 
some broad considerations taken into account with domestic mercy killers which should also 
be considered when the soldier stands trial. For instance, the mental state of the defendant, 
which can be affected by both the trauma of conflict and the military culture the soldier 
operates within, and which dehumanises the enemy, is a relevant factor. Also comparable is 
the  nature  of  the  relationship  with  the  victim,  which  is  influenced  by  bonds  of  shared 
                                                           
132 G Williams ‘Mercy Killing Legislation – A Rejoinder’ [1958] 43(1) Minnesota Law Review 1 2 
133 The Commission on Assisted Dying Final Report (Demos London 2011) 152   
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experience which soldiers have known since time immemorial. The battlefield mercy killing 
should be considered as a whole, and should include a focus on the circumstances of the death, 
the  prior  influences  upon  the  soldier,  including  their  perspective  on  the  taboo  of  killing 
another human, and the frenzy of battle which can influence the soldier’s decision making. 
Justice in this circumstance is very much dependant on treating each case individually and 
looking further than the intention of the defendant as means to correctly judge his actions. 
Current criminal law is confusing in its application and attaches inappropriate stigma to the 
battlefield mercy killer when the charge is murder. The moral perception of murder differs 
greatly from that which is attached to mercy killing, and in passing a mandatory life sentence 
a great injustice is caused. This is due to the focus on intention and downplaying motive, 
coupled with the false preoccupation with the sanctity of life principle. However, comparing 
how far actions consented to or not consented to can be legitimated in medical practice is 
helpful to gain a greater appreciation of the kinds of actions which result in death but through 
legal  sophistry  prove that  the sanctity of life principle is  not  absolute, as  public opinion 
towards euthanasia already shows. Unfortunately, the soldier’s actions are not compatible 
with the behaviour of medical practitioners who act in the patient’s best interests or under the 
doctrine of double effect,  when they withdraw, withhold or provide pain  relief treatment 
which consequently causes death. 
 
Trying the soldier under a court martial bypasses the problem of cultural misunderstandings 
between the mercy killer and the jury, but potentially poses risks to the justice that the soldier 
receives because of the threat of inherent bias and the prioritising of military discipline over 
the criminal law. However, as true justice can only be delivered through an understanding of 
all of the circumstances in which the event took place, the court martial, deliberated upon by  
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a  Board  of  officers,  offers  the  soldier  a  chance  to  be  tried  by  fellow  military  men  who 
understand the culture in which he operates.  
 
Overall, the main concern is that the potential punishment, especially following a murder 
charge, exaggerates the moral culpability that should be attributed to the battlefield mercy 
killer. Any punishment of the soldier can only be justified on the grounds that he deserved 
such a punishment, but such a view is not aligned with modern society’s norms. It is not to 
say that current law is bad law, it serves its purpose perfectly adequately, but rather the use of 
the current criminal law serves an injustice to the battlefield mercy killer. The principles 
which inform the law simply do not serve to effectively deal with this type of action, which 
originates  from  motives,  such  as  compassion,  which  clash  with  the  traditional  motives 
justifying the prohibition.  
 
Because of the conflicting, incoherent laws and principles combined with the wholly different 
experiences  of  the  soldier  applying  any  current  common  law  will  potentially  create  an 
injustice where someone is punished for committing a morally commendable, or at least an 
excusable act. Unless a specific law is enacted which deals with mercy killings of this nature, 
it will be hard to marry the actions, motives, intentions and circumstances of the soldier and 
the situation with current legal thinking. Furthermore, there is strong argument to suggest that 
it is not in the public interest to bring a prosecution for murder or manslaughter against the 
soldier who has delivered a coup de grace. The UK government has in circumstances of a 
similar  nature  exonerated  such  behaviour,
134 and because of the legal mire in which the 
soldier may be forced to wallow, it is argued that in cases of legitimate battlefield mercy 
cases this should be the correct and best way to give justice to the soldier. 
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Of course, there is potential for abuses to occur, it is not hard to envision a situation in which 
soldiers claim that they killed a protected person from compassion to mask some atrocity or 
brutality they have enacted upon a protected person. However, treating each case individually 
will minimise the possibility of such abuse whilst delivering a more appropriate justice to 
those who are forced to make a hard choice between their duty to impractical legal restraints 
and their duty to both their fellow soldier and their moral convictions influenced by long 
tradition. 
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